* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next-2.6: (1429 commits)
net: Allow dependancies of FDDI & Tokenring to be modular.
igb: Fix build warning when DCA is disabled.
net: Fix warning fallout from recent NAPI interface changes.
gro: Fix potential use after free
sfc: If AN is enabled, always read speed/duplex from the AN advertising bits
sfc: When disabling the NIC, close the device rather than unregistering it
sfc: SFT9001: Add cable diagnostics
sfc: Add support for multiple PHY self-tests
sfc: Merge top-level functions for self-tests
sfc: Clean up PHY mode management in loopback self-test
sfc: Fix unreliable link detection in some loopback modes
sfc: Generate unique names for per-NIC workqueues
802.3ad: use standard ethhdr instead of ad_header
802.3ad: generalize out mac address initializer
802.3ad: initialize ports LACPDU from const initializer
802.3ad: remove typedef around ad_system
802.3ad: turn ports is_individual into a bool
802.3ad: turn ports is_enabled into a bool
802.3ad: make ntt bool
ixgbe: Fix set_ringparam in ixgbe to use the same memory pools.
...
Fixed trivial IPv4/6 address printing conflicts in fs/cifs/connect.c due
to the conversion to %pI (in this networking merge) and the addition of
doing IPv6 addresses (from the earlier merge of CIFS).
Don't bother checking permissions when the kernel performs an
internal mount, as this should always be allowed.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Pass mount flags to security_sb_kern_mount(), so security modules
can determine if a mount operation is being performed by the kernel.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Allow kernel services to override LSM settings appropriate to the actions
performed by a task by duplicating a set of credentials, modifying it and then
using task_struct::cred to point to it when performing operations on behalf of
a task.
This is used, for example, by CacheFiles which has to transparently access the
cache on behalf of a process that thinks it is doing, say, NFS accesses with a
potentially inappropriate (with respect to accessing the cache) set of
credentials.
This patch provides two LSM hooks for modifying a task security record:
(*) security_kernel_act_as() which allows modification of the security datum
with which a task acts on other objects (most notably files).
(*) security_kernel_create_files_as() which allows modification of the
security datum that is used to initialise the security data on a file that
a task creates.
The patch also provides four new credentials handling functions, which wrap the
LSM functions:
(1) prepare_kernel_cred()
Prepare a set of credentials for a kernel service to use, based either on
a daemon's credentials or on init_cred. All the keyrings are cleared.
(2) set_security_override()
Set the LSM security ID in a set of credentials to a specific security
context, assuming permission from the LSM policy.
(3) set_security_override_from_ctx()
As (2), but takes the security context as a string.
(4) set_create_files_as()
Set the file creation LSM security ID in a set of credentials to be the
same as that on a particular inode.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [Smack changes]
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Add a 'kernel_service' object class to SELinux and give this object class two
access vectors: 'use_as_override' and 'create_files_as'.
The first vector is used to grant a process the right to nominate an alternate
process security ID for the kernel to use as an override for the SELinux
subjective security when accessing stuff on behalf of another process.
For example, CacheFiles when accessing the cache on behalf on a process
accessing an NFS file needs to use a subjective security ID appropriate to the
cache rather then the one the calling process is using. The cachefilesd
daemon will nominate the security ID to be used.
The second vector is used to grant a process the right to nominate a file
creation label for a kernel service to use.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Differentiate the objective and real subjective credentials from the effective
subjective credentials on a task by introducing a second credentials pointer
into the task_struct.
task_struct::real_cred then refers to the objective and apparent real
subjective credentials of a task, as perceived by the other tasks in the
system.
task_struct::cred then refers to the effective subjective credentials of a
task, as used by that task when it's actually running. These are not visible
to the other tasks in the system.
__task_cred(task) then refers to the objective/real credentials of the task in
question.
current_cred() refers to the effective subjective credentials of the current
task.
prepare_creds() uses the objective creds as a base and commit_creds() changes
both pointers in the task_struct (indeed commit_creds() requires them to be the
same).
override_creds() and revert_creds() change the subjective creds pointer only,
and the former returns the old subjective creds. These are used by NFSD,
faccessat() and do_coredump(), and will by used by CacheFiles.
In SELinux, current_has_perm() is provided as an alternative to
task_has_perm(). This uses the effective subjective context of current,
whereas task_has_perm() uses the objective/real context of the subject.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials, allowing it to set
up the credentials in advance, and then commit the whole lot after the point
of no return.
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
The credential bits from struct linux_binprm are, for the most part,
replaced with a single credentials pointer (bprm->cred). This means that
all the creds can be calculated in advance and then applied at the point
of no return with no possibility of failure.
I would like to replace bprm->cap_effective with:
cap_isclear(bprm->cap_effective)
but this seems impossible due to special behaviour for processes of pid 1
(they always retain their parent's capability masks where normally they'd
be changed - see cap_bprm_set_creds()).
The following sequence of events now happens:
(a) At the start of do_execve, the current task's cred_exec_mutex is
locked to prevent PTRACE_ATTACH from obsoleting the calculation of
creds that we make.
(a) prepare_exec_creds() is then called to make a copy of the current
task's credentials and prepare it. This copy is then assigned to
bprm->cred.
This renders security_bprm_alloc() and security_bprm_free()
unnecessary, and so they've been removed.
(b) The determination of unsafe execution is now performed immediately
after (a) rather than later on in the code. The result is stored in
bprm->unsafe for future reference.
(c) prepare_binprm() is called, possibly multiple times.
(i) This applies the result of set[ug]id binaries to the new creds
attached to bprm->cred. Personality bit clearance is recorded,
but now deferred on the basis that the exec procedure may yet
fail.
(ii) This then calls the new security_bprm_set_creds(). This should
calculate the new LSM and capability credentials into *bprm->cred.
This folds together security_bprm_set() and parts of
security_bprm_apply_creds() (these two have been removed).
Anything that might fail must be done at this point.
(iii) bprm->cred_prepared is set to 1.
bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first pass of the security
calculations, and 1 on all subsequent passes. This allows SELinux
in (ii) to base its calculations only on the initial script and
not on the interpreter.
(d) flush_old_exec() is called to commit the task to execution. This
performs the following steps with regard to credentials:
(i) Clear pdeath_signal and set dumpable on certain circumstances that
may not be covered by commit_creds().
(ii) Clear any bits in current->personality that were deferred from
(c.i).
(e) install_exec_creds() [compute_creds() as was] is called to install the
new credentials. This performs the following steps with regard to
credentials:
(i) Calls security_bprm_committing_creds() to apply any security
requirements, such as flushing unauthorised files in SELinux, that
must be done before the credentials are changed.
This is made up of bits of security_bprm_apply_creds() and
security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), both of which have been removed.
This function is not allowed to fail; anything that might fail
must have been done in (c.ii).
(ii) Calls commit_creds() to apply the new credentials in a single
assignment (more or less). Possibly pdeath_signal and dumpable
should be part of struct creds.
(iii) Unlocks the task's cred_replace_mutex, thus allowing
PTRACE_ATTACH to take place.
(iv) Clears The bprm->cred pointer as the credentials it was holding
are now immutable.
(v) Calls security_bprm_committed_creds() to apply any security
alterations that must be done after the creds have been changed.
SELinux uses this to flush signals and signal handlers.
(f) If an error occurs before (d.i), bprm_free() will call abort_creds()
to destroy the proposed new credentials and will then unlock
cred_replace_mutex. No changes to the credentials will have been
made.
(2) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_bprm_alloc(), ->bprm_alloc_security()
(*) security_bprm_free(), ->bprm_free_security()
Removed in favour of preparing new credentials and modifying those.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
(*) security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), ->bprm_post_apply_creds()
Removed; split between security_bprm_set_creds(),
security_bprm_committing_creds() and security_bprm_committed_creds().
(*) security_bprm_set(), ->bprm_set_security()
Removed; folded into security_bprm_set_creds().
(*) security_bprm_set_creds(), ->bprm_set_creds()
New. The new credentials in bprm->creds should be checked and set up
as appropriate. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first call, 1 on the
second and subsequent calls.
(*) security_bprm_committing_creds(), ->bprm_committing_creds()
(*) security_bprm_committed_creds(), ->bprm_committed_creds()
New. Apply the security effects of the new credentials. This
includes closing unauthorised files in SELinux. This function may not
fail. When the former is called, the creds haven't yet been applied
to the process; when the latter is called, they have.
The former may access bprm->cred, the latter may not.
(3) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) The bprm_security_struct struct has been removed in favour of using
the credentials-under-construction approach.
(c) flush_unauthorized_files() now takes a cred pointer and passes it on
to inode_has_perm(), file_has_perm() and dentry_open().
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Pass credentials through dentry_open() so that the COW creds patch can have
SELinux's flush_unauthorized_files() pass the appropriate creds back to itself
when it opens its null chardev.
The security_dentry_open() call also now takes a creds pointer, as does the
dentry_open hook in struct security_operations.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Make inode_has_perm() and file_has_perm() take a cred pointer rather than a
task pointer.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Wrap access to SELinux's task SID, using task_sid() and current_sid() as
appropriate.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Use RCU to access another task's creds and to release a task's own creds.
This means that it will be possible for the credentials of a task to be
replaced without another task (a) requiring a full lock to read them, and (b)
seeing deallocated memory.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Wrap current->cred and a few other accessors to hide their actual
implementation.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Detach the credentials from task_struct, duplicating them in copy_process()
and releasing them in __put_task_struct().
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Separate the task security context from task_struct. At this point, the
security data is temporarily embedded in the task_struct with two pointers
pointing to it.
Note that the Alpha arch is altered as it refers to (E)UID and (E)GID in
entry.S via asm-offsets.
With comment fixes Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne <marc.c.dionne@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Constify the kernel_cap_t arguments to the capset LSM hooks.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Take away the ability for sys_capset() to affect processes other than current.
This means that current will not need to lock its own credentials when reading
them against interference by other processes.
This has effectively been the case for a while anyway, since:
(1) Without LSM enabled, sys_capset() is disallowed.
(2) With file-based capabilities, sys_capset() is neutered.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
check when determining if a process has additional powers to override
memory limits or when trying to read/write illegal file labels. Use
the new noaudit call instead.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
make an A or B type decision instead of a security decision. Currently
this is the case at least for filesystems when deciding if a process can use
the reserved 'root' blocks and for the case of things like the oom
algorithm determining if processes are root processes and should be less
likely to be killed. These types of security system requests should not be
audited or logged since they are not really security decisions. It would be
possible to solve this problem like the vm_enough_memory security check did
by creating a new LSM interface and moving all of the policy into that
interface but proves the needlessly bloat the LSM and provide complex
indirection.
This merely allows those decisions to be made where they belong and to not
flood logs or printk with denials for thing that are not security decisions.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Currently when SELinux has not been updated to handle a netlink message
type the operation is denied with EINVAL. This patch will leave the
audit/warning message so things get fixed but if policy chose to allow
unknowns this will allow the netlink operation.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
In enforcing mode '/sbin/ip addrlabel' results in a SELinux error:
type=SELINUX_ERR msg=audit(1225698822.073:42): SELinux: unrecognized
netlink message type=74 for sclass=43
The problem is missing RTM_*ADDRLABEL entries in SELinux's netlink
message types table.
Reported in https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=469423
Signed-off-by: Michal Schmidt <mschmidt@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
SELinux has long been calling wake_up_interruptible() on
current->parent->signal->wait_chldexit without holding any locks. It
appears that this operation should hold the tasklist_lock to dereference
current->parent and we should hold the siglock when waking up the
signal->wait_chldexit.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
SELinux has wrongly (since 2004) had an incorrect test for an empty
tty->tty_files list. With an empty list selinux would be pointing to part
of the tty struct itself and would then proceed to dereference that value
and again dereference that result. An F10 change to plymouth on a ppc64
system is actually currently triggering this bug. This patch uses
list_empty() to handle empty lists rather than looking at a meaningless
location.
[note, this fixes the oops reported in
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=469079]
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Using NIPQUAD() with NIPQUAD_FMT, %d.%d.%d.%d or %u.%u.%u.%u
can be replaced with %pI4
Signed-off-by: Harvey Harrison <harvey.harrison@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Some operations, like searching a directory path or connecting a unix domain
socket, make explicit calls into inode_permission. Our choices are to
either try to come up with a signature for all of the explicit calls to
inode_permission and do not check open on those, or to move the open checks to
dentry_open where we know this is always an open operation. This patch moves
the checks to dentry_open.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The iscsi_ibft.c changes are almost certainly a bugfix as the
pointer 'ip' is a u8 *, so they never print the last 8 bytes
of the IPv6 address, and the eight bytes they do print have
a zero byte with them in each 16-bit word.
Other than that, this should cause no difference in functionality.
Signed-off-by: Harvey Harrison <harvey.harrison@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This is a much better version of a previous patch to make the parser
tables constant. Rather than changing the typedef, we put the "const" in
all the various places where its required, allowing the __initconst
exception for nfsroot which was the cause of the previous trouble.
This was posted for review some time ago and I believe its been in -mm
since then.
Signed-off-by: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <aviro@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: (24 commits)
integrity: special fs magic
As pointed out by Jonathan Corbet, the timer must be deleted before
ERROR: code indent should use tabs where possible
The tpm_dev_release function is only called for platform devices, not pnp
Protect tpm_chip_list when transversing it.
Renames num_open to is_open, as only one process can open the file at a time.
Remove the BKL calls from the TPM driver, which were added in the overall
netlabel: Add configuration support for local labeling
cipso: Add support for native local labeling and fixup mapping names
netlabel: Changes to the NetLabel security attributes to allow LSMs to pass full contexts
selinux: Cache NetLabel secattrs in the socket's security struct
selinux: Set socket NetLabel based on connection endpoint
netlabel: Add functionality to set the security attributes of a packet
netlabel: Add network address selectors to the NetLabel/LSM domain mapping
netlabel: Add a generic way to create ordered linked lists of network addrs
netlabel: Replace protocol/NetLabel linking with refrerence counts
smack: Fix missing calls to netlbl_skbuff_err()
selinux: Fix missing calls to netlbl_skbuff_err()
selinux: Fix a problem in security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr()
selinux: Better local/forward check in selinux_ip_postroute()
...
Currently it is sometimes locked by the tty mutex and sometimes by the
sighand lock. The latter is in fact correct and now we can hand back referenced
objects we can fix this up without problems around sleeping functions.
Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
We now return a kref covered tty reference. That ensures the tty structure
doesn't go away when you have a return from get_current_tty. This is not
enough to protect you from most of the resources being freed behind your
back - yet.
[Updated to include fixes for SELinux problems found by Andrew Morton and
an s390 leak found while debugging the former]
Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This patch provides support for including the LSM's secid in addition to
the LSM's MLS information in the NetLabel security attributes structure.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Previous work enabled the use of address based NetLabel selectors, which
while highly useful, brought the potential for additional per-packet overhead
when used. This patch attempts to mitigate some of that overhead by caching
the NetLabel security attribute struct within the SELinux socket security
structure. This should help eliminate the need to recreate the NetLabel
secattr structure for each packet resulting in less overhead.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Previous work enabled the use of address based NetLabel selectors, which while
highly useful, brought the potential for additional per-packet overhead when
used. This patch attempts to solve that by applying NetLabel socket labels
when sockets are connect()'d. This should alleviate the per-packet NetLabel
labeling for all connected sockets (yes, it even works for connected DGRAM
sockets).
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch builds upon the new NetLabel address selector functionality by
providing the NetLabel KAPI and CIPSO engine support needed to enable the
new packet-based labeling. The only new addition to the NetLabel KAPI at
this point is shown below:
* int netlbl_skbuff_setattr(skb, family, secattr)
... and is designed to be called from a Netfilter hook after the packet's
IP header has been populated such as in the FORWARD or LOCAL_OUT hooks.
This patch also provides the necessary SELinux hooks to support this new
functionality. Smack support is not currently included due to uncertainty
regarding the permissions needed to expand the Smack network access controls.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
At some point I think I messed up and dropped the calls to netlbl_skbuff_err()
which are necessary for CIPSO to send error notifications to remote systems.
This patch re-introduces the error handling calls into the SELinux code.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Currently when SELinux fails to allocate memory in
security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr() the NetLabel LSM domain field is set to
NULL which triggers the default NetLabel LSM domain mapping which may not
always be the desired mapping. This patch fixes this by returning an error
when the kernel is unable to allocate memory. This could result in more
failures on a system with heavy memory pressure but it is the "correct"
thing to do.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
It turns out that checking to see if skb->sk is NULL is not a very good
indicator of a forwarded packet as some locally generated packets also have
skb->sk set to NULL. Fix this by not only checking the skb->sk field but also
the IP[6]CB(skb)->flags field for the IP[6]SKB_FORWARDED flag. While we are
at it, we are calling selinux_parse_skb() much earlier than we really should
resulting in potentially wasted cycles parsing packets for information we
might no use; so shuffle the code around a bit to fix this.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
We did the right thing in a few cases but there were several areas where we
determined a packet's address family based on the socket's address family which
is not the right thing to do since we can get IPv4 packets on IPv6 sockets.
This patch fixes these problems by either taking the address family directly
from the packet.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
We were doing a lot of extra work in selinux_netlbl_sock_graft() what wasn't
necessary so this patch removes that code. It also removes the redundant
second argument to selinux_netlbl_sock_setsid() which allows us to simplify a
few other functions.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
At some point during the 2.6.27 development cycle two new fields were added
to the SELinux context structure, a string pointer and a length field. The
code in selinux_secattr_to_sid() was not modified and as a result these two
fields were left uninitialized which could result in erratic behavior,
including kernel panics, when NetLabel is used. This patch fixes the
problem by fully initializing the context in selinux_secattr_to_sid() before
use and reducing the level of direct context manipulation done to help
prevent future problems.
Please apply this to the 2.6.27-rcX release stream.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
At some point during the 2.6.27 development cycle two new fields were added
to the SELinux context structure, a string pointer and a length field. The
code in selinux_secattr_to_sid() was not modified and as a result these two
fields were left uninitialized which could result in erratic behavior,
including kernel panics, when NetLabel is used. This patch fixes the
problem by fully initializing the context in selinux_secattr_to_sid() before
use and reducing the level of direct context manipulation done to help
prevent future problems.
Please apply this to the 2.6.27-rcX release stream.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
As we are not concerned with fine-grained control over reading of
symlinks in proc, always use the default proc SID for all proc symlinks.
This should help avoid permission issues upon changes to the proc tree
as in the /proc/net -> /proc/self/net example.
This does not alter labeling of symlinks within /proc/pid directories.
ls -Zd /proc/net output before and after the patch should show the difference.
Signed-off-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
