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android_kernel_motorola_sm6225/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h

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Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
/* This file is automatically generated. Do not edit. */
#define COMMON_FILE__IOCTL 0x00000001UL
#define COMMON_FILE__READ 0x00000002UL
#define COMMON_FILE__WRITE 0x00000004UL
#define COMMON_FILE__CREATE 0x00000008UL
#define COMMON_FILE__GETATTR 0x00000010UL
#define COMMON_FILE__SETATTR 0x00000020UL
#define COMMON_FILE__LOCK 0x00000040UL
#define COMMON_FILE__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL
#define COMMON_FILE__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL
#define COMMON_FILE__APPEND 0x00000200UL
#define COMMON_FILE__UNLINK 0x00000400UL
#define COMMON_FILE__LINK 0x00000800UL
#define COMMON_FILE__RENAME 0x00001000UL
#define COMMON_FILE__EXECUTE 0x00002000UL
#define COMMON_FILE__SWAPON 0x00004000UL
#define COMMON_FILE__QUOTAON 0x00008000UL
#define COMMON_FILE__MOUNTON 0x00010000UL
#define COMMON_SOCKET__IOCTL 0x00000001UL
#define COMMON_SOCKET__READ 0x00000002UL
#define COMMON_SOCKET__WRITE 0x00000004UL
#define COMMON_SOCKET__CREATE 0x00000008UL
#define COMMON_SOCKET__GETATTR 0x00000010UL
#define COMMON_SOCKET__SETATTR 0x00000020UL
#define COMMON_SOCKET__LOCK 0x00000040UL
#define COMMON_SOCKET__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL
#define COMMON_SOCKET__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL
#define COMMON_SOCKET__APPEND 0x00000200UL
#define COMMON_SOCKET__BIND 0x00000400UL
#define COMMON_SOCKET__CONNECT 0x00000800UL
#define COMMON_SOCKET__LISTEN 0x00001000UL
#define COMMON_SOCKET__ACCEPT 0x00002000UL
#define COMMON_SOCKET__GETOPT 0x00004000UL
#define COMMON_SOCKET__SETOPT 0x00008000UL
#define COMMON_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN 0x00010000UL
#define COMMON_SOCKET__RECVFROM 0x00020000UL
#define COMMON_SOCKET__SENDTO 0x00040000UL
#define COMMON_SOCKET__RECV_MSG 0x00080000UL
#define COMMON_SOCKET__SEND_MSG 0x00100000UL
#define COMMON_SOCKET__NAME_BIND 0x00200000UL
#define COMMON_IPC__CREATE 0x00000001UL
#define COMMON_IPC__DESTROY 0x00000002UL
#define COMMON_IPC__GETATTR 0x00000004UL
#define COMMON_IPC__SETATTR 0x00000008UL
#define COMMON_IPC__READ 0x00000010UL
#define COMMON_IPC__WRITE 0x00000020UL
#define COMMON_IPC__ASSOCIATE 0x00000040UL
#define COMMON_IPC__UNIX_READ 0x00000080UL
#define COMMON_IPC__UNIX_WRITE 0x00000100UL
#define FILESYSTEM__MOUNT 0x00000001UL
#define FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT 0x00000002UL
#define FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT 0x00000004UL
#define FILESYSTEM__GETATTR 0x00000008UL
#define FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM 0x00000010UL
#define FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO 0x00000020UL
#define FILESYSTEM__TRANSITION 0x00000040UL
#define FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE 0x00000080UL
#define FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD 0x00000100UL
#define FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET 0x00000200UL
#define DIR__IOCTL 0x00000001UL
#define DIR__READ 0x00000002UL
#define DIR__WRITE 0x00000004UL
#define DIR__CREATE 0x00000008UL
#define DIR__GETATTR 0x00000010UL
#define DIR__SETATTR 0x00000020UL
#define DIR__LOCK 0x00000040UL
#define DIR__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL
#define DIR__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL
#define DIR__APPEND 0x00000200UL
#define DIR__UNLINK 0x00000400UL
#define DIR__LINK 0x00000800UL
#define DIR__RENAME 0x00001000UL
#define DIR__EXECUTE 0x00002000UL
#define DIR__SWAPON 0x00004000UL
#define DIR__QUOTAON 0x00008000UL
#define DIR__MOUNTON 0x00010000UL
#define DIR__ADD_NAME 0x00020000UL
#define DIR__REMOVE_NAME 0x00040000UL
#define DIR__REPARENT 0x00080000UL
#define DIR__SEARCH 0x00100000UL
#define DIR__RMDIR 0x00200000UL
#define FILE__IOCTL 0x00000001UL
#define FILE__READ 0x00000002UL
#define FILE__WRITE 0x00000004UL
#define FILE__CREATE 0x00000008UL
#define FILE__GETATTR 0x00000010UL
#define FILE__SETATTR 0x00000020UL
#define FILE__LOCK 0x00000040UL
#define FILE__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL
#define FILE__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL
#define FILE__APPEND 0x00000200UL
#define FILE__UNLINK 0x00000400UL
#define FILE__LINK 0x00000800UL
#define FILE__RENAME 0x00001000UL
#define FILE__EXECUTE 0x00002000UL
#define FILE__SWAPON 0x00004000UL
#define FILE__QUOTAON 0x00008000UL
#define FILE__MOUNTON 0x00010000UL
#define FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS 0x00020000UL
#define FILE__ENTRYPOINT 0x00040000UL
#define FILE__EXECMOD 0x00080000UL
#define LNK_FILE__IOCTL 0x00000001UL
#define LNK_FILE__READ 0x00000002UL
#define LNK_FILE__WRITE 0x00000004UL
#define LNK_FILE__CREATE 0x00000008UL
#define LNK_FILE__GETATTR 0x00000010UL
#define LNK_FILE__SETATTR 0x00000020UL
#define LNK_FILE__LOCK 0x00000040UL
#define LNK_FILE__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL
#define LNK_FILE__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL
#define LNK_FILE__APPEND 0x00000200UL
#define LNK_FILE__UNLINK 0x00000400UL
#define LNK_FILE__LINK 0x00000800UL
#define LNK_FILE__RENAME 0x00001000UL
#define LNK_FILE__EXECUTE 0x00002000UL
#define LNK_FILE__SWAPON 0x00004000UL
#define LNK_FILE__QUOTAON 0x00008000UL
#define LNK_FILE__MOUNTON 0x00010000UL
#define CHR_FILE__IOCTL 0x00000001UL
#define CHR_FILE__READ 0x00000002UL
#define CHR_FILE__WRITE 0x00000004UL
#define CHR_FILE__CREATE 0x00000008UL
#define CHR_FILE__GETATTR 0x00000010UL
#define CHR_FILE__SETATTR 0x00000020UL
#define CHR_FILE__LOCK 0x00000040UL
#define CHR_FILE__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL
#define CHR_FILE__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL
#define CHR_FILE__APPEND 0x00000200UL
#define CHR_FILE__UNLINK 0x00000400UL
#define CHR_FILE__LINK 0x00000800UL
#define CHR_FILE__RENAME 0x00001000UL
#define CHR_FILE__EXECUTE 0x00002000UL
#define CHR_FILE__SWAPON 0x00004000UL
#define CHR_FILE__QUOTAON 0x00008000UL
#define CHR_FILE__MOUNTON 0x00010000UL
#define CHR_FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS 0x00020000UL
#define CHR_FILE__ENTRYPOINT 0x00040000UL
#define CHR_FILE__EXECMOD 0x00080000UL
#define BLK_FILE__IOCTL 0x00000001UL
#define BLK_FILE__READ 0x00000002UL
#define BLK_FILE__WRITE 0x00000004UL
#define BLK_FILE__CREATE 0x00000008UL
#define BLK_FILE__GETATTR 0x00000010UL
#define BLK_FILE__SETATTR 0x00000020UL
#define BLK_FILE__LOCK 0x00000040UL
#define BLK_FILE__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL
#define BLK_FILE__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL
#define BLK_FILE__APPEND 0x00000200UL
#define BLK_FILE__UNLINK 0x00000400UL
#define BLK_FILE__LINK 0x00000800UL
#define BLK_FILE__RENAME 0x00001000UL
#define BLK_FILE__EXECUTE 0x00002000UL
#define BLK_FILE__SWAPON 0x00004000UL
#define BLK_FILE__QUOTAON 0x00008000UL
#define BLK_FILE__MOUNTON 0x00010000UL
#define SOCK_FILE__IOCTL 0x00000001UL
#define SOCK_FILE__READ 0x00000002UL
#define SOCK_FILE__WRITE 0x00000004UL
#define SOCK_FILE__CREATE 0x00000008UL
#define SOCK_FILE__GETATTR 0x00000010UL
#define SOCK_FILE__SETATTR 0x00000020UL
#define SOCK_FILE__LOCK 0x00000040UL
#define SOCK_FILE__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL
#define SOCK_FILE__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL
#define SOCK_FILE__APPEND 0x00000200UL
#define SOCK_FILE__UNLINK 0x00000400UL
#define SOCK_FILE__LINK 0x00000800UL
#define SOCK_FILE__RENAME 0x00001000UL
#define SOCK_FILE__EXECUTE 0x00002000UL
#define SOCK_FILE__SWAPON 0x00004000UL
#define SOCK_FILE__QUOTAON 0x00008000UL
#define SOCK_FILE__MOUNTON 0x00010000UL
#define FIFO_FILE__IOCTL 0x00000001UL
#define FIFO_FILE__READ 0x00000002UL
#define FIFO_FILE__WRITE 0x00000004UL
#define FIFO_FILE__CREATE 0x00000008UL
#define FIFO_FILE__GETATTR 0x00000010UL
#define FIFO_FILE__SETATTR 0x00000020UL
#define FIFO_FILE__LOCK 0x00000040UL
#define FIFO_FILE__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL
#define FIFO_FILE__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL
#define FIFO_FILE__APPEND 0x00000200UL
#define FIFO_FILE__UNLINK 0x00000400UL
#define FIFO_FILE__LINK 0x00000800UL
#define FIFO_FILE__RENAME 0x00001000UL
#define FIFO_FILE__EXECUTE 0x00002000UL
#define FIFO_FILE__SWAPON 0x00004000UL
#define FIFO_FILE__QUOTAON 0x00008000UL
#define FIFO_FILE__MOUNTON 0x00010000UL
#define FD__USE 0x00000001UL
#define SOCKET__IOCTL 0x00000001UL
#define SOCKET__READ 0x00000002UL
#define SOCKET__WRITE 0x00000004UL
#define SOCKET__CREATE 0x00000008UL
#define SOCKET__GETATTR 0x00000010UL
#define SOCKET__SETATTR 0x00000020UL
#define SOCKET__LOCK 0x00000040UL
#define SOCKET__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL
#define SOCKET__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL
#define SOCKET__APPEND 0x00000200UL
#define SOCKET__BIND 0x00000400UL
#define SOCKET__CONNECT 0x00000800UL
#define SOCKET__LISTEN 0x00001000UL
#define SOCKET__ACCEPT 0x00002000UL
#define SOCKET__GETOPT 0x00004000UL
#define SOCKET__SETOPT 0x00008000UL
#define SOCKET__SHUTDOWN 0x00010000UL
#define SOCKET__RECVFROM 0x00020000UL
#define SOCKET__SENDTO 0x00040000UL
#define SOCKET__RECV_MSG 0x00080000UL
#define SOCKET__SEND_MSG 0x00100000UL
#define SOCKET__NAME_BIND 0x00200000UL
#define TCP_SOCKET__IOCTL 0x00000001UL
#define TCP_SOCKET__READ 0x00000002UL
#define TCP_SOCKET__WRITE 0x00000004UL
#define TCP_SOCKET__CREATE 0x00000008UL
#define TCP_SOCKET__GETATTR 0x00000010UL
#define TCP_SOCKET__SETATTR 0x00000020UL
#define TCP_SOCKET__LOCK 0x00000040UL
#define TCP_SOCKET__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL
#define TCP_SOCKET__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL
#define TCP_SOCKET__APPEND 0x00000200UL
#define TCP_SOCKET__BIND 0x00000400UL
#define TCP_SOCKET__CONNECT 0x00000800UL
#define TCP_SOCKET__LISTEN 0x00001000UL
#define TCP_SOCKET__ACCEPT 0x00002000UL
#define TCP_SOCKET__GETOPT 0x00004000UL
#define TCP_SOCKET__SETOPT 0x00008000UL
#define TCP_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN 0x00010000UL
#define TCP_SOCKET__RECVFROM 0x00020000UL
#define TCP_SOCKET__SENDTO 0x00040000UL
#define TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG 0x00080000UL
#define TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG 0x00100000UL
#define TCP_SOCKET__NAME_BIND 0x00200000UL
#define TCP_SOCKET__CONNECTTO 0x00400000UL
#define TCP_SOCKET__NEWCONN 0x00800000UL
#define TCP_SOCKET__ACCEPTFROM 0x01000000UL
#define TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND 0x02000000UL
#define TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT 0x04000000UL
#define UDP_SOCKET__IOCTL 0x00000001UL
#define UDP_SOCKET__READ 0x00000002UL
#define UDP_SOCKET__WRITE 0x00000004UL
#define UDP_SOCKET__CREATE 0x00000008UL
#define UDP_SOCKET__GETATTR 0x00000010UL
#define UDP_SOCKET__SETATTR 0x00000020UL
#define UDP_SOCKET__LOCK 0x00000040UL
#define UDP_SOCKET__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL
#define UDP_SOCKET__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL
#define UDP_SOCKET__APPEND 0x00000200UL
#define UDP_SOCKET__BIND 0x00000400UL
#define UDP_SOCKET__CONNECT 0x00000800UL
#define UDP_SOCKET__LISTEN 0x00001000UL
#define UDP_SOCKET__ACCEPT 0x00002000UL
#define UDP_SOCKET__GETOPT 0x00004000UL
#define UDP_SOCKET__SETOPT 0x00008000UL
#define UDP_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN 0x00010000UL
#define UDP_SOCKET__RECVFROM 0x00020000UL
#define UDP_SOCKET__SENDTO 0x00040000UL
#define UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG 0x00080000UL
#define UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG 0x00100000UL
#define UDP_SOCKET__NAME_BIND 0x00200000UL
#define UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND 0x00400000UL
#define RAWIP_SOCKET__IOCTL 0x00000001UL
#define RAWIP_SOCKET__READ 0x00000002UL
#define RAWIP_SOCKET__WRITE 0x00000004UL
#define RAWIP_SOCKET__CREATE 0x00000008UL
#define RAWIP_SOCKET__GETATTR 0x00000010UL
#define RAWIP_SOCKET__SETATTR 0x00000020UL
#define RAWIP_SOCKET__LOCK 0x00000040UL
#define RAWIP_SOCKET__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL
#define RAWIP_SOCKET__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL
#define RAWIP_SOCKET__APPEND 0x00000200UL
#define RAWIP_SOCKET__BIND 0x00000400UL
#define RAWIP_SOCKET__CONNECT 0x00000800UL
#define RAWIP_SOCKET__LISTEN 0x00001000UL
#define RAWIP_SOCKET__ACCEPT 0x00002000UL
#define RAWIP_SOCKET__GETOPT 0x00004000UL
#define RAWIP_SOCKET__SETOPT 0x00008000UL
#define RAWIP_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN 0x00010000UL
#define RAWIP_SOCKET__RECVFROM 0x00020000UL
#define RAWIP_SOCKET__SENDTO 0x00040000UL
#define RAWIP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG 0x00080000UL
#define RAWIP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG 0x00100000UL
#define RAWIP_SOCKET__NAME_BIND 0x00200000UL
#define RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND 0x00400000UL
#define NODE__TCP_RECV 0x00000001UL
#define NODE__TCP_SEND 0x00000002UL
#define NODE__UDP_RECV 0x00000004UL
#define NODE__UDP_SEND 0x00000008UL
#define NODE__RAWIP_RECV 0x00000010UL
#define NODE__RAWIP_SEND 0x00000020UL
#define NODE__ENFORCE_DEST 0x00000040UL
[SELinux]: Add support for DCCP This patch implements SELinux kernel support for DCCP (http://linux-net.osdl.org/index.php/DCCP), which is similar in operation to TCP in terms of connected state between peers. The SELinux support for DCCP is thus modeled on existing handling of TCP. A new DCCP socket class is introduced, to allow protocol differentation. The permissions for this class inherit all of the socket permissions, as well as the current TCP permissions (node_bind, name_bind etc). IPv4 and IPv6 are supported, although labeled networking is not, at this stage. Patches for SELinux userspace are at: http://people.redhat.com/jmorris/selinux/dccp/user/ I've performed some basic testing, and it seems to be working as expected. Adding policy support is similar to TCP, the only real difference being that it's a different protocol. Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-11-14 01:09:01 +01:00
#define NODE__DCCP_RECV 0x00000080UL
#define NODE__DCCP_SEND 0x00000100UL
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
#define NETIF__TCP_RECV 0x00000001UL
#define NETIF__TCP_SEND 0x00000002UL
#define NETIF__UDP_RECV 0x00000004UL
#define NETIF__UDP_SEND 0x00000008UL
#define NETIF__RAWIP_RECV 0x00000010UL
#define NETIF__RAWIP_SEND 0x00000020UL
[SELinux]: Add support for DCCP This patch implements SELinux kernel support for DCCP (http://linux-net.osdl.org/index.php/DCCP), which is similar in operation to TCP in terms of connected state between peers. The SELinux support for DCCP is thus modeled on existing handling of TCP. A new DCCP socket class is introduced, to allow protocol differentation. The permissions for this class inherit all of the socket permissions, as well as the current TCP permissions (node_bind, name_bind etc). IPv4 and IPv6 are supported, although labeled networking is not, at this stage. Patches for SELinux userspace are at: http://people.redhat.com/jmorris/selinux/dccp/user/ I've performed some basic testing, and it seems to be working as expected. Adding policy support is similar to TCP, the only real difference being that it's a different protocol. Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-11-14 01:09:01 +01:00
#define NETIF__DCCP_RECV 0x00000040UL
#define NETIF__DCCP_SEND 0x00000080UL
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
#define NETLINK_SOCKET__IOCTL 0x00000001UL
#define NETLINK_SOCKET__READ 0x00000002UL
#define NETLINK_SOCKET__WRITE 0x00000004UL
#define NETLINK_SOCKET__CREATE 0x00000008UL
#define NETLINK_SOCKET__GETATTR 0x00000010UL
#define NETLINK_SOCKET__SETATTR 0x00000020UL
#define NETLINK_SOCKET__LOCK 0x00000040UL
#define NETLINK_SOCKET__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL
#define NETLINK_SOCKET__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL
#define NETLINK_SOCKET__APPEND 0x00000200UL
#define NETLINK_SOCKET__BIND 0x00000400UL
#define NETLINK_SOCKET__CONNECT 0x00000800UL
#define NETLINK_SOCKET__LISTEN 0x00001000UL
#define NETLINK_SOCKET__ACCEPT 0x00002000UL
#define NETLINK_SOCKET__GETOPT 0x00004000UL
#define NETLINK_SOCKET__SETOPT 0x00008000UL
#define NETLINK_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN 0x00010000UL
#define NETLINK_SOCKET__RECVFROM 0x00020000UL
#define NETLINK_SOCKET__SENDTO 0x00040000UL
#define NETLINK_SOCKET__RECV_MSG 0x00080000UL
#define NETLINK_SOCKET__SEND_MSG 0x00100000UL
#define NETLINK_SOCKET__NAME_BIND 0x00200000UL
#define PACKET_SOCKET__IOCTL 0x00000001UL
#define PACKET_SOCKET__READ 0x00000002UL
#define PACKET_SOCKET__WRITE 0x00000004UL
#define PACKET_SOCKET__CREATE 0x00000008UL
#define PACKET_SOCKET__GETATTR 0x00000010UL
#define PACKET_SOCKET__SETATTR 0x00000020UL
#define PACKET_SOCKET__LOCK 0x00000040UL
#define PACKET_SOCKET__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL
#define PACKET_SOCKET__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL
#define PACKET_SOCKET__APPEND 0x00000200UL
#define PACKET_SOCKET__BIND 0x00000400UL
#define PACKET_SOCKET__CONNECT 0x00000800UL
#define PACKET_SOCKET__LISTEN 0x00001000UL
#define PACKET_SOCKET__ACCEPT 0x00002000UL
#define PACKET_SOCKET__GETOPT 0x00004000UL
#define PACKET_SOCKET__SETOPT 0x00008000UL
#define PACKET_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN 0x00010000UL
#define PACKET_SOCKET__RECVFROM 0x00020000UL
#define PACKET_SOCKET__SENDTO 0x00040000UL
#define PACKET_SOCKET__RECV_MSG 0x00080000UL
#define PACKET_SOCKET__SEND_MSG 0x00100000UL
#define PACKET_SOCKET__NAME_BIND 0x00200000UL
#define KEY_SOCKET__IOCTL 0x00000001UL
#define KEY_SOCKET__READ 0x00000002UL
#define KEY_SOCKET__WRITE 0x00000004UL
#define KEY_SOCKET__CREATE 0x00000008UL
#define KEY_SOCKET__GETATTR 0x00000010UL
#define KEY_SOCKET__SETATTR 0x00000020UL
#define KEY_SOCKET__LOCK 0x00000040UL
#define KEY_SOCKET__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL
#define KEY_SOCKET__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL
#define KEY_SOCKET__APPEND 0x00000200UL
#define KEY_SOCKET__BIND 0x00000400UL
#define KEY_SOCKET__CONNECT 0x00000800UL
#define KEY_SOCKET__LISTEN 0x00001000UL
#define KEY_SOCKET__ACCEPT 0x00002000UL
#define KEY_SOCKET__GETOPT 0x00004000UL
#define KEY_SOCKET__SETOPT 0x00008000UL
#define KEY_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN 0x00010000UL
#define KEY_SOCKET__RECVFROM 0x00020000UL
#define KEY_SOCKET__SENDTO 0x00040000UL
#define KEY_SOCKET__RECV_MSG 0x00080000UL
#define KEY_SOCKET__SEND_MSG 0x00100000UL
#define KEY_SOCKET__NAME_BIND 0x00200000UL
#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__IOCTL 0x00000001UL
#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__READ 0x00000002UL
#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__WRITE 0x00000004UL
#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CREATE 0x00000008UL
#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__GETATTR 0x00000010UL
#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__SETATTR 0x00000020UL
#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__LOCK 0x00000040UL
#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL
#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL
#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__APPEND 0x00000200UL
#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__BIND 0x00000400UL
#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECT 0x00000800UL
#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__LISTEN 0x00001000UL
#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__ACCEPT 0x00002000UL
#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__GETOPT 0x00004000UL
#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__SETOPT 0x00008000UL
#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN 0x00010000UL
#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__RECVFROM 0x00020000UL
#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__SENDTO 0x00040000UL
#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__RECV_MSG 0x00080000UL
#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__SEND_MSG 0x00100000UL
#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__NAME_BIND 0x00200000UL
#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO 0x00400000UL
#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__NEWCONN 0x00800000UL
#define UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__ACCEPTFROM 0x01000000UL
#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__IOCTL 0x00000001UL
#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__READ 0x00000002UL
#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__WRITE 0x00000004UL
#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__CREATE 0x00000008UL
#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__GETATTR 0x00000010UL
#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__SETATTR 0x00000020UL
#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__LOCK 0x00000040UL
#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL
#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL
#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__APPEND 0x00000200UL
#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__BIND 0x00000400UL
#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__CONNECT 0x00000800UL
#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__LISTEN 0x00001000UL
#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__ACCEPT 0x00002000UL
#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__GETOPT 0x00004000UL
#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__SETOPT 0x00008000UL
#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN 0x00010000UL
#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__RECVFROM 0x00020000UL
#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__SENDTO 0x00040000UL
#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__RECV_MSG 0x00080000UL
#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__SEND_MSG 0x00100000UL
#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__NAME_BIND 0x00200000UL
#define PROCESS__FORK 0x00000001UL
#define PROCESS__TRANSITION 0x00000002UL
#define PROCESS__SIGCHLD 0x00000004UL
#define PROCESS__SIGKILL 0x00000008UL
#define PROCESS__SIGSTOP 0x00000010UL
#define PROCESS__SIGNULL 0x00000020UL
#define PROCESS__SIGNAL 0x00000040UL
#define PROCESS__PTRACE 0x00000080UL
#define PROCESS__GETSCHED 0x00000100UL
#define PROCESS__SETSCHED 0x00000200UL
#define PROCESS__GETSESSION 0x00000400UL
#define PROCESS__GETPGID 0x00000800UL
#define PROCESS__SETPGID 0x00001000UL
#define PROCESS__GETCAP 0x00002000UL
#define PROCESS__SETCAP 0x00004000UL
#define PROCESS__SHARE 0x00008000UL
#define PROCESS__GETATTR 0x00010000UL
#define PROCESS__SETEXEC 0x00020000UL
#define PROCESS__SETFSCREATE 0x00040000UL
#define PROCESS__NOATSECURE 0x00080000UL
#define PROCESS__SIGINH 0x00100000UL
#define PROCESS__SETRLIMIT 0x00200000UL
#define PROCESS__RLIMITINH 0x00400000UL
#define PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION 0x00800000UL
#define PROCESS__SETCURRENT 0x01000000UL
#define PROCESS__EXECMEM 0x02000000UL
[PATCH] selinux: add executable stack check This patch adds an execstack permission check that controls the ability to make the main process stack executable so that attempts to make the stack executable can still be prevented even if the process is allowed the existing execmem permission in order to e.g. perform runtime code generation. Note that this does not yet address thread stacks. Note also that unlike the execmem check, the execstack check is only applied on mprotect calls, not mmap calls, as the current security_file_mmap hook is not passed the necessary information presently. The original author of the code that makes the distinction of the stack region, is Ingo Molnar, who wrote it within his patch for /proc/<pid>/maps markers. (http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=linux-kernel&m=110719881508591&w=2) The patches also can be found at: http://pearls.tuxedo-es.org/patches/selinux/policy-execstack.patch http://pearls.tuxedo-es.org/patches/selinux/kernel-execstack.patch policy-execstack.patch is the patch that needs to be applied to the policy in order to support the execstack permission and exclude it from general_domain_access within macros/core_macros.te. kernel-execstack.patch adds such permission to the SELinux code within the kernel and adds the proper permission check to the selinux_file_mprotect() hook. Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Hernandez Garcia-Hierro <lorenzo@gnu.org> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-25 23:54:34 +02:00
#define PROCESS__EXECSTACK 0x04000000UL
[PATCH] selinux: add executable heap check This patch,based on sample code by Roland McGrath, adds an execheap permission check that controls the ability to make the heap executable so that this can be prevented in almost all cases (the X server is presently an exception, but this will hopefully be resolved in the future) so that even programs with execmem permission will need to have the anonymous memory mapped in order to make it executable. The only reason that we use a permission check for such restriction (vs. making it unconditional) is that the X module loader presently needs it; it could possibly be made unconditional in the future when X is changed. The policy patch for the execheap permission is available at: http://pearls.tuxedo-es.org/patches/selinux/policy-execheap.patch Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Hernandez Garcia-Hierro <lorenzo@gnu.org> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-25 23:54:35 +02:00
#define PROCESS__EXECHEAP 0x08000000UL
[PATCH] keys: add a way to store the appropriate context for newly-created keys Add a /proc/<pid>/attr/keycreate entry that stores the appropriate context for newly-created keys. Modify the selinux_key_alloc hook to make use of the new entry. Update the flask headers to include a new "setkeycreate" permission for processes. Update the flask headers to include a new "create" permission for keys. Use the create permission to restrict which SIDs each task can assign to newly-created keys. Add a new parameter to the security hook "security_key_alloc" to indicate whether it is being invoked by the kernel, or from userspace. If it is being invoked by the kernel, the security hook should never fail. Update the documentation to reflect these changes. Signed-off-by: Michael LeMay <mdlemay@epoch.ncsc.mil> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26 09:24:57 +02:00
#define PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE 0x10000000UL
[PATCH] SELinux: Add sockcreate node to procattr API Below is a patch to add a new /proc/self/attr/sockcreate A process may write a context into this interface and all subsequent sockets created will be labeled with that context. This is the same idea as the fscreate interface where a process can specify the label of a file about to be created. At this time one envisioned user of this will be xinetd. It will be able to better label sockets for the actual services. At this time all sockets take the label of the creating process, so all xinitd sockets would just be labeled the same. I tested this by creating a tcp sender and listener. The sender was able to write to this new proc file and then create sockets with the specified label. I am able to be sure the new label was used since the avc denial messages kicked out by the kernel included both the new security permission setsockcreate and all the socket denials were for the new label, not the label of the running process. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26 09:26:03 +02:00
#define PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE 0x20000000UL
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
#define IPC__CREATE 0x00000001UL
#define IPC__DESTROY 0x00000002UL
#define IPC__GETATTR 0x00000004UL
#define IPC__SETATTR 0x00000008UL
#define IPC__READ 0x00000010UL
#define IPC__WRITE 0x00000020UL
#define IPC__ASSOCIATE 0x00000040UL
#define IPC__UNIX_READ 0x00000080UL
#define IPC__UNIX_WRITE 0x00000100UL
#define SEM__CREATE 0x00000001UL
#define SEM__DESTROY 0x00000002UL
#define SEM__GETATTR 0x00000004UL
#define SEM__SETATTR 0x00000008UL
#define SEM__READ 0x00000010UL
#define SEM__WRITE 0x00000020UL
#define SEM__ASSOCIATE 0x00000040UL
#define SEM__UNIX_READ 0x00000080UL
#define SEM__UNIX_WRITE 0x00000100UL
#define MSGQ__CREATE 0x00000001UL
#define MSGQ__DESTROY 0x00000002UL
#define MSGQ__GETATTR 0x00000004UL
#define MSGQ__SETATTR 0x00000008UL
#define MSGQ__READ 0x00000010UL
#define MSGQ__WRITE 0x00000020UL
#define MSGQ__ASSOCIATE 0x00000040UL
#define MSGQ__UNIX_READ 0x00000080UL
#define MSGQ__UNIX_WRITE 0x00000100UL
#define MSGQ__ENQUEUE 0x00000200UL
#define MSG__SEND 0x00000001UL
#define MSG__RECEIVE 0x00000002UL
#define SHM__CREATE 0x00000001UL
#define SHM__DESTROY 0x00000002UL
#define SHM__GETATTR 0x00000004UL
#define SHM__SETATTR 0x00000008UL
#define SHM__READ 0x00000010UL
#define SHM__WRITE 0x00000020UL
#define SHM__ASSOCIATE 0x00000040UL
#define SHM__UNIX_READ 0x00000080UL
#define SHM__UNIX_WRITE 0x00000100UL
#define SHM__LOCK 0x00000200UL
#define SECURITY__COMPUTE_AV 0x00000001UL
#define SECURITY__COMPUTE_CREATE 0x00000002UL
#define SECURITY__COMPUTE_MEMBER 0x00000004UL
#define SECURITY__CHECK_CONTEXT 0x00000008UL
#define SECURITY__LOAD_POLICY 0x00000010UL
#define SECURITY__COMPUTE_RELABEL 0x00000020UL
#define SECURITY__COMPUTE_USER 0x00000040UL
#define SECURITY__SETENFORCE 0x00000080UL
#define SECURITY__SETBOOL 0x00000100UL
#define SECURITY__SETSECPARAM 0x00000200UL
#define SECURITY__SETCHECKREQPROT 0x00000400UL
#define SYSTEM__IPC_INFO 0x00000001UL
#define SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ 0x00000002UL
#define SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD 0x00000004UL
#define SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE 0x00000008UL
#define CAPABILITY__CHOWN 0x00000001UL
#define CAPABILITY__DAC_OVERRIDE 0x00000002UL
#define CAPABILITY__DAC_READ_SEARCH 0x00000004UL
#define CAPABILITY__FOWNER 0x00000008UL
#define CAPABILITY__FSETID 0x00000010UL
#define CAPABILITY__KILL 0x00000020UL
#define CAPABILITY__SETGID 0x00000040UL
#define CAPABILITY__SETUID 0x00000080UL
#define CAPABILITY__SETPCAP 0x00000100UL
#define CAPABILITY__LINUX_IMMUTABLE 0x00000200UL
#define CAPABILITY__NET_BIND_SERVICE 0x00000400UL
#define CAPABILITY__NET_BROADCAST 0x00000800UL
#define CAPABILITY__NET_ADMIN 0x00001000UL
#define CAPABILITY__NET_RAW 0x00002000UL
#define CAPABILITY__IPC_LOCK 0x00004000UL
#define CAPABILITY__IPC_OWNER 0x00008000UL
#define CAPABILITY__SYS_MODULE 0x00010000UL
#define CAPABILITY__SYS_RAWIO 0x00020000UL
#define CAPABILITY__SYS_CHROOT 0x00040000UL
#define CAPABILITY__SYS_PTRACE 0x00080000UL
#define CAPABILITY__SYS_PACCT 0x00100000UL
#define CAPABILITY__SYS_ADMIN 0x00200000UL
#define CAPABILITY__SYS_BOOT 0x00400000UL
#define CAPABILITY__SYS_NICE 0x00800000UL
#define CAPABILITY__SYS_RESOURCE 0x01000000UL
#define CAPABILITY__SYS_TIME 0x02000000UL
#define CAPABILITY__SYS_TTY_CONFIG 0x04000000UL
#define CAPABILITY__MKNOD 0x08000000UL
#define CAPABILITY__LEASE 0x10000000UL
[PATCH] SELinux: add support for NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT This patch adds SELinux support for the KOBJECT_UEVENT Netlink family, so that SELinux can apply finer grained controls to it. For example, security policy for hald can be locked down to the KOBJECT_UEVENT Netlink family only. Currently, this family simply defaults to the default Netlink socket class. Note that some new permission definitions are added to sync with changes in the core userspace policy package, which auto-generates header files. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-04-17 00:24:13 +02:00
#define CAPABILITY__AUDIT_WRITE 0x20000000UL
#define CAPABILITY__AUDIT_CONTROL 0x40000000UL
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__IOCTL 0x00000001UL
#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__READ 0x00000002UL
#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__WRITE 0x00000004UL
#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__CREATE 0x00000008UL
#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__GETATTR 0x00000010UL
#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__SETATTR 0x00000020UL
#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__LOCK 0x00000040UL
#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL
#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL
#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__APPEND 0x00000200UL
#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__BIND 0x00000400UL
#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__CONNECT 0x00000800UL
#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__LISTEN 0x00001000UL
#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__ACCEPT 0x00002000UL
#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__GETOPT 0x00004000UL
#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__SETOPT 0x00008000UL
#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN 0x00010000UL
#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__RECVFROM 0x00020000UL
#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__SENDTO 0x00040000UL
#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__RECV_MSG 0x00080000UL
#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__SEND_MSG 0x00100000UL
#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NAME_BIND 0x00200000UL
#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ 0x00400000UL
#define NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE 0x00800000UL
#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__IOCTL 0x00000001UL
#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__READ 0x00000002UL
#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__WRITE 0x00000004UL
#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__CREATE 0x00000008UL
#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__GETATTR 0x00000010UL
#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__SETATTR 0x00000020UL
#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__LOCK 0x00000040UL
#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL
#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL
#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__APPEND 0x00000200UL
#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__BIND 0x00000400UL
#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__CONNECT 0x00000800UL
#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__LISTEN 0x00001000UL
#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__ACCEPT 0x00002000UL
#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__GETOPT 0x00004000UL
#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__SETOPT 0x00008000UL
#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN 0x00010000UL
#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__RECVFROM 0x00020000UL
#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__SENDTO 0x00040000UL
#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__RECV_MSG 0x00080000UL
#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__SEND_MSG 0x00100000UL
#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__NAME_BIND 0x00200000UL
#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ 0x00400000UL
#define NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE 0x00800000UL
#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__IOCTL 0x00000001UL
#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__READ 0x00000002UL
#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__WRITE 0x00000004UL
#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__CREATE 0x00000008UL
#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__GETATTR 0x00000010UL
#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__SETATTR 0x00000020UL
#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__LOCK 0x00000040UL
#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL
#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL
#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__APPEND 0x00000200UL
#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__BIND 0x00000400UL
#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__CONNECT 0x00000800UL
#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__LISTEN 0x00001000UL
#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__ACCEPT 0x00002000UL
#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__GETOPT 0x00004000UL
#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__SETOPT 0x00008000UL
#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN 0x00010000UL
#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__RECVFROM 0x00020000UL
#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__SENDTO 0x00040000UL
#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__RECV_MSG 0x00080000UL
#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__SEND_MSG 0x00100000UL
#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__NAME_BIND 0x00200000UL
#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ 0x00400000UL
#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE 0x00800000UL
#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__IOCTL 0x00000001UL
#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__READ 0x00000002UL
#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__WRITE 0x00000004UL
#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__CREATE 0x00000008UL
#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__GETATTR 0x00000010UL
#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__SETATTR 0x00000020UL
#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__LOCK 0x00000040UL
#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL
#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL
#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__APPEND 0x00000200UL
#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__BIND 0x00000400UL
#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__CONNECT 0x00000800UL
#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__LISTEN 0x00001000UL
#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__ACCEPT 0x00002000UL
#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__GETOPT 0x00004000UL
#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__SETOPT 0x00008000UL
#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN 0x00010000UL
#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__RECVFROM 0x00020000UL
#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__SENDTO 0x00040000UL
#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__RECV_MSG 0x00080000UL
#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__SEND_MSG 0x00100000UL
#define NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET__NAME_BIND 0x00200000UL
#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__IOCTL 0x00000001UL
#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__READ 0x00000002UL
#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__WRITE 0x00000004UL
#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__CREATE 0x00000008UL
#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__GETATTR 0x00000010UL
#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__SETATTR 0x00000020UL
#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__LOCK 0x00000040UL
#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL
#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL
#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__APPEND 0x00000200UL
#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__BIND 0x00000400UL
#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__CONNECT 0x00000800UL
#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__LISTEN 0x00001000UL
#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__ACCEPT 0x00002000UL
#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__GETOPT 0x00004000UL
#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__SETOPT 0x00008000UL
#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN 0x00010000UL
#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__RECVFROM 0x00020000UL
#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__SENDTO 0x00040000UL
#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__RECV_MSG 0x00080000UL
#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__SEND_MSG 0x00100000UL
#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NAME_BIND 0x00200000UL
#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ 0x00400000UL
#define NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE 0x00800000UL
#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__IOCTL 0x00000001UL
#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__READ 0x00000002UL
#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__WRITE 0x00000004UL
#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__CREATE 0x00000008UL
#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__GETATTR 0x00000010UL
#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__SETATTR 0x00000020UL
#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__LOCK 0x00000040UL
#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL
#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL
#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__APPEND 0x00000200UL
#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__BIND 0x00000400UL
#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__CONNECT 0x00000800UL
#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__LISTEN 0x00001000UL
#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__ACCEPT 0x00002000UL
#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__GETOPT 0x00004000UL
#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__SETOPT 0x00008000UL
#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN 0x00010000UL
#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__RECVFROM 0x00020000UL
#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__SENDTO 0x00040000UL
#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__RECV_MSG 0x00080000UL
#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__SEND_MSG 0x00100000UL
#define NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET__NAME_BIND 0x00200000UL
#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__IOCTL 0x00000001UL
#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__READ 0x00000002UL
#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__WRITE 0x00000004UL
#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__CREATE 0x00000008UL
#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__GETATTR 0x00000010UL
#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__SETATTR 0x00000020UL
#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__LOCK 0x00000040UL
#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL
#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL
#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__APPEND 0x00000200UL
#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__BIND 0x00000400UL
#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__CONNECT 0x00000800UL
#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__LISTEN 0x00001000UL
#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__ACCEPT 0x00002000UL
#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__GETOPT 0x00004000UL
#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__SETOPT 0x00008000UL
#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN 0x00010000UL
#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__RECVFROM 0x00020000UL
#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__SENDTO 0x00040000UL
#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__RECV_MSG 0x00080000UL
#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__SEND_MSG 0x00100000UL
#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NAME_BIND 0x00200000UL
#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ 0x00400000UL
#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE 0x00800000UL
[PATCH] SELinux: add finer grained permissions to Netlink audit processing This patch provides finer grained permissions for the audit family of Netlink sockets under SELinux. 1. We need a way to differentiate between privileged and unprivileged reads of kernel data maintained by the audit subsystem. The AUDIT_GET operation is unprivileged: it returns the current status of the audit subsystem (e.g. whether it's enabled etc.). The AUDIT_LIST operation however returns a list of the current audit ruleset, which is considered privileged by the audit folk. To deal with this, a new SELinux permission has been implemented and applied to the operation: nlmsg_readpriv, which can be allocated to appropriately privileged domains. Unprivileged domains would only be allocated nlmsg_read. 2. There is a requirement for certain domains to generate audit events from userspace. These events need to be collected by the kernel, collated and transmitted sequentially back to the audit daemon. An example is user level login, an auditable event under CAPP, where login-related domains generate AUDIT_USER messages via PAM which are relayed back to auditd via the kernel. To prevent handing out nlmsg_write permissions to such domains, a new permission has been added, nlmsg_relay, which is intended for this type of purpose: data is passed via the kernel back to userspace but no privileged information is written to the kernel. Also, AUDIT_LOGIN messages are now valid only for kernel->user messaging, so this value has been removed from the SELinux nlmsgtab (which is only used to check user->kernel messages). Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-05-01 17:58:40 +02:00
#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_RELAY 0x01000000UL
#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READPRIV 0x02000000UL
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__IOCTL 0x00000001UL
#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__READ 0x00000002UL
#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__WRITE 0x00000004UL
#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__CREATE 0x00000008UL
#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__GETATTR 0x00000010UL
#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__SETATTR 0x00000020UL
#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__LOCK 0x00000040UL
#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL
#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL
#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__APPEND 0x00000200UL
#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__BIND 0x00000400UL
#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__CONNECT 0x00000800UL
#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__LISTEN 0x00001000UL
#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__ACCEPT 0x00002000UL
#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__GETOPT 0x00004000UL
#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__SETOPT 0x00008000UL
#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN 0x00010000UL
#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__RECVFROM 0x00020000UL
#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__SENDTO 0x00040000UL
#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__RECV_MSG 0x00080000UL
#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__SEND_MSG 0x00100000UL
#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__NAME_BIND 0x00200000UL
#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ 0x00400000UL
#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE 0x00800000UL
#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__IOCTL 0x00000001UL
#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__READ 0x00000002UL
#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__WRITE 0x00000004UL
#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__CREATE 0x00000008UL
#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__GETATTR 0x00000010UL
#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__SETATTR 0x00000020UL
#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__LOCK 0x00000040UL
#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL
#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL
#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__APPEND 0x00000200UL
#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__BIND 0x00000400UL
#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__CONNECT 0x00000800UL
#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__LISTEN 0x00001000UL
#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__ACCEPT 0x00002000UL
#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__GETOPT 0x00004000UL
#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__SETOPT 0x00008000UL
#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN 0x00010000UL
#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__RECVFROM 0x00020000UL
#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__SENDTO 0x00040000UL
#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__RECV_MSG 0x00080000UL
#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__SEND_MSG 0x00100000UL
#define NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET__NAME_BIND 0x00200000UL
[PATCH] SELinux: add support for NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT This patch adds SELinux support for the KOBJECT_UEVENT Netlink family, so that SELinux can apply finer grained controls to it. For example, security policy for hald can be locked down to the KOBJECT_UEVENT Netlink family only. Currently, this family simply defaults to the default Netlink socket class. Note that some new permission definitions are added to sync with changes in the core userspace policy package, which auto-generates header files. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-04-17 00:24:13 +02:00
#define ASSOCIATION__SENDTO 0x00000001UL
#define ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM 0x00000002UL
[LSM-IPSec]: Corrections to LSM-IPSec Nethooks This patch contains two corrections to the LSM-IPsec Nethooks patches previously applied. (1) free a security context on a failed insert via xfrm_user interface in xfrm_add_policy. Memory leak. (2) change the authorization of the allocation of a security context in a xfrm_policy or xfrm_state from both relabelfrom and relabelto to setcontext. Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-01-06 22:22:39 +01:00
#define ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT 0x00000004UL
[MLSXFRM]: Granular IPSec associations for use in MLS environments The current approach to labeling Security Associations for SELinux purposes uses a one-to-one mapping between xfrm policy rules and security associations. This doesn't address the needs of real world MLS (Multi-level System, traditional Bell-LaPadula) environments where a single xfrm policy rule (pertaining to a range, classified to secret for example) might need to map to multiple Security Associations (one each for classified, secret, top secret and all the compartments applicable to these security levels). This patch set addresses the above problem by allowing for the mapping of a single xfrm policy rule to multiple security associations, with each association used in the security context it is defined for. It also includes the security context to be used in IKE negotiation in the acquire messages sent to the IKE daemon so that a unique SA can be negotiated for each unique security context. A couple of bug fixes are also included; checks to make sure the SAs used by a packet match policy (security context-wise) on the inbound and also that the bundle used for the outbound matches the security context of the flow. This patch set also makes the use of the SELinux sid in flow cache lookups seemless by including the sid in the flow key itself. Also, open requests as well as connection-oriented child sockets are labeled automatically to be at the same level as the peer to allow for use of appropriately labeled IPSec associations. Description of changes: A "sid" member has been added to the flow cache key resulting in the sid being available at all needed locations and the flow cache lookups automatically using the sid. The flow sid is derived from the socket on the outbound and the SAs (unlabeled where an SA was not used) on the inbound. Outbound case: 1. Find policy for the socket. 2. OLD: Find an SA that matches the policy. NEW: Find an SA that matches BOTH the policy and the flow/socket. This is necessary since not every SA that matches the policy can be used for the flow/socket. Consider policy range Secret-TS, and SAs each for Secret and TS. We don't want a TS socket to use the Secret SA. Hence the additional check for the SA Vs. flow/socket. 3. NEW: When looking thru bundles for a policy, make sure the flow/socket can use the bundle. If a bundle is not found, create one, calling for IKE if necessary. If using IKE, include the security context in the acquire message to the IKE daemon. Inbound case: 1. OLD: Find policy for the socket. NEW: Find policy for the incoming packet based on the sid of the SA(s) it used or the unlabeled sid if no SAs were used. (Consider a case where a socket is "authorized" for two policies (unclassified-confidential, secret-top_secret). If the packet has come in using a secret SA, we really ought to be using the latter policy (secret-top_secret).) 2. OLD: BUG: No check to see if the SAs used by the packet agree with the policy sec_ctx-wise. (It was indicated in selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb() that this was being accomplished by (x->id.spi == tmpl->id.spi || !tmpl->id.spi) in xfrm_state_ok, but it turns out tmpl->id.spi would normally be zero (unless xfrm policy rules specify one at the template level, which they usually don't). NEW: The socket is checked for access to the SAs used (based on the sid of the SAs) in selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(). Forward case: This would be Step 1 from the Inbound case, followed by Steps 2 and 3 from the Outbound case. Outstanding items/issues: - Timewait acknowledgements and such are generated in the current/upstream implementation using a NULL socket resulting in the any_socket sid (SYSTEM_HIGH) to be used. This problem is not addressed by this patch set. This patch: Add new flask definitions to SELinux Adds a new avperm "polmatch" to arbitrate flow/state access to a xfrm policy rule. Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-07-25 08:26:30 +02:00
#define ASSOCIATION__POLMATCH 0x00000008UL
[PATCH] SELinux: add support for NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT This patch adds SELinux support for the KOBJECT_UEVENT Netlink family, so that SELinux can apply finer grained controls to it. For example, security policy for hald can be locked down to the KOBJECT_UEVENT Netlink family only. Currently, this family simply defaults to the default Netlink socket class. Note that some new permission definitions are added to sync with changes in the core userspace policy package, which auto-generates header files. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-04-17 00:24:13 +02:00
#define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__IOCTL 0x00000001UL
#define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__READ 0x00000002UL
#define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__WRITE 0x00000004UL
#define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__CREATE 0x00000008UL
#define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__GETATTR 0x00000010UL
#define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__SETATTR 0x00000020UL
#define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__LOCK 0x00000040UL
#define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL
#define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL
#define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__APPEND 0x00000200UL
#define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__BIND 0x00000400UL
#define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__CONNECT 0x00000800UL
#define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__LISTEN 0x00001000UL
#define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__ACCEPT 0x00002000UL
#define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__GETOPT 0x00004000UL
#define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__SETOPT 0x00008000UL
#define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN 0x00010000UL
#define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__RECVFROM 0x00020000UL
#define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__SENDTO 0x00040000UL
#define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__RECV_MSG 0x00080000UL
#define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__SEND_MSG 0x00100000UL
#define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__NAME_BIND 0x00200000UL
[SELINUX]: add security class for appletalk sockets Add a security class for appletalk sockets so that they can be distinguished in SELinux policy. Please apply. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-06-09 09:25:03 +02:00
#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__IOCTL 0x00000001UL
#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__READ 0x00000002UL
#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__WRITE 0x00000004UL
#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__CREATE 0x00000008UL
#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__GETATTR 0x00000010UL
#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__SETATTR 0x00000020UL
#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__LOCK 0x00000040UL
#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL
#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL
#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__APPEND 0x00000200UL
#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__BIND 0x00000400UL
#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__CONNECT 0x00000800UL
#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__LISTEN 0x00001000UL
#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__ACCEPT 0x00002000UL
#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__GETOPT 0x00004000UL
#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__SETOPT 0x00008000UL
#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN 0x00010000UL
#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__RECVFROM 0x00020000UL
#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__SENDTO 0x00040000UL
#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__RECV_MSG 0x00080000UL
#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__SEND_MSG 0x00100000UL
#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__NAME_BIND 0x00200000UL
[SECMARK]: Add new flask definitions to SELinux Secmark implements a new scheme for adding security markings to packets via iptables, as well as changes to SELinux to use these markings for security policy enforcement. The rationale for this scheme is explained and discussed in detail in the original threads: http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.network/34927/ http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.network/35244/ Examples of policy and rulesets, as well as a full archive of patches for iptables and SELinux userland, may be found at: http://people.redhat.com/jmorris/selinux/secmark/ The code has been tested with various compilation options and in several scenarios, including with 'complicated' protocols such as FTP and also with the new generic conntrack code with IPv6 connection tracking. This patch: Add support for a new object class ('packet'), and associated permissions ('send', 'recv', 'relabelto'). These are used to enforce security policy for network packets labeled with SECMARK, and for adding labeling rules. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-06-09 09:27:28 +02:00
#define PACKET__SEND 0x00000001UL
#define PACKET__RECV 0x00000002UL
#define PACKET__RELABELTO 0x00000004UL
[PATCH] selinux: add hooks for key subsystem Introduce SELinux hooks to support the access key retention subsystem within the kernel. Incorporate new flask headers from a modified version of the SELinux reference policy, with support for the new security class representing retained keys. Extend the "key_alloc" security hook with a task parameter representing the intended ownership context for the key being allocated. Attach security information to root's default keyrings within the SELinux initialization routine. Has passed David's testsuite. Signed-off-by: Michael LeMay <mdlemay@epoch.ncsc.mil> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-22 23:47:17 +02:00
#define KEY__VIEW 0x00000001UL
#define KEY__READ 0x00000002UL
#define KEY__WRITE 0x00000004UL
#define KEY__SEARCH 0x00000008UL
#define KEY__LINK 0x00000010UL
#define KEY__SETATTR 0x00000020UL
[PATCH] keys: add a way to store the appropriate context for newly-created keys Add a /proc/<pid>/attr/keycreate entry that stores the appropriate context for newly-created keys. Modify the selinux_key_alloc hook to make use of the new entry. Update the flask headers to include a new "setkeycreate" permission for processes. Update the flask headers to include a new "create" permission for keys. Use the create permission to restrict which SIDs each task can assign to newly-created keys. Add a new parameter to the security hook "security_key_alloc" to indicate whether it is being invoked by the kernel, or from userspace. If it is being invoked by the kernel, the security hook should never fail. Update the documentation to reflect these changes. Signed-off-by: Michael LeMay <mdlemay@epoch.ncsc.mil> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26 09:24:57 +02:00
#define KEY__CREATE 0x00000040UL
[SELinux]: Add support for DCCP This patch implements SELinux kernel support for DCCP (http://linux-net.osdl.org/index.php/DCCP), which is similar in operation to TCP in terms of connected state between peers. The SELinux support for DCCP is thus modeled on existing handling of TCP. A new DCCP socket class is introduced, to allow protocol differentation. The permissions for this class inherit all of the socket permissions, as well as the current TCP permissions (node_bind, name_bind etc). IPv4 and IPv6 are supported, although labeled networking is not, at this stage. Patches for SELinux userspace are at: http://people.redhat.com/jmorris/selinux/dccp/user/ I've performed some basic testing, and it seems to be working as expected. Adding policy support is similar to TCP, the only real difference being that it's a different protocol. Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-11-14 01:09:01 +01:00
#define DCCP_SOCKET__IOCTL 0x00000001UL
#define DCCP_SOCKET__READ 0x00000002UL
#define DCCP_SOCKET__WRITE 0x00000004UL
#define DCCP_SOCKET__CREATE 0x00000008UL
#define DCCP_SOCKET__GETATTR 0x00000010UL
#define DCCP_SOCKET__SETATTR 0x00000020UL
#define DCCP_SOCKET__LOCK 0x00000040UL
#define DCCP_SOCKET__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL
#define DCCP_SOCKET__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL
#define DCCP_SOCKET__APPEND 0x00000200UL
#define DCCP_SOCKET__BIND 0x00000400UL
#define DCCP_SOCKET__CONNECT 0x00000800UL
#define DCCP_SOCKET__LISTEN 0x00001000UL
#define DCCP_SOCKET__ACCEPT 0x00002000UL
#define DCCP_SOCKET__GETOPT 0x00004000UL
#define DCCP_SOCKET__SETOPT 0x00008000UL
#define DCCP_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN 0x00010000UL
#define DCCP_SOCKET__RECVFROM 0x00020000UL
#define DCCP_SOCKET__SENDTO 0x00040000UL
#define DCCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG 0x00080000UL
#define DCCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG 0x00100000UL
#define DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_BIND 0x00200000UL
#define DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND 0x00400000UL
#define DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT 0x00800000UL
security: Protection for exploiting null dereference using mmap Add a new security check on mmap operations to see if the user is attempting to mmap to low area of the address space. The amount of space protected is indicated by the new proc tunable /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr and defaults to 0, preserving existing behavior. This patch uses a new SELinux security class "memprotect." Policy already contains a number of allow rules like a_t self:process * (unconfined_t being one of them) which mean that putting this check in the process class (its best current fit) would make it useless as all user processes, which we also want to protect against, would be allowed. By taking the memprotect name of the new class it will also make it possible for us to move some of the other memory protect permissions out of 'process' and into the new class next time we bump the policy version number (which I also think is a good future idea) Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-06-28 21:55:21 +02:00
#define MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO 0x00000001UL
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