android_kernel_motorola_sm6225/kernel/kexec.c

1138 lines
29 KiB
C
Raw Normal View History

/*
* kexec.c - kexec system call
* Copyright (C) 2002-2004 Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
*
* This source code is licensed under the GNU General Public License,
* Version 2. See the file COPYING for more details.
*/
#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/kexec.h>
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
#include <linux/list.h>
#include <linux/highmem.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/reboot.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/ioport.h>
#include <linux/hardirq.h>
#include <linux/elf.h>
#include <linux/elfcore.h>
#include <asm/page.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/io.h>
#include <asm/system.h>
#include <asm/semaphore.h>
/* Per cpu memory for storing cpu states in case of system crash. */
note_buf_t* crash_notes;
/* Location of the reserved area for the crash kernel */
struct resource crashk_res = {
.name = "Crash kernel",
.start = 0,
.end = 0,
.flags = IORESOURCE_BUSY | IORESOURCE_MEM
};
int kexec_should_crash(struct task_struct *p)
{
if (in_interrupt() || !p->pid || is_init(p) || panic_on_oops)
return 1;
return 0;
}
/*
* When kexec transitions to the new kernel there is a one-to-one
* mapping between physical and virtual addresses. On processors
* where you can disable the MMU this is trivial, and easy. For
* others it is still a simple predictable page table to setup.
*
* In that environment kexec copies the new kernel to its final
* resting place. This means I can only support memory whose
* physical address can fit in an unsigned long. In particular
* addresses where (pfn << PAGE_SHIFT) > ULONG_MAX cannot be handled.
* If the assembly stub has more restrictive requirements
* KEXEC_SOURCE_MEMORY_LIMIT and KEXEC_DEST_MEMORY_LIMIT can be
* defined more restrictively in <asm/kexec.h>.
*
* The code for the transition from the current kernel to the
* the new kernel is placed in the control_code_buffer, whose size
* is given by KEXEC_CONTROL_CODE_SIZE. In the best case only a single
* page of memory is necessary, but some architectures require more.
* Because this memory must be identity mapped in the transition from
* virtual to physical addresses it must live in the range
* 0 - TASK_SIZE, as only the user space mappings are arbitrarily
* modifiable.
*
* The assembly stub in the control code buffer is passed a linked list
* of descriptor pages detailing the source pages of the new kernel,
* and the destination addresses of those source pages. As this data
* structure is not used in the context of the current OS, it must
* be self-contained.
*
* The code has been made to work with highmem pages and will use a
* destination page in its final resting place (if it happens
* to allocate it). The end product of this is that most of the
* physical address space, and most of RAM can be used.
*
* Future directions include:
* - allocating a page table with the control code buffer identity
* mapped, to simplify machine_kexec and make kexec_on_panic more
* reliable.
*/
/*
* KIMAGE_NO_DEST is an impossible destination address..., for
* allocating pages whose destination address we do not care about.
*/
#define KIMAGE_NO_DEST (-1UL)
static int kimage_is_destination_range(struct kimage *image,
unsigned long start, unsigned long end);
static struct page *kimage_alloc_page(struct kimage *image,
gfp_t gfp_mask,
unsigned long dest);
static int do_kimage_alloc(struct kimage **rimage, unsigned long entry,
unsigned long nr_segments,
struct kexec_segment __user *segments)
{
size_t segment_bytes;
struct kimage *image;
unsigned long i;
int result;
/* Allocate a controlling structure */
result = -ENOMEM;
image = kzalloc(sizeof(*image), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!image)
goto out;
image->head = 0;
image->entry = &image->head;
image->last_entry = &image->head;
image->control_page = ~0; /* By default this does not apply */
image->start = entry;
image->type = KEXEC_TYPE_DEFAULT;
/* Initialize the list of control pages */
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&image->control_pages);
/* Initialize the list of destination pages */
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&image->dest_pages);
/* Initialize the list of unuseable pages */
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&image->unuseable_pages);
/* Read in the segments */
image->nr_segments = nr_segments;
segment_bytes = nr_segments * sizeof(*segments);
result = copy_from_user(image->segment, segments, segment_bytes);
if (result)
goto out;
/*
* Verify we have good destination addresses. The caller is
* responsible for making certain we don't attempt to load
* the new image into invalid or reserved areas of RAM. This
* just verifies it is an address we can use.
*
* Since the kernel does everything in page size chunks ensure
* the destination addreses are page aligned. Too many
* special cases crop of when we don't do this. The most
* insidious is getting overlapping destination addresses
* simply because addresses are changed to page size
* granularity.
*/
result = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
for (i = 0; i < nr_segments; i++) {
unsigned long mstart, mend;
mstart = image->segment[i].mem;
mend = mstart + image->segment[i].memsz;
if ((mstart & ~PAGE_MASK) || (mend & ~PAGE_MASK))
goto out;
if (mend >= KEXEC_DESTINATION_MEMORY_LIMIT)
goto out;
}
/* Verify our destination addresses do not overlap.
* If we alloed overlapping destination addresses
* through very weird things can happen with no
* easy explanation as one segment stops on another.
*/
result = -EINVAL;
for (i = 0; i < nr_segments; i++) {
unsigned long mstart, mend;
unsigned long j;
mstart = image->segment[i].mem;
mend = mstart + image->segment[i].memsz;
for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
unsigned long pstart, pend;
pstart = image->segment[j].mem;
pend = pstart + image->segment[j].memsz;
/* Do the segments overlap ? */
if ((mend > pstart) && (mstart < pend))
goto out;
}
}
/* Ensure our buffer sizes are strictly less than
* our memory sizes. This should always be the case,
* and it is easier to check up front than to be surprised
* later on.
*/
result = -EINVAL;
for (i = 0; i < nr_segments; i++) {
if (image->segment[i].bufsz > image->segment[i].memsz)
goto out;
}
result = 0;
out:
if (result == 0)
*rimage = image;
else
kfree(image);
return result;
}
static int kimage_normal_alloc(struct kimage **rimage, unsigned long entry,
unsigned long nr_segments,
struct kexec_segment __user *segments)
{
int result;
struct kimage *image;
/* Allocate and initialize a controlling structure */
image = NULL;
result = do_kimage_alloc(&image, entry, nr_segments, segments);
if (result)
goto out;
*rimage = image;
/*
* Find a location for the control code buffer, and add it
* the vector of segments so that it's pages will also be
* counted as destination pages.
*/
result = -ENOMEM;
image->control_code_page = kimage_alloc_control_pages(image,
get_order(KEXEC_CONTROL_CODE_SIZE));
if (!image->control_code_page) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Could not allocate control_code_buffer\n");
goto out;
}
result = 0;
out:
if (result == 0)
*rimage = image;
else
kfree(image);
return result;
}
static int kimage_crash_alloc(struct kimage **rimage, unsigned long entry,
unsigned long nr_segments,
struct kexec_segment __user *segments)
{
int result;
struct kimage *image;
unsigned long i;
image = NULL;
/* Verify we have a valid entry point */
if ((entry < crashk_res.start) || (entry > crashk_res.end)) {
result = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
goto out;
}
/* Allocate and initialize a controlling structure */
result = do_kimage_alloc(&image, entry, nr_segments, segments);
if (result)
goto out;
/* Enable the special crash kernel control page
* allocation policy.
*/
image->control_page = crashk_res.start;
image->type = KEXEC_TYPE_CRASH;
/*
* Verify we have good destination addresses. Normally
* the caller is responsible for making certain we don't
* attempt to load the new image into invalid or reserved
* areas of RAM. But crash kernels are preloaded into a
* reserved area of ram. We must ensure the addresses
* are in the reserved area otherwise preloading the
* kernel could corrupt things.
*/
result = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
for (i = 0; i < nr_segments; i++) {
unsigned long mstart, mend;
mstart = image->segment[i].mem;
mend = mstart + image->segment[i].memsz - 1;
/* Ensure we are within the crash kernel limits */
if ((mstart < crashk_res.start) || (mend > crashk_res.end))
goto out;
}
/*
* Find a location for the control code buffer, and add
* the vector of segments so that it's pages will also be
* counted as destination pages.
*/
result = -ENOMEM;
image->control_code_page = kimage_alloc_control_pages(image,
get_order(KEXEC_CONTROL_CODE_SIZE));
if (!image->control_code_page) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Could not allocate control_code_buffer\n");
goto out;
}
result = 0;
out:
if (result == 0)
*rimage = image;
else
kfree(image);
return result;
}
static int kimage_is_destination_range(struct kimage *image,
unsigned long start,
unsigned long end)
{
unsigned long i;
for (i = 0; i < image->nr_segments; i++) {
unsigned long mstart, mend;
mstart = image->segment[i].mem;
mend = mstart + image->segment[i].memsz;
if ((end > mstart) && (start < mend))
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
static struct page *kimage_alloc_pages(gfp_t gfp_mask, unsigned int order)
{
struct page *pages;
pages = alloc_pages(gfp_mask, order);
if (pages) {
unsigned int count, i;
pages->mapping = NULL;
[PATCH] mm: split page table lock Christoph Lameter demonstrated very poor scalability on the SGI 512-way, with a many-threaded application which concurrently initializes different parts of a large anonymous area. This patch corrects that, by using a separate spinlock per page table page, to guard the page table entries in that page, instead of using the mm's single page_table_lock. (But even then, page_table_lock is still used to guard page table allocation, and anon_vma allocation.) In this implementation, the spinlock is tucked inside the struct page of the page table page: with a BUILD_BUG_ON in case it overflows - which it would in the case of 32-bit PA-RISC with spinlock debugging enabled. Splitting the lock is not quite for free: another cacheline access. Ideally, I suppose we would use split ptlock only for multi-threaded processes on multi-cpu machines; but deciding that dynamically would have its own costs. So for now enable it by config, at some number of cpus - since the Kconfig language doesn't support inequalities, let preprocessor compare that with NR_CPUS. But I don't think it's worth being user-configurable: for good testing of both split and unsplit configs, split now at 4 cpus, and perhaps change that to 8 later. There is a benefit even for singly threaded processes: kswapd can be attacking one part of the mm while another part is busy faulting. Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-10-30 02:16:40 +01:00
set_page_private(pages, order);
count = 1 << order;
for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
SetPageReserved(pages + i);
}
return pages;
}
static void kimage_free_pages(struct page *page)
{
unsigned int order, count, i;
[PATCH] mm: split page table lock Christoph Lameter demonstrated very poor scalability on the SGI 512-way, with a many-threaded application which concurrently initializes different parts of a large anonymous area. This patch corrects that, by using a separate spinlock per page table page, to guard the page table entries in that page, instead of using the mm's single page_table_lock. (But even then, page_table_lock is still used to guard page table allocation, and anon_vma allocation.) In this implementation, the spinlock is tucked inside the struct page of the page table page: with a BUILD_BUG_ON in case it overflows - which it would in the case of 32-bit PA-RISC with spinlock debugging enabled. Splitting the lock is not quite for free: another cacheline access. Ideally, I suppose we would use split ptlock only for multi-threaded processes on multi-cpu machines; but deciding that dynamically would have its own costs. So for now enable it by config, at some number of cpus - since the Kconfig language doesn't support inequalities, let preprocessor compare that with NR_CPUS. But I don't think it's worth being user-configurable: for good testing of both split and unsplit configs, split now at 4 cpus, and perhaps change that to 8 later. There is a benefit even for singly threaded processes: kswapd can be attacking one part of the mm while another part is busy faulting. Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-10-30 02:16:40 +01:00
order = page_private(page);
count = 1 << order;
for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
ClearPageReserved(page + i);
__free_pages(page, order);
}
static void kimage_free_page_list(struct list_head *list)
{
struct list_head *pos, *next;
list_for_each_safe(pos, next, list) {
struct page *page;
page = list_entry(pos, struct page, lru);
list_del(&page->lru);
kimage_free_pages(page);
}
}
static struct page *kimage_alloc_normal_control_pages(struct kimage *image,
unsigned int order)
{
/* Control pages are special, they are the intermediaries
* that are needed while we copy the rest of the pages
* to their final resting place. As such they must
* not conflict with either the destination addresses
* or memory the kernel is already using.
*
* The only case where we really need more than one of
* these are for architectures where we cannot disable
* the MMU and must instead generate an identity mapped
* page table for all of the memory.
*
* At worst this runs in O(N) of the image size.
*/
struct list_head extra_pages;
struct page *pages;
unsigned int count;
count = 1 << order;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&extra_pages);
/* Loop while I can allocate a page and the page allocated
* is a destination page.
*/
do {
unsigned long pfn, epfn, addr, eaddr;
pages = kimage_alloc_pages(GFP_KERNEL, order);
if (!pages)
break;
pfn = page_to_pfn(pages);
epfn = pfn + count;
addr = pfn << PAGE_SHIFT;
eaddr = epfn << PAGE_SHIFT;
if ((epfn >= (KEXEC_CONTROL_MEMORY_LIMIT >> PAGE_SHIFT)) ||
kimage_is_destination_range(image, addr, eaddr)) {
list_add(&pages->lru, &extra_pages);
pages = NULL;
}
} while (!pages);
if (pages) {
/* Remember the allocated page... */
list_add(&pages->lru, &image->control_pages);
/* Because the page is already in it's destination
* location we will never allocate another page at
* that address. Therefore kimage_alloc_pages
* will not return it (again) and we don't need
* to give it an entry in image->segment[].
*/
}
/* Deal with the destination pages I have inadvertently allocated.
*
* Ideally I would convert multi-page allocations into single
* page allocations, and add everyting to image->dest_pages.
*
* For now it is simpler to just free the pages.
*/
kimage_free_page_list(&extra_pages);
return pages;
}
static struct page *kimage_alloc_crash_control_pages(struct kimage *image,
unsigned int order)
{
/* Control pages are special, they are the intermediaries
* that are needed while we copy the rest of the pages
* to their final resting place. As such they must
* not conflict with either the destination addresses
* or memory the kernel is already using.
*
* Control pages are also the only pags we must allocate
* when loading a crash kernel. All of the other pages
* are specified by the segments and we just memcpy
* into them directly.
*
* The only case where we really need more than one of
* these are for architectures where we cannot disable
* the MMU and must instead generate an identity mapped
* page table for all of the memory.
*
* Given the low demand this implements a very simple
* allocator that finds the first hole of the appropriate
* size in the reserved memory region, and allocates all
* of the memory up to and including the hole.
*/
unsigned long hole_start, hole_end, size;
struct page *pages;
pages = NULL;
size = (1 << order) << PAGE_SHIFT;
hole_start = (image->control_page + (size - 1)) & ~(size - 1);
hole_end = hole_start + size - 1;
while (hole_end <= crashk_res.end) {
unsigned long i;
if (hole_end > KEXEC_CONTROL_MEMORY_LIMIT)
break;
if (hole_end > crashk_res.end)
break;
/* See if I overlap any of the segments */
for (i = 0; i < image->nr_segments; i++) {
unsigned long mstart, mend;
mstart = image->segment[i].mem;
mend = mstart + image->segment[i].memsz - 1;
if ((hole_end >= mstart) && (hole_start <= mend)) {
/* Advance the hole to the end of the segment */
hole_start = (mend + (size - 1)) & ~(size - 1);
hole_end = hole_start + size - 1;
break;
}
}
/* If I don't overlap any segments I have found my hole! */
if (i == image->nr_segments) {
pages = pfn_to_page(hole_start >> PAGE_SHIFT);
break;
}
}
if (pages)
image->control_page = hole_end;
return pages;
}
struct page *kimage_alloc_control_pages(struct kimage *image,
unsigned int order)
{
struct page *pages = NULL;
switch (image->type) {
case KEXEC_TYPE_DEFAULT:
pages = kimage_alloc_normal_control_pages(image, order);
break;
case KEXEC_TYPE_CRASH:
pages = kimage_alloc_crash_control_pages(image, order);
break;
}
return pages;
}
static int kimage_add_entry(struct kimage *image, kimage_entry_t entry)
{
if (*image->entry != 0)
image->entry++;
if (image->entry == image->last_entry) {
kimage_entry_t *ind_page;
struct page *page;
page = kimage_alloc_page(image, GFP_KERNEL, KIMAGE_NO_DEST);
if (!page)
return -ENOMEM;
ind_page = page_address(page);
*image->entry = virt_to_phys(ind_page) | IND_INDIRECTION;
image->entry = ind_page;
image->last_entry = ind_page +
((PAGE_SIZE/sizeof(kimage_entry_t)) - 1);
}
*image->entry = entry;
image->entry++;
*image->entry = 0;
return 0;
}
static int kimage_set_destination(struct kimage *image,
unsigned long destination)
{
int result;
destination &= PAGE_MASK;
result = kimage_add_entry(image, destination | IND_DESTINATION);
if (result == 0)
image->destination = destination;
return result;
}
static int kimage_add_page(struct kimage *image, unsigned long page)
{
int result;
page &= PAGE_MASK;
result = kimage_add_entry(image, page | IND_SOURCE);
if (result == 0)
image->destination += PAGE_SIZE;
return result;
}
static void kimage_free_extra_pages(struct kimage *image)
{
/* Walk through and free any extra destination pages I may have */
kimage_free_page_list(&image->dest_pages);
/* Walk through and free any unuseable pages I have cached */
kimage_free_page_list(&image->unuseable_pages);
}
static int kimage_terminate(struct kimage *image)
{
if (*image->entry != 0)
image->entry++;
*image->entry = IND_DONE;
return 0;
}
#define for_each_kimage_entry(image, ptr, entry) \
for (ptr = &image->head; (entry = *ptr) && !(entry & IND_DONE); \
ptr = (entry & IND_INDIRECTION)? \
phys_to_virt((entry & PAGE_MASK)): ptr +1)
static void kimage_free_entry(kimage_entry_t entry)
{
struct page *page;
page = pfn_to_page(entry >> PAGE_SHIFT);
kimage_free_pages(page);
}
static void kimage_free(struct kimage *image)
{
kimage_entry_t *ptr, entry;
kimage_entry_t ind = 0;
if (!image)
return;
kimage_free_extra_pages(image);
for_each_kimage_entry(image, ptr, entry) {
if (entry & IND_INDIRECTION) {
/* Free the previous indirection page */
if (ind & IND_INDIRECTION)
kimage_free_entry(ind);
/* Save this indirection page until we are
* done with it.
*/
ind = entry;
}
else if (entry & IND_SOURCE)
kimage_free_entry(entry);
}
/* Free the final indirection page */
if (ind & IND_INDIRECTION)
kimage_free_entry(ind);
/* Handle any machine specific cleanup */
machine_kexec_cleanup(image);
/* Free the kexec control pages... */
kimage_free_page_list(&image->control_pages);
kfree(image);
}
static kimage_entry_t *kimage_dst_used(struct kimage *image,
unsigned long page)
{
kimage_entry_t *ptr, entry;
unsigned long destination = 0;
for_each_kimage_entry(image, ptr, entry) {
if (entry & IND_DESTINATION)
destination = entry & PAGE_MASK;
else if (entry & IND_SOURCE) {
if (page == destination)
return ptr;
destination += PAGE_SIZE;
}
}
return NULL;
}
static struct page *kimage_alloc_page(struct kimage *image,
gfp_t gfp_mask,
unsigned long destination)
{
/*
* Here we implement safeguards to ensure that a source page
* is not copied to its destination page before the data on
* the destination page is no longer useful.
*
* To do this we maintain the invariant that a source page is
* either its own destination page, or it is not a
* destination page at all.
*
* That is slightly stronger than required, but the proof
* that no problems will not occur is trivial, and the
* implementation is simply to verify.
*
* When allocating all pages normally this algorithm will run
* in O(N) time, but in the worst case it will run in O(N^2)
* time. If the runtime is a problem the data structures can
* be fixed.
*/
struct page *page;
unsigned long addr;
/*
* Walk through the list of destination pages, and see if I
* have a match.
*/
list_for_each_entry(page, &image->dest_pages, lru) {
addr = page_to_pfn(page) << PAGE_SHIFT;
if (addr == destination) {
list_del(&page->lru);
return page;
}
}
page = NULL;
while (1) {
kimage_entry_t *old;
/* Allocate a page, if we run out of memory give up */
page = kimage_alloc_pages(gfp_mask, 0);
if (!page)
return NULL;
/* If the page cannot be used file it away */
if (page_to_pfn(page) >
(KEXEC_SOURCE_MEMORY_LIMIT >> PAGE_SHIFT)) {
list_add(&page->lru, &image->unuseable_pages);
continue;
}
addr = page_to_pfn(page) << PAGE_SHIFT;
/* If it is the destination page we want use it */
if (addr == destination)
break;
/* If the page is not a destination page use it */
if (!kimage_is_destination_range(image, addr,
addr + PAGE_SIZE))
break;
/*
* I know that the page is someones destination page.
* See if there is already a source page for this
* destination page. And if so swap the source pages.
*/
old = kimage_dst_used(image, addr);
if (old) {
/* If so move it */
unsigned long old_addr;
struct page *old_page;
old_addr = *old & PAGE_MASK;
old_page = pfn_to_page(old_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT);
copy_highpage(page, old_page);
*old = addr | (*old & ~PAGE_MASK);
/* The old page I have found cannot be a
* destination page, so return it.
*/
addr = old_addr;
page = old_page;
break;
}
else {
/* Place the page on the destination list I
* will use it later.
*/
list_add(&page->lru, &image->dest_pages);
}
}
return page;
}
static int kimage_load_normal_segment(struct kimage *image,
struct kexec_segment *segment)
{
unsigned long maddr;
unsigned long ubytes, mbytes;
int result;
unsigned char __user *buf;
result = 0;
buf = segment->buf;
ubytes = segment->bufsz;
mbytes = segment->memsz;
maddr = segment->mem;
result = kimage_set_destination(image, maddr);
if (result < 0)
goto out;
while (mbytes) {
struct page *page;
char *ptr;
size_t uchunk, mchunk;
page = kimage_alloc_page(image, GFP_HIGHUSER, maddr);
if (page == 0) {
result = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
result = kimage_add_page(image, page_to_pfn(page)
<< PAGE_SHIFT);
if (result < 0)
goto out;
ptr = kmap(page);
/* Start with a clear page */
memset(ptr, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
ptr += maddr & ~PAGE_MASK;
mchunk = PAGE_SIZE - (maddr & ~PAGE_MASK);
if (mchunk > mbytes)
mchunk = mbytes;
uchunk = mchunk;
if (uchunk > ubytes)
uchunk = ubytes;
result = copy_from_user(ptr, buf, uchunk);
kunmap(page);
if (result) {
result = (result < 0) ? result : -EIO;
goto out;
}
ubytes -= uchunk;
maddr += mchunk;
buf += mchunk;
mbytes -= mchunk;
}
out:
return result;
}
static int kimage_load_crash_segment(struct kimage *image,
struct kexec_segment *segment)
{
/* For crash dumps kernels we simply copy the data from
* user space to it's destination.
* We do things a page at a time for the sake of kmap.
*/
unsigned long maddr;
unsigned long ubytes, mbytes;
int result;
unsigned char __user *buf;
result = 0;
buf = segment->buf;
ubytes = segment->bufsz;
mbytes = segment->memsz;
maddr = segment->mem;
while (mbytes) {
struct page *page;
char *ptr;
size_t uchunk, mchunk;
page = pfn_to_page(maddr >> PAGE_SHIFT);
if (page == 0) {
result = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
ptr = kmap(page);
ptr += maddr & ~PAGE_MASK;
mchunk = PAGE_SIZE - (maddr & ~PAGE_MASK);
if (mchunk > mbytes)
mchunk = mbytes;
uchunk = mchunk;
if (uchunk > ubytes) {
uchunk = ubytes;
/* Zero the trailing part of the page */
memset(ptr + uchunk, 0, mchunk - uchunk);
}
result = copy_from_user(ptr, buf, uchunk);
kexec_flush_icache_page(page);
kunmap(page);
if (result) {
result = (result < 0) ? result : -EIO;
goto out;
}
ubytes -= uchunk;
maddr += mchunk;
buf += mchunk;
mbytes -= mchunk;
}
out:
return result;
}
static int kimage_load_segment(struct kimage *image,
struct kexec_segment *segment)
{
int result = -ENOMEM;
switch (image->type) {
case KEXEC_TYPE_DEFAULT:
result = kimage_load_normal_segment(image, segment);
break;
case KEXEC_TYPE_CRASH:
result = kimage_load_crash_segment(image, segment);
break;
}
return result;
}
/*
* Exec Kernel system call: for obvious reasons only root may call it.
*
* This call breaks up into three pieces.
* - A generic part which loads the new kernel from the current
* address space, and very carefully places the data in the
* allocated pages.
*
* - A generic part that interacts with the kernel and tells all of
* the devices to shut down. Preventing on-going dmas, and placing
* the devices in a consistent state so a later kernel can
* reinitialize them.
*
* - A machine specific part that includes the syscall number
* and the copies the image to it's final destination. And
* jumps into the image at entry.
*
* kexec does not sync, or unmount filesystems so if you need
* that to happen you need to do that yourself.
*/
struct kimage *kexec_image;
struct kimage *kexec_crash_image;
/*
* A home grown binary mutex.
* Nothing can wait so this mutex is safe to use
* in interrupt context :)
*/
static int kexec_lock;
asmlinkage long sys_kexec_load(unsigned long entry, unsigned long nr_segments,
struct kexec_segment __user *segments,
unsigned long flags)
{
struct kimage **dest_image, *image;
int locked;
int result;
/* We only trust the superuser with rebooting the system. */
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT))
return -EPERM;
/*
* Verify we have a legal set of flags
* This leaves us room for future extensions.
*/
if ((flags & KEXEC_FLAGS) != (flags & ~KEXEC_ARCH_MASK))
return -EINVAL;
/* Verify we are on the appropriate architecture */
if (((flags & KEXEC_ARCH_MASK) != KEXEC_ARCH) &&
((flags & KEXEC_ARCH_MASK) != KEXEC_ARCH_DEFAULT))
return -EINVAL;
/* Put an artificial cap on the number
* of segments passed to kexec_load.
*/
if (nr_segments > KEXEC_SEGMENT_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
image = NULL;
result = 0;
/* Because we write directly to the reserved memory
* region when loading crash kernels we need a mutex here to
* prevent multiple crash kernels from attempting to load
* simultaneously, and to prevent a crash kernel from loading
* over the top of a in use crash kernel.
*
* KISS: always take the mutex.
*/
locked = xchg(&kexec_lock, 1);
if (locked)
return -EBUSY;
dest_image = &kexec_image;
if (flags & KEXEC_ON_CRASH)
dest_image = &kexec_crash_image;
if (nr_segments > 0) {
unsigned long i;
/* Loading another kernel to reboot into */
if ((flags & KEXEC_ON_CRASH) == 0)
result = kimage_normal_alloc(&image, entry,
nr_segments, segments);
/* Loading another kernel to switch to if this one crashes */
else if (flags & KEXEC_ON_CRASH) {
/* Free any current crash dump kernel before
* we corrupt it.
*/
kimage_free(xchg(&kexec_crash_image, NULL));
result = kimage_crash_alloc(&image, entry,
nr_segments, segments);
}
if (result)
goto out;
result = machine_kexec_prepare(image);
if (result)
goto out;
for (i = 0; i < nr_segments; i++) {
result = kimage_load_segment(image, &image->segment[i]);
if (result)
goto out;
}
result = kimage_terminate(image);
if (result)
goto out;
}
/* Install the new kernel, and Uninstall the old */
image = xchg(dest_image, image);
out:
locked = xchg(&kexec_lock, 0); /* Release the mutex */
BUG_ON(!locked);
kimage_free(image);
return result;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
asmlinkage long compat_sys_kexec_load(unsigned long entry,
unsigned long nr_segments,
struct compat_kexec_segment __user *segments,
unsigned long flags)
{
struct compat_kexec_segment in;
struct kexec_segment out, __user *ksegments;
unsigned long i, result;
/* Don't allow clients that don't understand the native
* architecture to do anything.
*/
if ((flags & KEXEC_ARCH_MASK) == KEXEC_ARCH_DEFAULT)
return -EINVAL;
if (nr_segments > KEXEC_SEGMENT_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
ksegments = compat_alloc_user_space(nr_segments * sizeof(out));
for (i=0; i < nr_segments; i++) {
result = copy_from_user(&in, &segments[i], sizeof(in));
if (result)
return -EFAULT;
out.buf = compat_ptr(in.buf);
out.bufsz = in.bufsz;
out.mem = in.mem;
out.memsz = in.memsz;
result = copy_to_user(&ksegments[i], &out, sizeof(out));
if (result)
return -EFAULT;
}
return sys_kexec_load(entry, nr_segments, ksegments, flags);
}
#endif
void crash_kexec(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
int locked;
/* Take the kexec_lock here to prevent sys_kexec_load
* running on one cpu from replacing the crash kernel
* we are using after a panic on a different cpu.
*
* If the crash kernel was not located in a fixed area
* of memory the xchg(&kexec_crash_image) would be
* sufficient. But since I reuse the memory...
*/
locked = xchg(&kexec_lock, 1);
if (!locked) {
[POWERPC] Add the use of the firmware soft-reset-nmi to kdump. With this patch, kdump uses the firmware soft-reset NMI for two purposes: 1) Initiate the kdump (take a crash dump) by issuing a soft-reset. 2) Break a CPU out of a deadlock condition that is detected during kdump processing. When a soft-reset is initiated each CPU will enter system_reset_exception() and set its corresponding bit in the global bit-array cpus_in_sr then call die(). When die() finds the CPU's bit set in cpu_in_sr crash_kexec() is called to initiate a crash dump. The first CPU to enter crash_kexec() is called the "crashing CPU". All other CPUs are "secondary CPUs". The secondary CPU's pass through to crash_kexec_secondary() and sleep. The crashing CPU waits for all CPUs to enter via soft-reset then boots the kdump kernel (see crash_soft_reset_check()) When the system crashes due to a panic or exception, crash_kexec() is called by panic() or die(). The crashing CPU sends an IPI to all other CPUs to notify them of the pending shutdown. If a CPU is in a deadlock or hung state with interrupts disabled, the IPI will not be delivered. The result being, that the kdump kernel is not booted. This problem is solved with the use of a firmware generated soft-reset. After the crashing_cpu has issued the IPI, it waits for 10 sec for all CPUs to enter crash_ipi_callback(). A CPU signifies its entry to crash_ipi_callback() by setting its corresponding bit in the cpus_in_crash bit array. After 10 sec, if one or more CPUs have not set their bit in cpus_in_crash we assume that the CPU(s) is deadlocked. The operator is then prompted to generate a soft-reset to break the deadlock. Each CPU enters the soft reset handler as described above. Two conditions must be handled at this point: 1) The system crashed because the operator generated a soft-reset. See 2) The system had crashed before the soft-reset was generated ( in the case of a Panic or oops). The first CPU to enter crash_kexec() uses the state of the kexec_lock to determine this state. If kexec_lock is already held then condition 2 is true and crash_kexec_secondary() is called, else; this CPU is flagged as the crashing CPU, the kexec_lock is acquired and crash_kexec() proceeds as described above. Each additional CPUs responding to the soft-reset will pass through crash_kexec() to kexec_secondary(). All secondary CPUs call crash_ipi_callback() readying them self's for the shutdown. When ready they clear their bit in cpus_in_sr. The crashing CPU waits in kexec_secondary() until all other CPUs have cleared their bits in cpus_in_sr. The kexec kernel boot is then started. Signed-off-by: Haren Myneni <haren@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David Wilder <dwilder@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
2006-06-24 00:29:34 +02:00
if (kexec_crash_image) {
struct pt_regs fixed_regs;
crash_setup_regs(&fixed_regs, regs);
machine_crash_shutdown(&fixed_regs);
[POWERPC] Add the use of the firmware soft-reset-nmi to kdump. With this patch, kdump uses the firmware soft-reset NMI for two purposes: 1) Initiate the kdump (take a crash dump) by issuing a soft-reset. 2) Break a CPU out of a deadlock condition that is detected during kdump processing. When a soft-reset is initiated each CPU will enter system_reset_exception() and set its corresponding bit in the global bit-array cpus_in_sr then call die(). When die() finds the CPU's bit set in cpu_in_sr crash_kexec() is called to initiate a crash dump. The first CPU to enter crash_kexec() is called the "crashing CPU". All other CPUs are "secondary CPUs". The secondary CPU's pass through to crash_kexec_secondary() and sleep. The crashing CPU waits for all CPUs to enter via soft-reset then boots the kdump kernel (see crash_soft_reset_check()) When the system crashes due to a panic or exception, crash_kexec() is called by panic() or die(). The crashing CPU sends an IPI to all other CPUs to notify them of the pending shutdown. If a CPU is in a deadlock or hung state with interrupts disabled, the IPI will not be delivered. The result being, that the kdump kernel is not booted. This problem is solved with the use of a firmware generated soft-reset. After the crashing_cpu has issued the IPI, it waits for 10 sec for all CPUs to enter crash_ipi_callback(). A CPU signifies its entry to crash_ipi_callback() by setting its corresponding bit in the cpus_in_crash bit array. After 10 sec, if one or more CPUs have not set their bit in cpus_in_crash we assume that the CPU(s) is deadlocked. The operator is then prompted to generate a soft-reset to break the deadlock. Each CPU enters the soft reset handler as described above. Two conditions must be handled at this point: 1) The system crashed because the operator generated a soft-reset. See 2) The system had crashed before the soft-reset was generated ( in the case of a Panic or oops). The first CPU to enter crash_kexec() uses the state of the kexec_lock to determine this state. If kexec_lock is already held then condition 2 is true and crash_kexec_secondary() is called, else; this CPU is flagged as the crashing CPU, the kexec_lock is acquired and crash_kexec() proceeds as described above. Each additional CPUs responding to the soft-reset will pass through crash_kexec() to kexec_secondary(). All secondary CPUs call crash_ipi_callback() readying them self's for the shutdown. When ready they clear their bit in cpus_in_sr. The crashing CPU waits in kexec_secondary() until all other CPUs have cleared their bits in cpus_in_sr. The kexec kernel boot is then started. Signed-off-by: Haren Myneni <haren@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David Wilder <dwilder@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
2006-06-24 00:29:34 +02:00
machine_kexec(kexec_crash_image);
}
locked = xchg(&kexec_lock, 0);
BUG_ON(!locked);
}
}
static u32 *append_elf_note(u32 *buf, char *name, unsigned type, void *data,
size_t data_len)
{
struct elf_note note;
note.n_namesz = strlen(name) + 1;
note.n_descsz = data_len;
note.n_type = type;
memcpy(buf, &note, sizeof(note));
buf += (sizeof(note) + 3)/4;
memcpy(buf, name, note.n_namesz);
buf += (note.n_namesz + 3)/4;
memcpy(buf, data, note.n_descsz);
buf += (note.n_descsz + 3)/4;
return buf;
}
static void final_note(u32 *buf)
{
struct elf_note note;
note.n_namesz = 0;
note.n_descsz = 0;
note.n_type = 0;
memcpy(buf, &note, sizeof(note));
}
void crash_save_cpu(struct pt_regs *regs, int cpu)
{
struct elf_prstatus prstatus;
u32 *buf;
if ((cpu < 0) || (cpu >= NR_CPUS))
return;
/* Using ELF notes here is opportunistic.
* I need a well defined structure format
* for the data I pass, and I need tags
* on the data to indicate what information I have
* squirrelled away. ELF notes happen to provide
* all of that, so there is no need to invent something new.
*/
buf = (u32*)per_cpu_ptr(crash_notes, cpu);
if (!buf)
return;
memset(&prstatus, 0, sizeof(prstatus));
prstatus.pr_pid = current->pid;
elf_core_copy_regs(&prstatus.pr_reg, regs);
buf = append_elf_note(buf, KEXEC_CORE_NOTE_NAME, NT_PRSTATUS,
&prstatus, sizeof(prstatus));
final_note(buf);
}
static int __init crash_notes_memory_init(void)
{
/* Allocate memory for saving cpu registers. */
crash_notes = alloc_percpu(note_buf_t);
if (!crash_notes) {
printk("Kexec: Memory allocation for saving cpu register"
" states failed\n");
return -ENOMEM;
}
return 0;
}
module_init(crash_notes_memory_init)