Commit graph

10 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Ahmed S. Darwish
cb622bbb69 smackfs: remove redundant lock, fix open(,O_RDWR)
Older smackfs was parsing MAC rules by characters, thus a need of locking
write sessions on open() was needed.  This lock is no longer useful now since
each rule is handled by a single write() call.

This is also a bugfix since seq_open() was not called if an open() O_RDWR flag
was given, leading to a seq_read() without an initialized seq_file, thus an
Oops.

Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-03-24 19:22:19 -07:00
Serge Hallyn
aedb60a67c file capabilities: remove cap_task_kill()
The original justification for cap_task_kill() was as follows:

	check_kill_permission() does appropriate uid equivalence checks.
	However with file capabilities it becomes possible for an
	unprivileged user to execute a file with file capabilities
	resulting in a more privileged task with the same uid.

However now that cap_task_kill() always returns 0 (permission
granted) when p->uid==current->uid, the whole hook is worthless,
and only likely to create more subtle problems in the corner cases
where it might still be called but return -EPERM.  Those cases
are basically when uids are different but euid/suid is equivalent
as per the check in check_kill_permission().

One example of a still-broken application is 'at' for non-root users.

This patch removes cap_task_kill().

Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Earlier-version-tested-by: Luiz Fernando N. Capitulino <lcapitulino@mandriva.com.br>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-03-20 09:46:36 -07:00
Ahmed S. Darwish
1d252fb870 smack: do not dereference NULL ipc object
In the SYSV ipc msgctl(),semctl(),shmctl() family, if the user passed *_INFO
as the desired operation, no specific object is meant to be controlled and
only system-wide information is returned.  This leads to a NULL IPC object in
the LSM hooks if the _INFO flag is given.

Avoid dereferencing this NULL pointer in Smack ipc *ctl() methods.

Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-03-19 18:53:36 -07:00
Ahmed S. Darwish
b500ce8d24 smackfs: do not trust `count' in inodes write()s
Smackfs write() implementation does not put a higher bound on the number of
bytes to copy from user-space.  This may lead to a DOS attack if a malicious
`count' field is given.

Assure that given `count' is exactly the length needed for a /smack/load rule.
 In case of /smack/cipso where the length is relative, assure that `count'
does not exceed the size needed for a buffer representing maximum possible
number of CIPSO 2.2 categories.

Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-03-13 13:11:43 -07:00
Eric Paris
e000752989 LSM/SELinux: Interfaces to allow FS to control mount options
Introduce new LSM interfaces to allow an FS to deal with their own mount
options.  This includes a new string parsing function exported from the
LSM that an FS can use to get a security data blob and a new security
data blob.  This is particularly useful for an FS which uses binary
mount data, like NFS, which does not pass strings into the vfs to be
handled by the loaded LSM.  Also fix a BUG() in both SELinux and SMACK
when dealing with binary mount data.  If the binary mount data is less
than one page the copy_page() in security_sb_copy_data() can cause an
illegal page fault and boom.  Remove all NFSisms from the SELinux code
since they were broken by past NFS changes.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-03-06 08:40:53 +11:00
Casey Schaufler
bcdca225bf Smack: update for file capabilities
Update the Smack LSM to allow the registration of the capability "module"
as a secondary LSM.  Integrate the new hooks required for file based
capabilities.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-23 17:13:24 -08:00
Casey Schaufler
4bc87e6277 Smack: unlabeled outgoing ambient packets
Smack uses CIPSO labeling, but allows for unlabeled packets by
specifying an "ambient" label that is applied to incoming unlabeled
packets.

Because the other end of the connection may dislike IP options, and ssh
is one know application that behaves thus, it is prudent to respond in
kind.

This patch changes the network labeling behavior such that an outgoing
packet that would be given a CIPSO label that matches the ambient label
is left unlabeled.  An "unlbl" domain is added and the netlabel
defaulting mechanism invoked rather than assuming that everything is
CIPSO.  Locking has been added around changes to the ambient label as
the mechanisms used to do so are more involved.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-19 07:51:00 -08:00
Jan Blunck
4ac9137858 Embed a struct path into struct nameidata instead of nd->{dentry,mnt}
This is the central patch of a cleanup series. In most cases there is no good
reason why someone would want to use a dentry for itself. This series reflects
that fact and embeds a struct path into nameidata.

Together with the other patches of this series
- it enforced the correct order of getting/releasing the reference count on
  <dentry,vfsmount> pairs
- it prepares the VFS for stacking support since it is essential to have a
  struct path in every place where the stack can be traversed
- it reduces the overall code size:

without patch series:
   text    data     bss     dec     hex filename
5321639  858418  715768 6895825  6938d1 vmlinux

with patch series:
   text    data     bss     dec     hex filename
5320026  858418  715768 6894212  693284 vmlinux

This patch:

Switch from nd->{dentry,mnt} to nd->path.{dentry,mnt} everywhere.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix cifs]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix smack]
Signed-off-by: Jan Blunck <jblunck@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-14 21:13:33 -08:00
Ahmed S. Darwish
2e1d146a19 Smack: check for 'struct socket' with NULL sk
There's a small problem with smack and NFS. A similar report was also
sent here: http://lkml.org/lkml/2007/10/27/85

I've also added similar checks in inode_{get/set}security().  Cheating from
SELinux post_create_socket(), it does the same.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: remove uneeded BUG_ON()]
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schuafler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-13 16:21:20 -08:00
Casey Schaufler
e114e47377 Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel
Smack is the Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel.

Smack implements mandatory access control (MAC) using labels
attached to tasks and data containers, including files, SVIPC,
and other tasks. Smack is a kernel based scheme that requires
an absolute minimum of application support and a very small
amount of configuration data.

Smack uses extended attributes and
provides a set of general mount options, borrowing technics used
elsewhere. Smack uses netlabel for CIPSO labeling. Smack provides
a pseudo-filesystem smackfs that is used for manipulation of
system Smack attributes.

The patch, patches for ls and sshd, a README, a startup script,
and x86 binaries for ls and sshd are also available on

    http://www.schaufler-ca.com

Development has been done using Fedora Core 7 in a virtual machine
environment and on an old Sony laptop.

Smack provides mandatory access controls based on the label attached
to a task and the label attached to the object it is attempting to
access. Smack labels are deliberately short (1-23 characters) text
strings. Single character labels using special characters are reserved
for system use. The only operation applied to Smack labels is equality
comparison. No wildcards or expressions, regular or otherwise, are
used. Smack labels are composed of printable characters and may not
include "/".

A file always gets the Smack label of the task that created it.

Smack defines and uses these labels:

    "*" - pronounced "star"
    "_" - pronounced "floor"
    "^" - pronounced "hat"
    "?" - pronounced "huh"

The access rules enforced by Smack are, in order:

1. Any access requested by a task labeled "*" is denied.
2. A read or execute access requested by a task labeled "^"
   is permitted.
3. A read or execute access requested on an object labeled "_"
   is permitted.
4. Any access requested on an object labeled "*" is permitted.
5. Any access requested by a task on an object with the same
   label is permitted.
6. Any access requested that is explicitly defined in the loaded
   rule set is permitted.
7. Any other access is denied.

Rules may be explicitly defined by writing subject,object,access
triples to /smack/load.

Smack rule sets can be easily defined that describe Bell&LaPadula
sensitivity, Biba integrity, and a variety of interesting
configurations. Smack rule sets can be modified on the fly to
accommodate changes in the operating environment or even the time
of day.

Some practical use cases:

Hierarchical levels. The less common of the two usual uses
for MLS systems is to define hierarchical levels, often
unclassified, confidential, secret, and so on. To set up smack
to support this, these rules could be defined:

   C        Unclass rx
   S        C       rx
   S        Unclass rx
   TS       S       rx
   TS       C       rx
   TS       Unclass rx

A TS process can read S, C, and Unclass data, but cannot write it.
An S process can read C and Unclass. Note that specifying that
TS can read S and S can read C does not imply TS can read C, it
has to be explicitly stated.

Non-hierarchical categories. This is the more common of the
usual uses for an MLS system. Since the default rule is that a
subject cannot access an object with a different label no
access rules are required to implement compartmentalization.

A case that the Bell & LaPadula policy does not allow is demonstrated
with this Smack access rule:

A case that Bell&LaPadula does not allow that Smack does:

    ESPN    ABC   r
    ABC     ESPN  r

On my portable video device I have two applications, one that
shows ABC programming and the other ESPN programming. ESPN wants
to show me sport stories that show up as news, and ABC will
only provide minimal information about a sports story if ESPN
is covering it. Each side can look at the other's info, neither
can change the other. Neither can see what FOX is up to, which
is just as well all things considered.

Another case that I especially like:

    SatData Guard   w
    Guard   Publish w

A program running with the Guard label opens a UDP socket and
accepts messages sent by a program running with a SatData label.
The Guard program inspects the message to ensure it is wholesome
and if it is sends it to a program running with the Publish label.
This program then puts the information passed in an appropriate
place. Note that the Guard program cannot write to a Publish
file system object because file system semanitic require read as
well as write.

The four cases (categories, levels, mutual read, guardbox) here
are all quite real, and problems I've been asked to solve over
the years. The first two are easy to do with traditonal MLS systems
while the last two you can't without invoking privilege, at least
for a while.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Joshua Brindle <method@manicmethod.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-05 09:44:20 -08:00