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android_kernel_motorola_sm6225/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c

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Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
/*
* INET An implementation of the TCP/IP protocol suite for the LINUX
* operating system. INET is implemented using the BSD Socket
* interface as the means of communication with the user level.
*
* The IP to API glue.
*
* Version: $Id: ip_sockglue.c,v 1.62 2002/02/01 22:01:04 davem Exp $
*
* Authors: see ip.c
*
* Fixes:
* Many : Split from ip.c , see ip.c for history.
* Martin Mares : TOS setting fixed.
* Alan Cox : Fixed a couple of oopses in Martin's
* TOS tweaks.
* Mike McLagan : Routing by source
*/
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
#include <linux/ip.h>
#include <linux/icmp.h>
[INET_SOCK]: Move struct inet_sock & helper functions to net/inet_sock.h To help in reducing the number of include dependencies, several files were touched as they were getting needed headers indirectly for stuff they use. Thanks also to Alan Menegotto for pointing out that net/dccp/proto.c had linux/dccp.h include twice. Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@mandriva.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-12-27 05:43:12 +01:00
#include <linux/inetdevice.h>
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
#include <linux/netdevice.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
#include <net/ip.h>
#include <net/icmp.h>
[IP_SOCKGLUE]: Remove most of the tcp specific calls As DCCP needs to be called in the same spots. Now we have a member in inet_sock (is_icsk), set at sock creation time from struct inet_protosw->flags (if INET_PROTOSW_ICSK is set, like for TCP and DCCP) to see if a struct sock instance is a inet_connection_sock for places like the ones in ip_sockglue.c (v4 and v6) where we previously were looking if sk_type was SOCK_STREAM, that is insufficient because we now use the same code for DCCP, that has sk_type SOCK_DCCP. Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@mandriva.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-12-14 08:26:10 +01:00
#include <net/tcp_states.h>
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
#include <linux/udp.h>
#include <linux/igmp.h>
#include <linux/netfilter.h>
#include <linux/route.h>
#include <linux/mroute.h>
#include <net/route.h>
#include <net/xfrm.h>
#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
#include <net/transp_v6.h>
#endif
#include <linux/errqueue.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
#define IP_CMSG_PKTINFO 1
#define IP_CMSG_TTL 2
#define IP_CMSG_TOS 4
#define IP_CMSG_RECVOPTS 8
#define IP_CMSG_RETOPTS 16
[SECURITY]: TCP/UDP getpeersec This patch implements an application of the LSM-IPSec networking controls whereby an application can determine the label of the security association its TCP or UDP sockets are currently connected to via getsockopt and the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg. Patch purpose: This patch enables a security-aware application to retrieve the security context of an IPSec security association a particular TCP or UDP socket is using. The application can then use this security context to determine the security context for processing on behalf of the peer at the other end of this connection. In the case of UDP, the security context is for each individual packet. An example application is the inetd daemon, which could be modified to start daemons running at security contexts dependent on the remote client. Patch design approach: - Design for TCP The patch enables the SELinux LSM to set the peer security context for a socket based on the security context of the IPSec security association. The application may retrieve this context using getsockopt. When called, the kernel determines if the socket is a connected (TCP_ESTABLISHED) TCP socket and, if so, uses the dst_entry cache on the socket to retrieve the security associations. If a security association has a security context, the context string is returned, as for UNIX domain sockets. - Design for UDP Unlike TCP, UDP is connectionless. This requires a somewhat different API to retrieve the peer security context. With TCP, the peer security context stays the same throughout the connection, thus it can be retrieved at any time between when the connection is established and when it is torn down. With UDP, each read/write can have different peer and thus the security context might change every time. As a result the security context retrieval must be done TOGETHER with the packet retrieval. The solution is to build upon the existing Unix domain socket API for retrieving user credentials. Linux offers the API for obtaining user credentials via ancillary messages (i.e., out of band/control messages that are bundled together with a normal message). Patch implementation details: - Implementation for TCP The security context can be retrieved by applications using getsockopt with the existing SO_PEERSEC flag. As an example (ignoring error checking): getsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PEERSEC, optbuf, &optlen); printf("Socket peer context is: %s\n", optbuf); The SELinux function, selinux_socket_getpeersec, is extended to check for labeled security associations for connected (TCP_ESTABLISHED == sk->sk_state) TCP sockets only. If so, the socket has a dst_cache of struct dst_entry values that may refer to security associations. If these have security associations with security contexts, the security context is returned. getsockopt returns a buffer that contains a security context string or the buffer is unmodified. - Implementation for UDP To retrieve the security context, the application first indicates to the kernel such desire by setting the IP_PASSSEC option via getsockopt. Then the application retrieves the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism. An example server application for UDP should look like this: toggle = 1; toggle_len = sizeof(toggle); setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_IP, IP_PASSSEC, &toggle, &toggle_len); recvmsg(sockfd, &msg_hdr, 0); if (msg_hdr.msg_controllen > sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) { cmsg_hdr = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg_hdr); if (cmsg_hdr->cmsg_len <= CMSG_LEN(sizeof(scontext)) && cmsg_hdr->cmsg_level == SOL_IP && cmsg_hdr->cmsg_type == SCM_SECURITY) { memcpy(&scontext, CMSG_DATA(cmsg_hdr), sizeof(scontext)); } } ip_setsockopt is enhanced with a new socket option IP_PASSSEC to allow a server socket to receive security context of the peer. A new ancillary message type SCM_SECURITY. When the packet is received we get the security context from the sec_path pointer which is contained in the sk_buff, and copy it to the ancillary message space. An additional LSM hook, selinux_socket_getpeersec_udp, is defined to retrieve the security context from the SELinux space. The existing function, selinux_socket_getpeersec does not suit our purpose, because the security context is copied directly to user space, rather than to kernel space. Testing: We have tested the patch by setting up TCP and UDP connections between applications on two machines using the IPSec policies that result in labeled security associations being built. For TCP, we can then extract the peer security context using getsockopt on either end. For UDP, the receiving end can retrieve the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg. Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-03-21 07:41:23 +01:00
#define IP_CMSG_PASSSEC 32
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
/*
* SOL_IP control messages.
*/
static void ip_cmsg_recv_pktinfo(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct in_pktinfo info;
struct rtable *rt = (struct rtable *)skb->dst;
info.ipi_addr.s_addr = skb->nh.iph->daddr;
if (rt) {
info.ipi_ifindex = rt->rt_iif;
info.ipi_spec_dst.s_addr = rt->rt_spec_dst;
} else {
info.ipi_ifindex = 0;
info.ipi_spec_dst.s_addr = 0;
}
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IP, IP_PKTINFO, sizeof(info), &info);
}
static void ip_cmsg_recv_ttl(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int ttl = skb->nh.iph->ttl;
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IP, IP_TTL, sizeof(int), &ttl);
}
static void ip_cmsg_recv_tos(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IP, IP_TOS, 1, &skb->nh.iph->tos);
}
static void ip_cmsg_recv_opts(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
if (IPCB(skb)->opt.optlen == 0)
return;
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IP, IP_RECVOPTS, IPCB(skb)->opt.optlen, skb->nh.iph+1);
}
static void ip_cmsg_recv_retopts(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
unsigned char optbuf[sizeof(struct ip_options) + 40];
struct ip_options * opt = (struct ip_options*)optbuf;
if (IPCB(skb)->opt.optlen == 0)
return;
if (ip_options_echo(opt, skb)) {
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_CTRUNC;
return;
}
ip_options_undo(opt);
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IP, IP_RETOPTS, opt->optlen, opt->__data);
}
[SECURITY]: TCP/UDP getpeersec This patch implements an application of the LSM-IPSec networking controls whereby an application can determine the label of the security association its TCP or UDP sockets are currently connected to via getsockopt and the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg. Patch purpose: This patch enables a security-aware application to retrieve the security context of an IPSec security association a particular TCP or UDP socket is using. The application can then use this security context to determine the security context for processing on behalf of the peer at the other end of this connection. In the case of UDP, the security context is for each individual packet. An example application is the inetd daemon, which could be modified to start daemons running at security contexts dependent on the remote client. Patch design approach: - Design for TCP The patch enables the SELinux LSM to set the peer security context for a socket based on the security context of the IPSec security association. The application may retrieve this context using getsockopt. When called, the kernel determines if the socket is a connected (TCP_ESTABLISHED) TCP socket and, if so, uses the dst_entry cache on the socket to retrieve the security associations. If a security association has a security context, the context string is returned, as for UNIX domain sockets. - Design for UDP Unlike TCP, UDP is connectionless. This requires a somewhat different API to retrieve the peer security context. With TCP, the peer security context stays the same throughout the connection, thus it can be retrieved at any time between when the connection is established and when it is torn down. With UDP, each read/write can have different peer and thus the security context might change every time. As a result the security context retrieval must be done TOGETHER with the packet retrieval. The solution is to build upon the existing Unix domain socket API for retrieving user credentials. Linux offers the API for obtaining user credentials via ancillary messages (i.e., out of band/control messages that are bundled together with a normal message). Patch implementation details: - Implementation for TCP The security context can be retrieved by applications using getsockopt with the existing SO_PEERSEC flag. As an example (ignoring error checking): getsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PEERSEC, optbuf, &optlen); printf("Socket peer context is: %s\n", optbuf); The SELinux function, selinux_socket_getpeersec, is extended to check for labeled security associations for connected (TCP_ESTABLISHED == sk->sk_state) TCP sockets only. If so, the socket has a dst_cache of struct dst_entry values that may refer to security associations. If these have security associations with security contexts, the security context is returned. getsockopt returns a buffer that contains a security context string or the buffer is unmodified. - Implementation for UDP To retrieve the security context, the application first indicates to the kernel such desire by setting the IP_PASSSEC option via getsockopt. Then the application retrieves the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism. An example server application for UDP should look like this: toggle = 1; toggle_len = sizeof(toggle); setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_IP, IP_PASSSEC, &toggle, &toggle_len); recvmsg(sockfd, &msg_hdr, 0); if (msg_hdr.msg_controllen > sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) { cmsg_hdr = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg_hdr); if (cmsg_hdr->cmsg_len <= CMSG_LEN(sizeof(scontext)) && cmsg_hdr->cmsg_level == SOL_IP && cmsg_hdr->cmsg_type == SCM_SECURITY) { memcpy(&scontext, CMSG_DATA(cmsg_hdr), sizeof(scontext)); } } ip_setsockopt is enhanced with a new socket option IP_PASSSEC to allow a server socket to receive security context of the peer. A new ancillary message type SCM_SECURITY. When the packet is received we get the security context from the sec_path pointer which is contained in the sk_buff, and copy it to the ancillary message space. An additional LSM hook, selinux_socket_getpeersec_udp, is defined to retrieve the security context from the SELinux space. The existing function, selinux_socket_getpeersec does not suit our purpose, because the security context is copied directly to user space, rather than to kernel space. Testing: We have tested the patch by setting up TCP and UDP connections between applications on two machines using the IPSec policies that result in labeled security associations being built. For TCP, we can then extract the peer security context using getsockopt on either end. For UDP, the receiving end can retrieve the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg. Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-03-21 07:41:23 +01:00
static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
char *secdata;
u32 seclen;
int err;
err = security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(skb, &secdata, &seclen);
if (err)
return;
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IP, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
}
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
void ip_cmsg_recv(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(skb->sk);
unsigned flags = inet->cmsg_flags;
/* Ordered by supposed usage frequency */
if (flags & 1)
ip_cmsg_recv_pktinfo(msg, skb);
if ((flags>>=1) == 0)
return;
if (flags & 1)
ip_cmsg_recv_ttl(msg, skb);
if ((flags>>=1) == 0)
return;
if (flags & 1)
ip_cmsg_recv_tos(msg, skb);
if ((flags>>=1) == 0)
return;
if (flags & 1)
ip_cmsg_recv_opts(msg, skb);
if ((flags>>=1) == 0)
return;
if (flags & 1)
ip_cmsg_recv_retopts(msg, skb);
[SECURITY]: TCP/UDP getpeersec This patch implements an application of the LSM-IPSec networking controls whereby an application can determine the label of the security association its TCP or UDP sockets are currently connected to via getsockopt and the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg. Patch purpose: This patch enables a security-aware application to retrieve the security context of an IPSec security association a particular TCP or UDP socket is using. The application can then use this security context to determine the security context for processing on behalf of the peer at the other end of this connection. In the case of UDP, the security context is for each individual packet. An example application is the inetd daemon, which could be modified to start daemons running at security contexts dependent on the remote client. Patch design approach: - Design for TCP The patch enables the SELinux LSM to set the peer security context for a socket based on the security context of the IPSec security association. The application may retrieve this context using getsockopt. When called, the kernel determines if the socket is a connected (TCP_ESTABLISHED) TCP socket and, if so, uses the dst_entry cache on the socket to retrieve the security associations. If a security association has a security context, the context string is returned, as for UNIX domain sockets. - Design for UDP Unlike TCP, UDP is connectionless. This requires a somewhat different API to retrieve the peer security context. With TCP, the peer security context stays the same throughout the connection, thus it can be retrieved at any time between when the connection is established and when it is torn down. With UDP, each read/write can have different peer and thus the security context might change every time. As a result the security context retrieval must be done TOGETHER with the packet retrieval. The solution is to build upon the existing Unix domain socket API for retrieving user credentials. Linux offers the API for obtaining user credentials via ancillary messages (i.e., out of band/control messages that are bundled together with a normal message). Patch implementation details: - Implementation for TCP The security context can be retrieved by applications using getsockopt with the existing SO_PEERSEC flag. As an example (ignoring error checking): getsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PEERSEC, optbuf, &optlen); printf("Socket peer context is: %s\n", optbuf); The SELinux function, selinux_socket_getpeersec, is extended to check for labeled security associations for connected (TCP_ESTABLISHED == sk->sk_state) TCP sockets only. If so, the socket has a dst_cache of struct dst_entry values that may refer to security associations. If these have security associations with security contexts, the security context is returned. getsockopt returns a buffer that contains a security context string or the buffer is unmodified. - Implementation for UDP To retrieve the security context, the application first indicates to the kernel such desire by setting the IP_PASSSEC option via getsockopt. Then the application retrieves the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism. An example server application for UDP should look like this: toggle = 1; toggle_len = sizeof(toggle); setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_IP, IP_PASSSEC, &toggle, &toggle_len); recvmsg(sockfd, &msg_hdr, 0); if (msg_hdr.msg_controllen > sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) { cmsg_hdr = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg_hdr); if (cmsg_hdr->cmsg_len <= CMSG_LEN(sizeof(scontext)) && cmsg_hdr->cmsg_level == SOL_IP && cmsg_hdr->cmsg_type == SCM_SECURITY) { memcpy(&scontext, CMSG_DATA(cmsg_hdr), sizeof(scontext)); } } ip_setsockopt is enhanced with a new socket option IP_PASSSEC to allow a server socket to receive security context of the peer. A new ancillary message type SCM_SECURITY. When the packet is received we get the security context from the sec_path pointer which is contained in the sk_buff, and copy it to the ancillary message space. An additional LSM hook, selinux_socket_getpeersec_udp, is defined to retrieve the security context from the SELinux space. The existing function, selinux_socket_getpeersec does not suit our purpose, because the security context is copied directly to user space, rather than to kernel space. Testing: We have tested the patch by setting up TCP and UDP connections between applications on two machines using the IPSec policies that result in labeled security associations being built. For TCP, we can then extract the peer security context using getsockopt on either end. For UDP, the receiving end can retrieve the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg. Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-03-21 07:41:23 +01:00
if ((flags>>=1) == 0)
return;
if (flags & 1)
ip_cmsg_recv_security(msg, skb);
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
}
int ip_cmsg_send(struct msghdr *msg, struct ipcm_cookie *ipc)
{
int err;
struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
for (cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(msg); cmsg; cmsg = CMSG_NXTHDR(msg, cmsg)) {
if (!CMSG_OK(msg, cmsg))
return -EINVAL;
if (cmsg->cmsg_level != SOL_IP)
continue;
switch (cmsg->cmsg_type) {
case IP_RETOPTS:
err = cmsg->cmsg_len - CMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct cmsghdr));
[IP]: Introduce ip_options_get_from_user This variant is needed to satisfy sparse __user annotations. Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@mandriva.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-08-17 00:46:48 +02:00
err = ip_options_get(&ipc->opt, CMSG_DATA(cmsg), err < 40 ? err : 40);
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
if (err)
return err;
break;
case IP_PKTINFO:
{
struct in_pktinfo *info;
if (cmsg->cmsg_len != CMSG_LEN(sizeof(struct in_pktinfo)))
return -EINVAL;
info = (struct in_pktinfo *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg);
ipc->oif = info->ipi_ifindex;
ipc->addr = info->ipi_spec_dst.s_addr;
break;
}
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
}
return 0;
}
/* Special input handler for packets caught by router alert option.
They are selected only by protocol field, and then processed likely
local ones; but only if someone wants them! Otherwise, router
not running rsvpd will kill RSVP.
It is user level problem, what it will make with them.
I have no idea, how it will masquearde or NAT them (it is joke, joke :-)),
but receiver should be enough clever f.e. to forward mtrace requests,
sent to multicast group to reach destination designated router.
*/
struct ip_ra_chain *ip_ra_chain;
DEFINE_RWLOCK(ip_ra_lock);
int ip_ra_control(struct sock *sk, unsigned char on, void (*destructor)(struct sock *))
{
struct ip_ra_chain *ra, *new_ra, **rap;
if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_RAW || inet_sk(sk)->num == IPPROTO_RAW)
return -EINVAL;
new_ra = on ? kmalloc(sizeof(*new_ra), GFP_KERNEL) : NULL;
write_lock_bh(&ip_ra_lock);
for (rap = &ip_ra_chain; (ra=*rap) != NULL; rap = &ra->next) {
if (ra->sk == sk) {
if (on) {
write_unlock_bh(&ip_ra_lock);
[NET]: kfree cleanup From: Jesper Juhl <jesper.juhl@gmail.com> This is the net/ part of the big kfree cleanup patch. Remove pointless checks for NULL prior to calling kfree() in net/. Signed-off-by: Jesper Juhl <jesper.juhl@gmail.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@conectiva.com.br> Acked-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Acked-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
2005-11-08 18:41:34 +01:00
kfree(new_ra);
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
return -EADDRINUSE;
}
*rap = ra->next;
write_unlock_bh(&ip_ra_lock);
if (ra->destructor)
ra->destructor(sk);
sock_put(sk);
kfree(ra);
return 0;
}
}
if (new_ra == NULL) {
write_unlock_bh(&ip_ra_lock);
return -ENOBUFS;
}
new_ra->sk = sk;
new_ra->destructor = destructor;
new_ra->next = ra;
*rap = new_ra;
sock_hold(sk);
write_unlock_bh(&ip_ra_lock);
return 0;
}
void ip_icmp_error(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, int err,
u16 port, u32 info, u8 *payload)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct sock_exterr_skb *serr;
if (!inet->recverr)
return;
skb = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!skb)
return;
serr = SKB_EXT_ERR(skb);
serr->ee.ee_errno = err;
serr->ee.ee_origin = SO_EE_ORIGIN_ICMP;
serr->ee.ee_type = skb->h.icmph->type;
serr->ee.ee_code = skb->h.icmph->code;
serr->ee.ee_pad = 0;
serr->ee.ee_info = info;
serr->ee.ee_data = 0;
serr->addr_offset = (u8*)&(((struct iphdr*)(skb->h.icmph+1))->daddr) - skb->nh.raw;
serr->port = port;
skb->h.raw = payload;
if (!skb_pull(skb, payload - skb->data) ||
sock_queue_err_skb(sk, skb))
kfree_skb(skb);
}
void ip_local_error(struct sock *sk, int err, u32 daddr, u16 port, u32 info)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct sock_exterr_skb *serr;
struct iphdr *iph;
struct sk_buff *skb;
if (!inet->recverr)
return;
skb = alloc_skb(sizeof(struct iphdr), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!skb)
return;
iph = (struct iphdr*)skb_put(skb, sizeof(struct iphdr));
skb->nh.iph = iph;
iph->daddr = daddr;
serr = SKB_EXT_ERR(skb);
serr->ee.ee_errno = err;
serr->ee.ee_origin = SO_EE_ORIGIN_LOCAL;
serr->ee.ee_type = 0;
serr->ee.ee_code = 0;
serr->ee.ee_pad = 0;
serr->ee.ee_info = info;
serr->ee.ee_data = 0;
serr->addr_offset = (u8*)&iph->daddr - skb->nh.raw;
serr->port = port;
skb->h.raw = skb->tail;
__skb_pull(skb, skb->tail - skb->data);
if (sock_queue_err_skb(sk, skb))
kfree_skb(skb);
}
/*
* Handle MSG_ERRQUEUE
*/
int ip_recv_error(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, int len)
{
struct sock_exterr_skb *serr;
struct sk_buff *skb, *skb2;
struct sockaddr_in *sin;
struct {
struct sock_extended_err ee;
struct sockaddr_in offender;
} errhdr;
int err;
int copied;
err = -EAGAIN;
skb = skb_dequeue(&sk->sk_error_queue);
if (skb == NULL)
goto out;
copied = skb->len;
if (copied > len) {
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
copied = len;
}
err = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied);
if (err)
goto out_free_skb;
sock_recv_timestamp(msg, sk, skb);
serr = SKB_EXT_ERR(skb);
sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)msg->msg_name;
if (sin) {
sin->sin_family = AF_INET;
sin->sin_addr.s_addr = *(u32*)(skb->nh.raw + serr->addr_offset);
sin->sin_port = serr->port;
memset(&sin->sin_zero, 0, sizeof(sin->sin_zero));
}
memcpy(&errhdr.ee, &serr->ee, sizeof(struct sock_extended_err));
sin = &errhdr.offender;
sin->sin_family = AF_UNSPEC;
if (serr->ee.ee_origin == SO_EE_ORIGIN_ICMP) {
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
sin->sin_family = AF_INET;
sin->sin_addr.s_addr = skb->nh.iph->saddr;
sin->sin_port = 0;
memset(&sin->sin_zero, 0, sizeof(sin->sin_zero));
if (inet->cmsg_flags)
ip_cmsg_recv(msg, skb);
}
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IP, IP_RECVERR, sizeof(errhdr), &errhdr);
/* Now we could try to dump offended packet options */
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_ERRQUEUE;
err = copied;
/* Reset and regenerate socket error */
[IPV4/IPV6]: Replace spin_lock_irq with spin_lock_bh In light of my recent patch to net/ipv4/udp.c that replaced the spin_lock_irq calls on the receive queue lock with spin_lock_bh, here is a similar patch for all other occurences of spin_lock_irq on receive/error queue locks in IPv4 and IPv6. In these stacks, we know that they can only be entered from user or softirq context. Therefore it's safe to disable BH only. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-06-19 07:56:18 +02:00
spin_lock_bh(&sk->sk_error_queue.lock);
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
sk->sk_err = 0;
if ((skb2 = skb_peek(&sk->sk_error_queue)) != NULL) {
sk->sk_err = SKB_EXT_ERR(skb2)->ee.ee_errno;
[IPV4/IPV6]: Replace spin_lock_irq with spin_lock_bh In light of my recent patch to net/ipv4/udp.c that replaced the spin_lock_irq calls on the receive queue lock with spin_lock_bh, here is a similar patch for all other occurences of spin_lock_irq on receive/error queue locks in IPv4 and IPv6. In these stacks, we know that they can only be entered from user or softirq context. Therefore it's safe to disable BH only. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-06-19 07:56:18 +02:00
spin_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_error_queue.lock);
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
sk->sk_error_report(sk);
} else
[IPV4/IPV6]: Replace spin_lock_irq with spin_lock_bh In light of my recent patch to net/ipv4/udp.c that replaced the spin_lock_irq calls on the receive queue lock with spin_lock_bh, here is a similar patch for all other occurences of spin_lock_irq on receive/error queue locks in IPv4 and IPv6. In these stacks, we know that they can only be entered from user or softirq context. Therefore it's safe to disable BH only. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-06-19 07:56:18 +02:00
spin_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_error_queue.lock);
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
out_free_skb:
kfree_skb(skb);
out:
return err;
}
/*
* Socket option code for IP. This is the end of the line after any TCP,UDP etc options on
* an IP socket.
*/
[NET]: {get|set}sockopt compatibility layer This patch extends {get|set}sockopt compatibility layer in order to move protocol specific parts to their place and avoid huge universal net/compat.c file in the future. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Mishin <dim@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-03-21 07:45:21 +01:00
static int do_ip_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level,
int optname, char __user *optval, int optlen)
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
int val=0,err;
if (((1<<optname) & ((1<<IP_PKTINFO) | (1<<IP_RECVTTL) |
(1<<IP_RECVOPTS) | (1<<IP_RECVTOS) |
(1<<IP_RETOPTS) | (1<<IP_TOS) |
(1<<IP_TTL) | (1<<IP_HDRINCL) |
(1<<IP_MTU_DISCOVER) | (1<<IP_RECVERR) |
[SECURITY]: TCP/UDP getpeersec This patch implements an application of the LSM-IPSec networking controls whereby an application can determine the label of the security association its TCP or UDP sockets are currently connected to via getsockopt and the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg. Patch purpose: This patch enables a security-aware application to retrieve the security context of an IPSec security association a particular TCP or UDP socket is using. The application can then use this security context to determine the security context for processing on behalf of the peer at the other end of this connection. In the case of UDP, the security context is for each individual packet. An example application is the inetd daemon, which could be modified to start daemons running at security contexts dependent on the remote client. Patch design approach: - Design for TCP The patch enables the SELinux LSM to set the peer security context for a socket based on the security context of the IPSec security association. The application may retrieve this context using getsockopt. When called, the kernel determines if the socket is a connected (TCP_ESTABLISHED) TCP socket and, if so, uses the dst_entry cache on the socket to retrieve the security associations. If a security association has a security context, the context string is returned, as for UNIX domain sockets. - Design for UDP Unlike TCP, UDP is connectionless. This requires a somewhat different API to retrieve the peer security context. With TCP, the peer security context stays the same throughout the connection, thus it can be retrieved at any time between when the connection is established and when it is torn down. With UDP, each read/write can have different peer and thus the security context might change every time. As a result the security context retrieval must be done TOGETHER with the packet retrieval. The solution is to build upon the existing Unix domain socket API for retrieving user credentials. Linux offers the API for obtaining user credentials via ancillary messages (i.e., out of band/control messages that are bundled together with a normal message). Patch implementation details: - Implementation for TCP The security context can be retrieved by applications using getsockopt with the existing SO_PEERSEC flag. As an example (ignoring error checking): getsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PEERSEC, optbuf, &optlen); printf("Socket peer context is: %s\n", optbuf); The SELinux function, selinux_socket_getpeersec, is extended to check for labeled security associations for connected (TCP_ESTABLISHED == sk->sk_state) TCP sockets only. If so, the socket has a dst_cache of struct dst_entry values that may refer to security associations. If these have security associations with security contexts, the security context is returned. getsockopt returns a buffer that contains a security context string or the buffer is unmodified. - Implementation for UDP To retrieve the security context, the application first indicates to the kernel such desire by setting the IP_PASSSEC option via getsockopt. Then the application retrieves the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism. An example server application for UDP should look like this: toggle = 1; toggle_len = sizeof(toggle); setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_IP, IP_PASSSEC, &toggle, &toggle_len); recvmsg(sockfd, &msg_hdr, 0); if (msg_hdr.msg_controllen > sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) { cmsg_hdr = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg_hdr); if (cmsg_hdr->cmsg_len <= CMSG_LEN(sizeof(scontext)) && cmsg_hdr->cmsg_level == SOL_IP && cmsg_hdr->cmsg_type == SCM_SECURITY) { memcpy(&scontext, CMSG_DATA(cmsg_hdr), sizeof(scontext)); } } ip_setsockopt is enhanced with a new socket option IP_PASSSEC to allow a server socket to receive security context of the peer. A new ancillary message type SCM_SECURITY. When the packet is received we get the security context from the sec_path pointer which is contained in the sk_buff, and copy it to the ancillary message space. An additional LSM hook, selinux_socket_getpeersec_udp, is defined to retrieve the security context from the SELinux space. The existing function, selinux_socket_getpeersec does not suit our purpose, because the security context is copied directly to user space, rather than to kernel space. Testing: We have tested the patch by setting up TCP and UDP connections between applications on two machines using the IPSec policies that result in labeled security associations being built. For TCP, we can then extract the peer security context using getsockopt on either end. For UDP, the receiving end can retrieve the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg. Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-03-21 07:41:23 +01:00
(1<<IP_ROUTER_ALERT) | (1<<IP_FREEBIND) |
(1<<IP_PASSSEC))) ||
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
optname == IP_MULTICAST_TTL ||
optname == IP_MULTICAST_LOOP) {
if (optlen >= sizeof(int)) {
if (get_user(val, (int __user *) optval))
return -EFAULT;
} else if (optlen >= sizeof(char)) {
unsigned char ucval;
if (get_user(ucval, (unsigned char __user *) optval))
return -EFAULT;
val = (int) ucval;
}
}
/* If optlen==0, it is equivalent to val == 0 */
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_MROUTE
if (optname >= MRT_BASE && optname <= (MRT_BASE + 10))
return ip_mroute_setsockopt(sk,optname,optval,optlen);
#endif
err = 0;
lock_sock(sk);
switch (optname) {
case IP_OPTIONS:
{
struct ip_options * opt = NULL;
if (optlen > 40 || optlen < 0)
goto e_inval;
[IP]: Introduce ip_options_get_from_user This variant is needed to satisfy sparse __user annotations. Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@mandriva.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-08-17 00:46:48 +02:00
err = ip_options_get_from_user(&opt, optval, optlen);
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
if (err)
break;
[IP_SOCKGLUE]: Remove most of the tcp specific calls As DCCP needs to be called in the same spots. Now we have a member in inet_sock (is_icsk), set at sock creation time from struct inet_protosw->flags (if INET_PROTOSW_ICSK is set, like for TCP and DCCP) to see if a struct sock instance is a inet_connection_sock for places like the ones in ip_sockglue.c (v4 and v6) where we previously were looking if sk_type was SOCK_STREAM, that is insufficient because we now use the same code for DCCP, that has sk_type SOCK_DCCP. Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@mandriva.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-12-14 08:26:10 +01:00
if (inet->is_icsk) {
struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET ||
(!((1 << sk->sk_state) &
(TCPF_LISTEN | TCPF_CLOSE)) &&
inet->daddr != LOOPBACK4_IPV6)) {
#endif
if (inet->opt)
[IP_SOCKGLUE]: Remove most of the tcp specific calls As DCCP needs to be called in the same spots. Now we have a member in inet_sock (is_icsk), set at sock creation time from struct inet_protosw->flags (if INET_PROTOSW_ICSK is set, like for TCP and DCCP) to see if a struct sock instance is a inet_connection_sock for places like the ones in ip_sockglue.c (v4 and v6) where we previously were looking if sk_type was SOCK_STREAM, that is insufficient because we now use the same code for DCCP, that has sk_type SOCK_DCCP. Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@mandriva.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-12-14 08:26:10 +01:00
icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len -= inet->opt->optlen;
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
if (opt)
[IP_SOCKGLUE]: Remove most of the tcp specific calls As DCCP needs to be called in the same spots. Now we have a member in inet_sock (is_icsk), set at sock creation time from struct inet_protosw->flags (if INET_PROTOSW_ICSK is set, like for TCP and DCCP) to see if a struct sock instance is a inet_connection_sock for places like the ones in ip_sockglue.c (v4 and v6) where we previously were looking if sk_type was SOCK_STREAM, that is insufficient because we now use the same code for DCCP, that has sk_type SOCK_DCCP. Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@mandriva.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-12-14 08:26:10 +01:00
icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len += opt->optlen;
icsk->icsk_sync_mss(sk, icsk->icsk_pmtu_cookie);
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
}
#endif
}
opt = xchg(&inet->opt, opt);
[NET]: kfree cleanup From: Jesper Juhl <jesper.juhl@gmail.com> This is the net/ part of the big kfree cleanup patch. Remove pointless checks for NULL prior to calling kfree() in net/. Signed-off-by: Jesper Juhl <jesper.juhl@gmail.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@conectiva.com.br> Acked-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Acked-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
2005-11-08 18:41:34 +01:00
kfree(opt);
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
break;
}
case IP_PKTINFO:
if (val)
inet->cmsg_flags |= IP_CMSG_PKTINFO;
else
inet->cmsg_flags &= ~IP_CMSG_PKTINFO;
break;
case IP_RECVTTL:
if (val)
inet->cmsg_flags |= IP_CMSG_TTL;
else
inet->cmsg_flags &= ~IP_CMSG_TTL;
break;
case IP_RECVTOS:
if (val)
inet->cmsg_flags |= IP_CMSG_TOS;
else
inet->cmsg_flags &= ~IP_CMSG_TOS;
break;
case IP_RECVOPTS:
if (val)
inet->cmsg_flags |= IP_CMSG_RECVOPTS;
else
inet->cmsg_flags &= ~IP_CMSG_RECVOPTS;
break;
case IP_RETOPTS:
if (val)
inet->cmsg_flags |= IP_CMSG_RETOPTS;
else
inet->cmsg_flags &= ~IP_CMSG_RETOPTS;
break;
[SECURITY]: TCP/UDP getpeersec This patch implements an application of the LSM-IPSec networking controls whereby an application can determine the label of the security association its TCP or UDP sockets are currently connected to via getsockopt and the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg. Patch purpose: This patch enables a security-aware application to retrieve the security context of an IPSec security association a particular TCP or UDP socket is using. The application can then use this security context to determine the security context for processing on behalf of the peer at the other end of this connection. In the case of UDP, the security context is for each individual packet. An example application is the inetd daemon, which could be modified to start daemons running at security contexts dependent on the remote client. Patch design approach: - Design for TCP The patch enables the SELinux LSM to set the peer security context for a socket based on the security context of the IPSec security association. The application may retrieve this context using getsockopt. When called, the kernel determines if the socket is a connected (TCP_ESTABLISHED) TCP socket and, if so, uses the dst_entry cache on the socket to retrieve the security associations. If a security association has a security context, the context string is returned, as for UNIX domain sockets. - Design for UDP Unlike TCP, UDP is connectionless. This requires a somewhat different API to retrieve the peer security context. With TCP, the peer security context stays the same throughout the connection, thus it can be retrieved at any time between when the connection is established and when it is torn down. With UDP, each read/write can have different peer and thus the security context might change every time. As a result the security context retrieval must be done TOGETHER with the packet retrieval. The solution is to build upon the existing Unix domain socket API for retrieving user credentials. Linux offers the API for obtaining user credentials via ancillary messages (i.e., out of band/control messages that are bundled together with a normal message). Patch implementation details: - Implementation for TCP The security context can be retrieved by applications using getsockopt with the existing SO_PEERSEC flag. As an example (ignoring error checking): getsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PEERSEC, optbuf, &optlen); printf("Socket peer context is: %s\n", optbuf); The SELinux function, selinux_socket_getpeersec, is extended to check for labeled security associations for connected (TCP_ESTABLISHED == sk->sk_state) TCP sockets only. If so, the socket has a dst_cache of struct dst_entry values that may refer to security associations. If these have security associations with security contexts, the security context is returned. getsockopt returns a buffer that contains a security context string or the buffer is unmodified. - Implementation for UDP To retrieve the security context, the application first indicates to the kernel such desire by setting the IP_PASSSEC option via getsockopt. Then the application retrieves the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism. An example server application for UDP should look like this: toggle = 1; toggle_len = sizeof(toggle); setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_IP, IP_PASSSEC, &toggle, &toggle_len); recvmsg(sockfd, &msg_hdr, 0); if (msg_hdr.msg_controllen > sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) { cmsg_hdr = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg_hdr); if (cmsg_hdr->cmsg_len <= CMSG_LEN(sizeof(scontext)) && cmsg_hdr->cmsg_level == SOL_IP && cmsg_hdr->cmsg_type == SCM_SECURITY) { memcpy(&scontext, CMSG_DATA(cmsg_hdr), sizeof(scontext)); } } ip_setsockopt is enhanced with a new socket option IP_PASSSEC to allow a server socket to receive security context of the peer. A new ancillary message type SCM_SECURITY. When the packet is received we get the security context from the sec_path pointer which is contained in the sk_buff, and copy it to the ancillary message space. An additional LSM hook, selinux_socket_getpeersec_udp, is defined to retrieve the security context from the SELinux space. The existing function, selinux_socket_getpeersec does not suit our purpose, because the security context is copied directly to user space, rather than to kernel space. Testing: We have tested the patch by setting up TCP and UDP connections between applications on two machines using the IPSec policies that result in labeled security associations being built. For TCP, we can then extract the peer security context using getsockopt on either end. For UDP, the receiving end can retrieve the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg. Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-03-21 07:41:23 +01:00
case IP_PASSSEC:
if (val)
inet->cmsg_flags |= IP_CMSG_PASSSEC;
else
inet->cmsg_flags &= ~IP_CMSG_PASSSEC;
break;
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
case IP_TOS: /* This sets both TOS and Precedence */
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM) {
val &= ~3;
val |= inet->tos & 3;
}
if (IPTOS_PREC(val) >= IPTOS_PREC_CRITIC_ECP &&
!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
err = -EPERM;
break;
}
if (inet->tos != val) {
inet->tos = val;
sk->sk_priority = rt_tos2priority(val);
sk_dst_reset(sk);
}
break;
case IP_TTL:
if (optlen<1)
goto e_inval;
if (val != -1 && (val < 1 || val>255))
goto e_inval;
inet->uc_ttl = val;
break;
case IP_HDRINCL:
if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_RAW) {
err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
break;
}
inet->hdrincl = val ? 1 : 0;
break;
case IP_MTU_DISCOVER:
if (val<0 || val>2)
goto e_inval;
inet->pmtudisc = val;
break;
case IP_RECVERR:
inet->recverr = !!val;
if (!val)
skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_error_queue);
break;
case IP_MULTICAST_TTL:
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM)
goto e_inval;
if (optlen<1)
goto e_inval;
if (val==-1)
val = 1;
if (val < 0 || val > 255)
goto e_inval;
inet->mc_ttl = val;
break;
case IP_MULTICAST_LOOP:
if (optlen<1)
goto e_inval;
inet->mc_loop = !!val;
break;
case IP_MULTICAST_IF:
{
struct ip_mreqn mreq;
struct net_device *dev = NULL;
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM)
goto e_inval;
/*
* Check the arguments are allowable
*/
err = -EFAULT;
if (optlen >= sizeof(struct ip_mreqn)) {
if (copy_from_user(&mreq,optval,sizeof(mreq)))
break;
} else {
memset(&mreq, 0, sizeof(mreq));
if (optlen >= sizeof(struct in_addr) &&
copy_from_user(&mreq.imr_address,optval,sizeof(struct in_addr)))
break;
}
if (!mreq.imr_ifindex) {
if (mreq.imr_address.s_addr == INADDR_ANY) {
inet->mc_index = 0;
inet->mc_addr = 0;
err = 0;
break;
}
dev = ip_dev_find(mreq.imr_address.s_addr);
if (dev) {
mreq.imr_ifindex = dev->ifindex;
dev_put(dev);
}
} else
dev = __dev_get_by_index(mreq.imr_ifindex);
err = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
if (!dev)
break;
err = -EINVAL;
if (sk->sk_bound_dev_if &&
mreq.imr_ifindex != sk->sk_bound_dev_if)
break;
inet->mc_index = mreq.imr_ifindex;
inet->mc_addr = mreq.imr_address.s_addr;
err = 0;
break;
}
case IP_ADD_MEMBERSHIP:
case IP_DROP_MEMBERSHIP:
{
struct ip_mreqn mreq;
if (optlen < sizeof(struct ip_mreq))
goto e_inval;
err = -EFAULT;
if (optlen >= sizeof(struct ip_mreqn)) {
if(copy_from_user(&mreq,optval,sizeof(mreq)))
break;
} else {
memset(&mreq, 0, sizeof(mreq));
if (copy_from_user(&mreq,optval,sizeof(struct ip_mreq)))
break;
}
if (optname == IP_ADD_MEMBERSHIP)
err = ip_mc_join_group(sk, &mreq);
else
err = ip_mc_leave_group(sk, &mreq);
break;
}
case IP_MSFILTER:
{
extern int sysctl_igmp_max_msf;
struct ip_msfilter *msf;
if (optlen < IP_MSFILTER_SIZE(0))
goto e_inval;
if (optlen > sysctl_optmem_max) {
err = -ENOBUFS;
break;
}
[NET]: Remove more unneeded typecasts on *malloc() This removes more unneeded casts on the return value for kmalloc(), sock_kmalloc(), and vmalloc(). Signed-off-by: Kris Katterjohn <kjak@users.sourceforge.net> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-01-12 00:56:43 +01:00
msf = kmalloc(optlen, GFP_KERNEL);
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
if (msf == 0) {
err = -ENOBUFS;
break;
}
err = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(msf, optval, optlen)) {
kfree(msf);
break;
}
/* numsrc >= (1G-4) overflow in 32 bits */
if (msf->imsf_numsrc >= 0x3ffffffcU ||
msf->imsf_numsrc > sysctl_igmp_max_msf) {
kfree(msf);
err = -ENOBUFS;
break;
}
if (IP_MSFILTER_SIZE(msf->imsf_numsrc) > optlen) {
kfree(msf);
err = -EINVAL;
break;
}
err = ip_mc_msfilter(sk, msf, 0);
kfree(msf);
break;
}
case IP_BLOCK_SOURCE:
case IP_UNBLOCK_SOURCE:
case IP_ADD_SOURCE_MEMBERSHIP:
case IP_DROP_SOURCE_MEMBERSHIP:
{
struct ip_mreq_source mreqs;
int omode, add;
if (optlen != sizeof(struct ip_mreq_source))
goto e_inval;
if (copy_from_user(&mreqs, optval, sizeof(mreqs))) {
err = -EFAULT;
break;
}
if (optname == IP_BLOCK_SOURCE) {
omode = MCAST_EXCLUDE;
add = 1;
} else if (optname == IP_UNBLOCK_SOURCE) {
omode = MCAST_EXCLUDE;
add = 0;
} else if (optname == IP_ADD_SOURCE_MEMBERSHIP) {
struct ip_mreqn mreq;
mreq.imr_multiaddr.s_addr = mreqs.imr_multiaddr;
mreq.imr_address.s_addr = mreqs.imr_interface;
mreq.imr_ifindex = 0;
err = ip_mc_join_group(sk, &mreq);
[IPV4]: multicast API "join" issues 1) Changes IP_ADD_SOURCE_MEMBERSHIP and MCAST_JOIN_SOURCE_GROUP to ignore EADDRINUSE errors on a "courtesy join" -- prior membership or not is ok for these. 2) Adds "leave group" equivalence of (INCLUDE, empty) filters in the delta-based API. Without this, mixing delta-based API calls that end in an (INCLUDE, empty) filter would not allow a subsequent regular IP_ADD_MEMBERSHIP. It also frees socket buffer memory that isn't needed for both the multicast group record and source filter. Signed-off-by: David L Stevens <dlstevens@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-07-09 02:39:23 +02:00
if (err && err != -EADDRINUSE)
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
break;
omode = MCAST_INCLUDE;
add = 1;
[IPV4]: multicast API "join" issues 1) Changes IP_ADD_SOURCE_MEMBERSHIP and MCAST_JOIN_SOURCE_GROUP to ignore EADDRINUSE errors on a "courtesy join" -- prior membership or not is ok for these. 2) Adds "leave group" equivalence of (INCLUDE, empty) filters in the delta-based API. Without this, mixing delta-based API calls that end in an (INCLUDE, empty) filter would not allow a subsequent regular IP_ADD_MEMBERSHIP. It also frees socket buffer memory that isn't needed for both the multicast group record and source filter. Signed-off-by: David L Stevens <dlstevens@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-07-09 02:39:23 +02:00
} else /* IP_DROP_SOURCE_MEMBERSHIP */ {
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
omode = MCAST_INCLUDE;
add = 0;
}
err = ip_mc_source(add, omode, sk, &mreqs, 0);
break;
}
case MCAST_JOIN_GROUP:
case MCAST_LEAVE_GROUP:
{
struct group_req greq;
struct sockaddr_in *psin;
struct ip_mreqn mreq;
if (optlen < sizeof(struct group_req))
goto e_inval;
err = -EFAULT;
if(copy_from_user(&greq, optval, sizeof(greq)))
break;
psin = (struct sockaddr_in *)&greq.gr_group;
if (psin->sin_family != AF_INET)
goto e_inval;
memset(&mreq, 0, sizeof(mreq));
mreq.imr_multiaddr = psin->sin_addr;
mreq.imr_ifindex = greq.gr_interface;
if (optname == MCAST_JOIN_GROUP)
err = ip_mc_join_group(sk, &mreq);
else
err = ip_mc_leave_group(sk, &mreq);
break;
}
case MCAST_JOIN_SOURCE_GROUP:
case MCAST_LEAVE_SOURCE_GROUP:
case MCAST_BLOCK_SOURCE:
case MCAST_UNBLOCK_SOURCE:
{
struct group_source_req greqs;
struct ip_mreq_source mreqs;
struct sockaddr_in *psin;
int omode, add;
if (optlen != sizeof(struct group_source_req))
goto e_inval;
if (copy_from_user(&greqs, optval, sizeof(greqs))) {
err = -EFAULT;
break;
}
if (greqs.gsr_group.ss_family != AF_INET ||
greqs.gsr_source.ss_family != AF_INET) {
err = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
break;
}
psin = (struct sockaddr_in *)&greqs.gsr_group;
mreqs.imr_multiaddr = psin->sin_addr.s_addr;
psin = (struct sockaddr_in *)&greqs.gsr_source;
mreqs.imr_sourceaddr = psin->sin_addr.s_addr;
mreqs.imr_interface = 0; /* use index for mc_source */
if (optname == MCAST_BLOCK_SOURCE) {
omode = MCAST_EXCLUDE;
add = 1;
} else if (optname == MCAST_UNBLOCK_SOURCE) {
omode = MCAST_EXCLUDE;
add = 0;
} else if (optname == MCAST_JOIN_SOURCE_GROUP) {
struct ip_mreqn mreq;
psin = (struct sockaddr_in *)&greqs.gsr_group;
mreq.imr_multiaddr = psin->sin_addr;
mreq.imr_address.s_addr = 0;
mreq.imr_ifindex = greqs.gsr_interface;
err = ip_mc_join_group(sk, &mreq);
[IPV4]: multicast API "join" issues 1) Changes IP_ADD_SOURCE_MEMBERSHIP and MCAST_JOIN_SOURCE_GROUP to ignore EADDRINUSE errors on a "courtesy join" -- prior membership or not is ok for these. 2) Adds "leave group" equivalence of (INCLUDE, empty) filters in the delta-based API. Without this, mixing delta-based API calls that end in an (INCLUDE, empty) filter would not allow a subsequent regular IP_ADD_MEMBERSHIP. It also frees socket buffer memory that isn't needed for both the multicast group record and source filter. Signed-off-by: David L Stevens <dlstevens@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-07-09 02:39:23 +02:00
if (err && err != -EADDRINUSE)
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
break;
greqs.gsr_interface = mreq.imr_ifindex;
omode = MCAST_INCLUDE;
add = 1;
} else /* MCAST_LEAVE_SOURCE_GROUP */ {
omode = MCAST_INCLUDE;
add = 0;
}
err = ip_mc_source(add, omode, sk, &mreqs,
greqs.gsr_interface);
break;
}
case MCAST_MSFILTER:
{
extern int sysctl_igmp_max_msf;
struct sockaddr_in *psin;
struct ip_msfilter *msf = NULL;
struct group_filter *gsf = NULL;
int msize, i, ifindex;
if (optlen < GROUP_FILTER_SIZE(0))
goto e_inval;
if (optlen > sysctl_optmem_max) {
err = -ENOBUFS;
break;
}
[NET]: Remove more unneeded typecasts on *malloc() This removes more unneeded casts on the return value for kmalloc(), sock_kmalloc(), and vmalloc(). Signed-off-by: Kris Katterjohn <kjak@users.sourceforge.net> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-01-12 00:56:43 +01:00
gsf = kmalloc(optlen,GFP_KERNEL);
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
if (gsf == 0) {
err = -ENOBUFS;
break;
}
err = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(gsf, optval, optlen)) {
goto mc_msf_out;
}
/* numsrc >= (4G-140)/128 overflow in 32 bits */
if (gsf->gf_numsrc >= 0x1ffffff ||
gsf->gf_numsrc > sysctl_igmp_max_msf) {
err = -ENOBUFS;
goto mc_msf_out;
}
if (GROUP_FILTER_SIZE(gsf->gf_numsrc) > optlen) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto mc_msf_out;
}
msize = IP_MSFILTER_SIZE(gsf->gf_numsrc);
[NET]: Remove more unneeded typecasts on *malloc() This removes more unneeded casts on the return value for kmalloc(), sock_kmalloc(), and vmalloc(). Signed-off-by: Kris Katterjohn <kjak@users.sourceforge.net> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-01-12 00:56:43 +01:00
msf = kmalloc(msize,GFP_KERNEL);
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
if (msf == 0) {
err = -ENOBUFS;
goto mc_msf_out;
}
ifindex = gsf->gf_interface;
psin = (struct sockaddr_in *)&gsf->gf_group;
if (psin->sin_family != AF_INET) {
err = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
goto mc_msf_out;
}
msf->imsf_multiaddr = psin->sin_addr.s_addr;
msf->imsf_interface = 0;
msf->imsf_fmode = gsf->gf_fmode;
msf->imsf_numsrc = gsf->gf_numsrc;
err = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
for (i=0; i<gsf->gf_numsrc; ++i) {
psin = (struct sockaddr_in *)&gsf->gf_slist[i];
if (psin->sin_family != AF_INET)
goto mc_msf_out;
msf->imsf_slist[i] = psin->sin_addr.s_addr;
}
kfree(gsf);
gsf = NULL;
err = ip_mc_msfilter(sk, msf, ifindex);
mc_msf_out:
[NET]: kfree cleanup From: Jesper Juhl <jesper.juhl@gmail.com> This is the net/ part of the big kfree cleanup patch. Remove pointless checks for NULL prior to calling kfree() in net/. Signed-off-by: Jesper Juhl <jesper.juhl@gmail.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@conectiva.com.br> Acked-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Acked-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
2005-11-08 18:41:34 +01:00
kfree(msf);
kfree(gsf);
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
break;
}
case IP_ROUTER_ALERT:
err = ip_ra_control(sk, val ? 1 : 0, NULL);
break;
case IP_FREEBIND:
if (optlen<1)
goto e_inval;
inet->freebind = !!val;
break;
case IP_IPSEC_POLICY:
case IP_XFRM_POLICY:
[IPSEC]: Restrict socket policy loading to CAP_NET_ADMIN. The interface needs much redesigning if we wish to allow normal users to do this in some way. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-08-06 15:33:15 +02:00
err = -EPERM;
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
break;
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
err = xfrm_user_policy(sk, optname, optval, optlen);
break;
default:
err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
break;
}
release_sock(sk);
return err;
e_inval:
release_sock(sk);
return -EINVAL;
}
[NET]: {get|set}sockopt compatibility layer This patch extends {get|set}sockopt compatibility layer in order to move protocol specific parts to their place and avoid huge universal net/compat.c file in the future. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Mishin <dim@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-03-21 07:45:21 +01:00
int ip_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level,
int optname, char __user *optval, int optlen)
{
int err;
if (level != SOL_IP)
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
err = do_ip_setsockopt(sk, level, optname, optval, optlen);
#ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
/* we need to exclude all possible ENOPROTOOPTs except default case */
if (err == -ENOPROTOOPT && optname != IP_HDRINCL &&
optname != IP_IPSEC_POLICY && optname != IP_XFRM_POLICY
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_MROUTE
&& (optname < MRT_BASE || optname > (MRT_BASE + 10))
#endif
) {
lock_sock(sk);
err = nf_setsockopt(sk, PF_INET, optname, optval, optlen);
release_sock(sk);
}
#endif
return err;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
[NET]: Identation & other cleanups related to compat_[gs]etsockopt cset No code changes, just tidying up, in some cases moving EXPORT_SYMBOLs to just after the function exported, etc. Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@mandriva.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-03-21 07:48:35 +01:00
int compat_ip_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, int optlen)
[NET]: {get|set}sockopt compatibility layer This patch extends {get|set}sockopt compatibility layer in order to move protocol specific parts to their place and avoid huge universal net/compat.c file in the future. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Mishin <dim@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-03-21 07:45:21 +01:00
{
int err;
if (level != SOL_IP)
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
err = do_ip_setsockopt(sk, level, optname, optval, optlen);
#ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
/* we need to exclude all possible ENOPROTOOPTs except default case */
if (err == -ENOPROTOOPT && optname != IP_HDRINCL &&
[NET]: Identation & other cleanups related to compat_[gs]etsockopt cset No code changes, just tidying up, in some cases moving EXPORT_SYMBOLs to just after the function exported, etc. Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@mandriva.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-03-21 07:48:35 +01:00
optname != IP_IPSEC_POLICY && optname != IP_XFRM_POLICY
[NET]: {get|set}sockopt compatibility layer This patch extends {get|set}sockopt compatibility layer in order to move protocol specific parts to their place and avoid huge universal net/compat.c file in the future. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Mishin <dim@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-03-21 07:45:21 +01:00
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_MROUTE
[NET]: Identation & other cleanups related to compat_[gs]etsockopt cset No code changes, just tidying up, in some cases moving EXPORT_SYMBOLs to just after the function exported, etc. Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@mandriva.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-03-21 07:48:35 +01:00
&& (optname < MRT_BASE || optname > (MRT_BASE + 10))
[NET]: {get|set}sockopt compatibility layer This patch extends {get|set}sockopt compatibility layer in order to move protocol specific parts to their place and avoid huge universal net/compat.c file in the future. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Mishin <dim@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-03-21 07:45:21 +01:00
#endif
) {
lock_sock(sk);
[NET]: Identation & other cleanups related to compat_[gs]etsockopt cset No code changes, just tidying up, in some cases moving EXPORT_SYMBOLs to just after the function exported, etc. Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@mandriva.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-03-21 07:48:35 +01:00
err = compat_nf_setsockopt(sk, PF_INET, optname,
optval, optlen);
[NET]: {get|set}sockopt compatibility layer This patch extends {get|set}sockopt compatibility layer in order to move protocol specific parts to their place and avoid huge universal net/compat.c file in the future. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Mishin <dim@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-03-21 07:45:21 +01:00
release_sock(sk);
}
#endif
return err;
}
[NET]: Identation & other cleanups related to compat_[gs]etsockopt cset No code changes, just tidying up, in some cases moving EXPORT_SYMBOLs to just after the function exported, etc. Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@mandriva.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-03-21 07:48:35 +01:00
EXPORT_SYMBOL(compat_ip_setsockopt);
[NET]: {get|set}sockopt compatibility layer This patch extends {get|set}sockopt compatibility layer in order to move protocol specific parts to their place and avoid huge universal net/compat.c file in the future. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Mishin <dim@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-03-21 07:45:21 +01:00
#endif
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
/*
* Get the options. Note for future reference. The GET of IP options gets the
* _received_ ones. The set sets the _sent_ ones.
*/
[NET]: {get|set}sockopt compatibility layer This patch extends {get|set}sockopt compatibility layer in order to move protocol specific parts to their place and avoid huge universal net/compat.c file in the future. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Mishin <dim@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-03-21 07:45:21 +01:00
static int do_ip_getsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
int val;
int len;
if(level!=SOL_IP)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_MROUTE
if(optname>=MRT_BASE && optname <=MRT_BASE+10)
{
return ip_mroute_getsockopt(sk,optname,optval,optlen);
}
#endif
if(get_user(len,optlen))
return -EFAULT;
if(len < 0)
return -EINVAL;
lock_sock(sk);
switch(optname) {
case IP_OPTIONS:
{
unsigned char optbuf[sizeof(struct ip_options)+40];
struct ip_options * opt = (struct ip_options*)optbuf;
opt->optlen = 0;
if (inet->opt)
memcpy(optbuf, inet->opt,
sizeof(struct ip_options)+
inet->opt->optlen);
release_sock(sk);
if (opt->optlen == 0)
return put_user(0, optlen);
ip_options_undo(opt);
len = min_t(unsigned int, len, opt->optlen);
if(put_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
if(copy_to_user(optval, opt->__data, len))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
case IP_PKTINFO:
val = (inet->cmsg_flags & IP_CMSG_PKTINFO) != 0;
break;
case IP_RECVTTL:
val = (inet->cmsg_flags & IP_CMSG_TTL) != 0;
break;
case IP_RECVTOS:
val = (inet->cmsg_flags & IP_CMSG_TOS) != 0;
break;
case IP_RECVOPTS:
val = (inet->cmsg_flags & IP_CMSG_RECVOPTS) != 0;
break;
case IP_RETOPTS:
val = (inet->cmsg_flags & IP_CMSG_RETOPTS) != 0;
break;
[SECURITY]: TCP/UDP getpeersec This patch implements an application of the LSM-IPSec networking controls whereby an application can determine the label of the security association its TCP or UDP sockets are currently connected to via getsockopt and the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg. Patch purpose: This patch enables a security-aware application to retrieve the security context of an IPSec security association a particular TCP or UDP socket is using. The application can then use this security context to determine the security context for processing on behalf of the peer at the other end of this connection. In the case of UDP, the security context is for each individual packet. An example application is the inetd daemon, which could be modified to start daemons running at security contexts dependent on the remote client. Patch design approach: - Design for TCP The patch enables the SELinux LSM to set the peer security context for a socket based on the security context of the IPSec security association. The application may retrieve this context using getsockopt. When called, the kernel determines if the socket is a connected (TCP_ESTABLISHED) TCP socket and, if so, uses the dst_entry cache on the socket to retrieve the security associations. If a security association has a security context, the context string is returned, as for UNIX domain sockets. - Design for UDP Unlike TCP, UDP is connectionless. This requires a somewhat different API to retrieve the peer security context. With TCP, the peer security context stays the same throughout the connection, thus it can be retrieved at any time between when the connection is established and when it is torn down. With UDP, each read/write can have different peer and thus the security context might change every time. As a result the security context retrieval must be done TOGETHER with the packet retrieval. The solution is to build upon the existing Unix domain socket API for retrieving user credentials. Linux offers the API for obtaining user credentials via ancillary messages (i.e., out of band/control messages that are bundled together with a normal message). Patch implementation details: - Implementation for TCP The security context can be retrieved by applications using getsockopt with the existing SO_PEERSEC flag. As an example (ignoring error checking): getsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PEERSEC, optbuf, &optlen); printf("Socket peer context is: %s\n", optbuf); The SELinux function, selinux_socket_getpeersec, is extended to check for labeled security associations for connected (TCP_ESTABLISHED == sk->sk_state) TCP sockets only. If so, the socket has a dst_cache of struct dst_entry values that may refer to security associations. If these have security associations with security contexts, the security context is returned. getsockopt returns a buffer that contains a security context string or the buffer is unmodified. - Implementation for UDP To retrieve the security context, the application first indicates to the kernel such desire by setting the IP_PASSSEC option via getsockopt. Then the application retrieves the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism. An example server application for UDP should look like this: toggle = 1; toggle_len = sizeof(toggle); setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_IP, IP_PASSSEC, &toggle, &toggle_len); recvmsg(sockfd, &msg_hdr, 0); if (msg_hdr.msg_controllen > sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) { cmsg_hdr = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg_hdr); if (cmsg_hdr->cmsg_len <= CMSG_LEN(sizeof(scontext)) && cmsg_hdr->cmsg_level == SOL_IP && cmsg_hdr->cmsg_type == SCM_SECURITY) { memcpy(&scontext, CMSG_DATA(cmsg_hdr), sizeof(scontext)); } } ip_setsockopt is enhanced with a new socket option IP_PASSSEC to allow a server socket to receive security context of the peer. A new ancillary message type SCM_SECURITY. When the packet is received we get the security context from the sec_path pointer which is contained in the sk_buff, and copy it to the ancillary message space. An additional LSM hook, selinux_socket_getpeersec_udp, is defined to retrieve the security context from the SELinux space. The existing function, selinux_socket_getpeersec does not suit our purpose, because the security context is copied directly to user space, rather than to kernel space. Testing: We have tested the patch by setting up TCP and UDP connections between applications on two machines using the IPSec policies that result in labeled security associations being built. For TCP, we can then extract the peer security context using getsockopt on either end. For UDP, the receiving end can retrieve the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg. Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-03-21 07:41:23 +01:00
case IP_PASSSEC:
val = (inet->cmsg_flags & IP_CMSG_PASSSEC) != 0;
break;
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
case IP_TOS:
val = inet->tos;
break;
case IP_TTL:
val = (inet->uc_ttl == -1 ?
sysctl_ip_default_ttl :
inet->uc_ttl);
break;
case IP_HDRINCL:
val = inet->hdrincl;
break;
case IP_MTU_DISCOVER:
val = inet->pmtudisc;
break;
case IP_MTU:
{
struct dst_entry *dst;
val = 0;
dst = sk_dst_get(sk);
if (dst) {
val = dst_mtu(dst);
dst_release(dst);
}
if (!val) {
release_sock(sk);
return -ENOTCONN;
}
break;
}
case IP_RECVERR:
val = inet->recverr;
break;
case IP_MULTICAST_TTL:
val = inet->mc_ttl;
break;
case IP_MULTICAST_LOOP:
val = inet->mc_loop;
break;
case IP_MULTICAST_IF:
{
struct in_addr addr;
len = min_t(unsigned int, len, sizeof(struct in_addr));
addr.s_addr = inet->mc_addr;
release_sock(sk);
if(put_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
if(copy_to_user(optval, &addr, len))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
case IP_MSFILTER:
{
struct ip_msfilter msf;
int err;
if (len < IP_MSFILTER_SIZE(0)) {
release_sock(sk);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (copy_from_user(&msf, optval, IP_MSFILTER_SIZE(0))) {
release_sock(sk);
return -EFAULT;
}
err = ip_mc_msfget(sk, &msf,
(struct ip_msfilter __user *)optval, optlen);
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
case MCAST_MSFILTER:
{
struct group_filter gsf;
int err;
if (len < GROUP_FILTER_SIZE(0)) {
release_sock(sk);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (copy_from_user(&gsf, optval, GROUP_FILTER_SIZE(0))) {
release_sock(sk);
return -EFAULT;
}
err = ip_mc_gsfget(sk, &gsf,
(struct group_filter __user *)optval, optlen);
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
case IP_PKTOPTIONS:
{
struct msghdr msg;
release_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_STREAM)
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
msg.msg_control = optval;
msg.msg_controllen = len;
msg.msg_flags = 0;
if (inet->cmsg_flags & IP_CMSG_PKTINFO) {
struct in_pktinfo info;
info.ipi_addr.s_addr = inet->rcv_saddr;
info.ipi_spec_dst.s_addr = inet->rcv_saddr;
info.ipi_ifindex = inet->mc_index;
put_cmsg(&msg, SOL_IP, IP_PKTINFO, sizeof(info), &info);
}
if (inet->cmsg_flags & IP_CMSG_TTL) {
int hlim = inet->mc_ttl;
put_cmsg(&msg, SOL_IP, IP_TTL, sizeof(hlim), &hlim);
}
len -= msg.msg_controllen;
return put_user(len, optlen);
}
case IP_FREEBIND:
val = inet->freebind;
break;
default:
release_sock(sk);
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
release_sock(sk);
if (len < sizeof(int) && len > 0 && val>=0 && val<255) {
unsigned char ucval = (unsigned char)val;
len = 1;
if(put_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
if(copy_to_user(optval,&ucval,1))
return -EFAULT;
} else {
len = min_t(unsigned int, sizeof(int), len);
if(put_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
if(copy_to_user(optval,&val,len))
return -EFAULT;
}
return 0;
}
[NET]: {get|set}sockopt compatibility layer This patch extends {get|set}sockopt compatibility layer in order to move protocol specific parts to their place and avoid huge universal net/compat.c file in the future. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Mishin <dim@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-03-21 07:45:21 +01:00
int ip_getsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level,
int optname, char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
{
int err;
err = do_ip_getsockopt(sk, level, optname, optval, optlen);
#ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
/* we need to exclude all possible ENOPROTOOPTs except default case */
if (err == -ENOPROTOOPT && optname != IP_PKTOPTIONS
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_MROUTE
&& (optname < MRT_BASE || optname > MRT_BASE+10)
#endif
) {
int len;
if(get_user(len,optlen))
return -EFAULT;
lock_sock(sk);
err = nf_getsockopt(sk, PF_INET, optname, optval,
&len);
release_sock(sk);
if (err >= 0)
err = put_user(len, optlen);
return err;
}
#endif
return err;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
[NET]: Identation & other cleanups related to compat_[gs]etsockopt cset No code changes, just tidying up, in some cases moving EXPORT_SYMBOLs to just after the function exported, etc. Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@mandriva.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-03-21 07:48:35 +01:00
int compat_ip_getsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
[NET]: {get|set}sockopt compatibility layer This patch extends {get|set}sockopt compatibility layer in order to move protocol specific parts to their place and avoid huge universal net/compat.c file in the future. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Mishin <dim@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-03-21 07:45:21 +01:00
{
[NET]: Identation & other cleanups related to compat_[gs]etsockopt cset No code changes, just tidying up, in some cases moving EXPORT_SYMBOLs to just after the function exported, etc. Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@mandriva.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-03-21 07:48:35 +01:00
int err = do_ip_getsockopt(sk, level, optname, optval, optlen);
[NET]: {get|set}sockopt compatibility layer This patch extends {get|set}sockopt compatibility layer in order to move protocol specific parts to their place and avoid huge universal net/compat.c file in the future. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Mishin <dim@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-03-21 07:45:21 +01:00
#ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
/* we need to exclude all possible ENOPROTOOPTs except default case */
if (err == -ENOPROTOOPT && optname != IP_PKTOPTIONS
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_MROUTE
[NET]: Identation & other cleanups related to compat_[gs]etsockopt cset No code changes, just tidying up, in some cases moving EXPORT_SYMBOLs to just after the function exported, etc. Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@mandriva.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-03-21 07:48:35 +01:00
&& (optname < MRT_BASE || optname > MRT_BASE+10)
[NET]: {get|set}sockopt compatibility layer This patch extends {get|set}sockopt compatibility layer in order to move protocol specific parts to their place and avoid huge universal net/compat.c file in the future. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Mishin <dim@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-03-21 07:45:21 +01:00
#endif
) {
int len;
[NET]: Identation & other cleanups related to compat_[gs]etsockopt cset No code changes, just tidying up, in some cases moving EXPORT_SYMBOLs to just after the function exported, etc. Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@mandriva.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-03-21 07:48:35 +01:00
if (get_user(len, optlen))
[NET]: {get|set}sockopt compatibility layer This patch extends {get|set}sockopt compatibility layer in order to move protocol specific parts to their place and avoid huge universal net/compat.c file in the future. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Mishin <dim@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-03-21 07:45:21 +01:00
return -EFAULT;
lock_sock(sk);
[NET]: Identation & other cleanups related to compat_[gs]etsockopt cset No code changes, just tidying up, in some cases moving EXPORT_SYMBOLs to just after the function exported, etc. Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@mandriva.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-03-21 07:48:35 +01:00
err = compat_nf_getsockopt(sk, PF_INET, optname, optval, &len);
[NET]: {get|set}sockopt compatibility layer This patch extends {get|set}sockopt compatibility layer in order to move protocol specific parts to their place and avoid huge universal net/compat.c file in the future. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Mishin <dim@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-03-21 07:45:21 +01:00
release_sock(sk);
if (err >= 0)
err = put_user(len, optlen);
return err;
}
#endif
return err;
}
[NET]: Identation & other cleanups related to compat_[gs]etsockopt cset No code changes, just tidying up, in some cases moving EXPORT_SYMBOLs to just after the function exported, etc. Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@mandriva.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-03-21 07:48:35 +01:00
EXPORT_SYMBOL(compat_ip_getsockopt);
[NET]: {get|set}sockopt compatibility layer This patch extends {get|set}sockopt compatibility layer in order to move protocol specific parts to their place and avoid huge universal net/compat.c file in the future. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Mishin <dim@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-03-21 07:45:21 +01:00
#endif
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ip_cmsg_recv);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ip_getsockopt);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ip_setsockopt);
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