Commit graph

197 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Christian Brauner
21cd79a27a ptrace: reintroduce usage of subjective credentials in ptrace_has_cap()
commit 6b3ad6649a4c75504edeba242d3fd36b3096a57f upstream.

Commit 69f594a389 ("ptrace: do not audit capability check when outputing /proc/pid/stat")
introduced the ability to opt out of audit messages for accesses to various
proc files since they are not violations of policy.  While doing so it
somehow switched the check from ns_capable() to
has_ns_capability{_noaudit}(). That means it switched from checking the
subjective credentials of the task to using the objective credentials. This
is wrong since. ptrace_has_cap() is currently only used in
ptrace_may_access() And is used to check whether the calling task (subject)
has the CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability in the provided user namespace to operate
on the target task (object). According to the cred.h comments this would
mean the subjective credentials of the calling task need to be used.
This switches ptrace_has_cap() to use security_capable(). Because we only
call ptrace_has_cap() in ptrace_may_access() and in there we already have a
stable reference to the calling task's creds under rcu_read_lock() there's
no need to go through another series of dereferences and rcu locking done
in ns_capable{_noaudit}().

As one example where this might be particularly problematic, Jann pointed
out that in combination with the upcoming IORING_OP_OPENAT feature, this
bug might allow unprivileged users to bypass the capability checks while
asynchronously opening files like /proc/*/mem, because the capability
checks for this would be performed against kernel credentials.

To illustrate on the former point about this being exploitable: When
io_uring creates a new context it records the subjective credentials of the
caller. Later on, when it starts to do work it creates a kernel thread and
registers a callback. The callback runs with kernel creds for
ktask->real_cred and ktask->cred. To prevent this from becoming a
full-blown 0-day io_uring will call override_cred() and override
ktask->cred with the subjective credentials of the creator of the io_uring
instance. With ptrace_has_cap() currently looking at ktask->real_cred this
override will be ineffective and the caller will be able to open arbitray
proc files as mentioned above.
Luckily, this is currently not exploitable but will turn into a 0-day once
IORING_OP_OPENAT{2} land in v5.6. Fix it now!

Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Fixes: 69f594a389 ("ptrace: do not audit capability check when outputing /proc/pid/stat")
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-01-23 08:21:29 +01:00
Jann Horn
54435b7fff ptrace: Fix ->ptracer_cred handling for PTRACE_TRACEME
commit 6994eefb0053799d2e07cd140df6c2ea106c41ee upstream.

Fix two issues:

When called for PTRACE_TRACEME, ptrace_link() would obtain an RCU
reference to the parent's objective credentials, then give that pointer
to get_cred().  However, the object lifetime rules for things like
struct cred do not permit unconditionally turning an RCU reference into
a stable reference.

PTRACE_TRACEME records the parent's credentials as if the parent was
acting as the subject, but that's not the case.  If a malicious
unprivileged child uses PTRACE_TRACEME and the parent is privileged, and
at a later point, the parent process becomes attacker-controlled
(because it drops privileges and calls execve()), the attacker ends up
with control over two processes with a privileged ptrace relationship,
which can be abused to ptrace a suid binary and obtain root privileges.

Fix both of these by always recording the credentials of the process
that is requesting the creation of the ptrace relationship:
current_cred() can't change under us, and current is the proper subject
for access control.

This change is theoretically userspace-visible, but I am not aware of
any code that it will actually break.

Fixes: 64b875f7ac ("ptrace: Capture the ptracer's creds not PT_PTRACE_CAP")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-07-10 09:53:41 +02:00
Jann Horn
31e216cf9d ptrace: restore smp_rmb() in __ptrace_may_access()
commit f6581f5b55141a95657ef5742cf6a6bfa20a109f upstream.

Restore the read memory barrier in __ptrace_may_access() that was deleted
a couple years ago. Also add comments on this barrier and the one it pairs
with to explain why they're there (as far as I understand).

Fixes: bfedb58925 ("mm: Add a user_ns owner to mm_struct and fix ptrace permission checks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-06-19 08:18:00 +02:00
Eric W. Biederman
662b831dde signal/ptrace: Don't leak unitialized kernel memory with PTRACE_PEEK_SIGINFO
[ Upstream commit f6e2aa91a46d2bc79fce9b93a988dbe7655c90c0 ]

Recently syzbot in conjunction with KMSAN reported that
ptrace_peek_siginfo can copy an uninitialized siginfo to userspace.
Inspecting ptrace_peek_siginfo confirms this.

The problem is that off when initialized from args.off can be
initialized to a negaive value.  At which point the "if (off >= 0)"
test to see if off became negative fails because off started off
negative.

Prevent the core problem by adding a variable found that is only true
if a siginfo is found and copied to a temporary in preparation for
being copied to userspace.

Prevent args.off from being truncated when being assigned to off by
testing that off is <= the maximum possible value of off.  Convert off
to an unsigned long so that we should not have to truncate args.off,
we have well defined overflow behavior so if we add another check we
won't risk fighting undefined compiler behavior, and so that we have a
type whose maximum value is easy to test for.

Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: syzbot+0d602a1b0d8c95bdf299@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 84c751bd4a ("ptrace: add ability to retrieve signals without removing from a queue (v4)")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2019-06-19 08:18:00 +02:00
Andrei Vagin
13a6a6dd3c ptrace: take into account saved_sigmask in PTRACE{GET,SET}SIGMASK
[ Upstream commit fcfc2aa0185f4a731d05a21e9f359968fdfd02e7 ]

There are a few system calls (pselect, ppoll, etc) which replace a task
sigmask while they are running in a kernel-space

When a task calls one of these syscalls, the kernel saves a current
sigmask in task->saved_sigmask and sets a syscall sigmask.

On syscall-exit-stop, ptrace traps a task before restoring the
saved_sigmask, so PTRACE_GETSIGMASK returns the syscall sigmask and
PTRACE_SETSIGMASK does nothing, because its sigmask is replaced by
saved_sigmask, when the task returns to user-space.

This patch fixes this problem.  PTRACE_GETSIGMASK returns saved_sigmask
if it's set.  PTRACE_SETSIGMASK drops the TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK flag.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181120060616.6043-1-avagin@gmail.com
Fixes: 29000caecb ("ptrace: add ability to get/set signal-blocked mask")
Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin (Microsoft) <sashal@kernel.org>
2019-05-04 09:20:22 +02:00
Thomas Gleixner
aecb99692a ptrace: Remove unused ptrace_may_access_sched() and MODE_IBRS
commit 46f7ecb1e7359f183f5bbd1e08b90e10e52164f9 upstream

The IBPB control code in x86 removed the usage. Remove the functionality
which was introduced for this.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.559149393@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-12-05 19:32:03 +01:00
Jiri Kosina
cacd9385b7 x86/speculation: Apply IBPB more strictly to avoid cross-process data leak
commit dbfe2953f63c640463c630746cd5d9de8b2f63ae upstream

Currently, IBPB is only issued in cases when switching into a non-dumpable
process, the rationale being to protect such 'important and security
sensitive' processess (such as GPG) from data leaking into a different
userspace process via spectre v2.

This is however completely insufficient to provide proper userspace-to-userpace
spectrev2 protection, as any process can poison branch buffers before being
scheduled out, and the newly scheduled process immediately becomes spectrev2
victim.

In order to minimize the performance impact (for usecases that do require
spectrev2 protection), issue the barrier only in cases when switching between
processess where the victim can't be ptraced by the potential attacker (as in
such cases, the attacker doesn't have to bother with branch buffers at all).

[ tglx: Split up PTRACE_MODE_NOACCESS_CHK into PTRACE_MODE_SCHED and
  PTRACE_MODE_IBPB to be able to do ptrace() context tracking reasonably
  fine-grained ]

Fixes: 18bf3c3ea8 ("x86/speculation: Use Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier in context switch")
Originally-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc:  "WoodhouseDavid" <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc:  "SchauflerCasey" <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/nycvar.YFH.7.76.1809251437340.15880@cbobk.fhfr.pm
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-12-05 19:32:00 +01:00
Mike Rapoport
2ee0826085 pids: introduce find_get_task_by_vpid() helper
There are several functions that do find_task_by_vpid() followed by
get_task_struct().  We can use a helper function instead.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509602027-11337-1-git-send-email-rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-02-06 18:32:46 -08:00
Linus Torvalds
3dbc4f5485 Merge branch 'next-seccomp' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull seccomp updates from James Morris:
 "Add support for retrieving seccomp metadata"

* 'next-seccomp' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
  ptrace, seccomp: add support for retrieving seccomp metadata
  seccomp: hoist out filter resolving logic
2018-01-31 13:44:45 -08:00
Eric W. Biederman
0752d7bf62 ptrace: Use copy_siginfo in setsiginfo and getsiginfo
Now that copy_siginfo copies all of the fields this is safe, safer (as
all of the bits are guaranteed to be copied), clearer, and less error
prone than using a structure copy.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-01-16 12:48:30 -06:00
Eric W. Biederman
eb5346c379 signal: Remove the code to clear siginfo before calling copy_siginfo_from_user32
The new unified copy_siginfo_from_user32 takes care of this.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-01-15 18:01:19 -06:00
Tycho Andersen
26500475ac ptrace, seccomp: add support for retrieving seccomp metadata
With the new SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG, we need to be able to extract these
flags for checkpoint restore, since they describe the state of a filter.

So, let's add PTRACE_SECCOMP_GET_METADATA, similar to ..._GET_FILTER, which
returns the metadata of the nth filter (right now, just the flags).
Hopefully this will be future proof, and new per-filter metadata can be
added to this struct.

Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@docker.com>
CC: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
CC: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
CC: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2017-11-28 15:41:01 -08:00
Eric W. Biederman
cc731525f2 signal: Remove kernel interal si_code magic
struct siginfo is a union and the kernel since 2.4 has been hiding a union
tag in the high 16bits of si_code using the values:
__SI_KILL
__SI_TIMER
__SI_POLL
__SI_FAULT
__SI_CHLD
__SI_RT
__SI_MESGQ
__SI_SYS

While this looks plausible on the surface, in practice this situation has
not worked well.

- Injected positive signals are not copied to user space properly
  unless they have these magic high bits set.

- Injected positive signals are not reported properly by signalfd
  unless they have these magic high bits set.

- These kernel internal values leaked to userspace via ptrace_peek_siginfo

- It was possible to inject these kernel internal values and cause the
  the kernel to misbehave.

- Kernel developers got confused and expected these kernel internal values
  in userspace in kernel self tests.

- Kernel developers got confused and set si_code to __SI_FAULT which
  is SI_USER in userspace which causes userspace to think an ordinary user
  sent the signal and that it was not kernel generated.

- The values make it impossible to reorganize the code to transform
  siginfo_copy_to_user into a plain copy_to_user.  As si_code must
  be massaged before being passed to userspace.

So remove these kernel internal si codes and make the kernel code simpler
and more maintainable.

To replace these kernel internal magic si_codes introduce the helper
function siginfo_layout, that takes a signal number and an si_code and
computes which union member of siginfo is being used.  Have
siginfo_layout return an enumeration so that gcc will have enough
information to warn if a switch statement does not handle all of union
members.

A couple of architectures have a messed up ABI that defines signal
specific duplications of SI_USER which causes more special cases in
siginfo_layout than I would like.  The good news is only problem
architectures pay the cost.

Update all of the code that used the previous magic __SI_ values to
use the new SIL_ values and to call siginfo_layout to get those
values.  Escept where not all of the cases are handled remove the
defaults in the switch statements so that if a new case is missed in
the future the lack will show up at compile time.

Modify the code that copies siginfo si_code to userspace to just copy
the value and not cast si_code to a short first.  The high bits are no
longer used to hold a magic union member.

Fixup the siginfo header files to stop including the __SI_ values in
their constants and for the headers that were missing it to properly
update the number of si_codes for each signal type.

The fixes to copy_siginfo_from_user32 implementations has the
interesting property that several of them perviously should never have
worked as the __SI_ values they depended up where kernel internal.
With that dependency gone those implementations should work much
better.

The idea of not passing the __SI_ values out to userspace and then
not reinserting them has been tested with criu and criu worked without
changes.

Ref: 2.4.0-test1
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2017-07-24 14:30:28 -05:00
Eric W. Biederman
c70d9d809f ptrace: Properly initialize ptracer_cred on fork
When I introduced ptracer_cred I failed to consider the weirdness of
fork where the task_struct copies the old value by default.  This
winds up leaving ptracer_cred set even when a process forks and
the child process does not wind up being ptraced.

Because ptracer_cred is not set on non-ptraced processes whose
parents were ptraced this has broken the ability of the enlightenment
window manager to start setuid children.

Fix this by properly initializing ptracer_cred in ptrace_init_task

This must be done with a little bit of care to preserve the current value
of ptracer_cred when ptrace carries through fork.  Re-reading the
ptracer_cred from the ptracing process at this point is inconsistent
with how PT_PTRACE_CAP has been maintained all of these years.

Tested-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Fixes: 64b875f7ac ("ptrace: Capture the ptracer's creds not PT_PTRACE_CAP")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2017-05-23 07:40:44 -05:00
bsegall@google.com
5402e97af6 ptrace: fix PTRACE_LISTEN race corrupting task->state
In PT_SEIZED + LISTEN mode STOP/CONT signals cause a wakeup against
__TASK_TRACED.  If this races with the ptrace_unfreeze_traced at the end
of a PTRACE_LISTEN, this can wake the task /after/ the check against
__TASK_TRACED, but before the reset of state to TASK_TRACED.  This
causes it to instead clobber TASK_WAKING, allowing a subsequent wakeup
against TRACED while the task is still on the rq wake_list, corrupting
it.

Oleg said:
 "The kernel can crash or this can lead to other hard-to-debug problems.
  In short, "task->state = TASK_TRACED" in ptrace_unfreeze_traced()
  assumes that nobody else can wake it up, but PTRACE_LISTEN breaks the
  contract. Obviusly it is very wrong to manipulate task->state if this
  task is already running, or WAKING, or it sleeps again"

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Fixes: 9899d11f ("ptrace: ensure arch_ptrace/ptrace_request can never race with SIGKILL")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/xm26y3vfhmkp.fsf_-_@bsegall-linux.mtv.corp.google.com
Signed-off-by: Ben Segall <bsegall@google.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-04-08 00:47:48 -07:00
Ingo Molnar
299300258d sched/headers: Prepare for new header dependencies before moving code to <linux/sched/task.h>
We are going to split <linux/sched/task.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which
will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files.

Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/task.h> file that just
maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and
bisectable.

Include the new header in the files that are going to need it.

Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-03-02 08:42:35 +01:00
Ingo Molnar
f7ccbae45c sched/headers: Prepare for new header dependencies before moving code to <linux/sched/coredump.h>
We are going to split <linux/sched/coredump.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which
will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files.

Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/coredump.h> file that just
maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and
bisectable.

Include the new header in the files that are going to need it.

Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-03-02 08:42:28 +01:00
Ingo Molnar
6e84f31522 sched/headers: Prepare for new header dependencies before moving code to <linux/sched/mm.h>
We are going to split <linux/sched/mm.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which
will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files.

Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/mm.h> file that just
maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and
bisectable.

The APIs that are going to be moved first are:

   mm_alloc()
   __mmdrop()
   mmdrop()
   mmdrop_async_fn()
   mmdrop_async()
   mmget_not_zero()
   mmput()
   mmput_async()
   get_task_mm()
   mm_access()
   mm_release()

Include the new header in the files that are going to need it.

Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-03-02 08:42:28 +01:00
Eric W. Biederman
84d77d3f06 ptrace: Don't allow accessing an undumpable mm
It is the reasonable expectation that if an executable file is not
readable there will be no way for a user without special privileges to
read the file.  This is enforced in ptrace_attach but if ptrace
is already attached before exec there is no enforcement for read-only
executables.

As the only way to read such an mm is through access_process_vm
spin a variant called ptrace_access_vm that will fail if the
target process is not being ptraced by the current process, or
the current process did not have sufficient privileges when ptracing
began to read the target processes mm.

In the ptrace implementations replace access_process_vm by
ptrace_access_vm.  There remain several ptrace sites that still use
access_process_vm as they are reading the target executables
instructions (for kernel consumption) or register stacks.  As such it
does not appear necessary to add a permission check to those calls.

This bug has always existed in Linux.

Fixes: v1.0
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2016-11-22 12:57:38 -06:00
Eric W. Biederman
64b875f7ac ptrace: Capture the ptracer's creds not PT_PTRACE_CAP
When the flag PT_PTRACE_CAP was added the PTRACE_TRACEME path was
overlooked.  This can result in incorrect behavior when an application
like strace traces an exec of a setuid executable.

Further PT_PTRACE_CAP does not have enough information for making good
security decisions as it does not report which user namespace the
capability is in.  This has already allowed one mistake through
insufficient granulariy.

I found this issue when I was testing another corner case of exec and
discovered that I could not get strace to set PT_PTRACE_CAP even when
running strace as root with a full set of caps.

This change fixes the above issue with strace allowing stracing as
root a setuid executable without disabling setuid.  More fundamentaly
this change allows what is allowable at all times, by using the correct
information in it's decision.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 4214e42f96d4 ("v2.4.9.11 -> v2.4.9.12")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2016-11-22 11:49:49 -06:00
Eric W. Biederman
bfedb58925 mm: Add a user_ns owner to mm_struct and fix ptrace permission checks
During exec dumpable is cleared if the file that is being executed is
not readable by the user executing the file.  A bug in
ptrace_may_access allows reading the file if the executable happens to
enter into a subordinate user namespace (aka clone(CLONE_NEWUSER),
unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER), or setns(fd, CLONE_NEWUSER).

This problem is fixed with only necessary userspace breakage by adding
a user namespace owner to mm_struct, captured at the time of exec, so
it is clear in which user namespace CAP_SYS_PTRACE must be present in
to be able to safely give read permission to the executable.

The function ptrace_may_access is modified to verify that the ptracer
has CAP_SYS_ADMIN in task->mm->user_ns instead of task->cred->user_ns.
This ensures that if the task changes it's cred into a subordinate
user namespace it does not become ptraceable.

The function ptrace_attach is modified to only set PT_PTRACE_CAP when
CAP_SYS_PTRACE is held over task->mm->user_ns.  The intent of
PT_PTRACE_CAP is to be a flag to note that whatever permission changes
the task might go through the tracer has sufficient permissions for
it not to be an issue.  task->cred->user_ns is always the same
as or descendent of mm->user_ns.  Which guarantees that having
CAP_SYS_PTRACE over mm->user_ns is the worst case for the tasks
credentials.

To prevent regressions mm->dumpable and mm->user_ns are not considered
when a task has no mm.  As simply failing ptrace_may_attach causes
regressions in privileged applications attempting to read things
such as /proc/<pid>/stat

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Fixes: 8409cca705 ("userns: allow ptrace from non-init user namespaces")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2016-11-22 11:49:48 -06:00
Lorenzo Stoakes
f307ab6dce mm: replace access_process_vm() write parameter with gup_flags
This removes the 'write' argument from access_process_vm() and replaces
it with 'gup_flags' as use of this function previously silently implied
FOLL_FORCE, whereas after this patch callers explicitly pass this flag.

We make this explicit as use of FOLL_FORCE can result in surprising
behaviour (and hence bugs) within the mm subsystem.

Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Jesper Nilsson <jesper.nilsson@axis.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-10-19 08:31:25 -07:00
Ales Novak
0a5bf409d3 ptrace: clear TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE on ptrace detach
On __ptrace_detach(), called from do_exit()->exit_notify()->
forget_original_parent()->exit_ptrace(), the TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE in
thread->flags of the tracee is not cleared up.  This results in the
tracehook_report_syscall_* being called (though there's no longer a tracer
listening to that) upon its further syscalls.

Example scenario - attach "strace" to a running process and kill it (the
strace) with SIGKILL.  You'll see that the syscall trace hooks are still
being called.

The clearing of this flag should be moved from ptrace_detach() to
__ptrace_detach().

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1472759493-20554-1-git-send-email-alnovak@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Ales Novak <alnovak@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-10-11 15:06:32 -07:00
Masahiro Yamada
97f2645f35 tree-wide: replace config_enabled() with IS_ENABLED()
The use of config_enabled() against config options is ambiguous.  In
practical terms, config_enabled() is equivalent to IS_BUILTIN(), but the
author might have used it for the meaning of IS_ENABLED().  Using
IS_ENABLED(), IS_BUILTIN(), IS_MODULE() etc.  makes the intention
clearer.

This commit replaces config_enabled() with IS_ENABLED() where possible.
This commit is only touching bool config options.

I noticed two cases where config_enabled() is used against a tristate
option:

 - config_enabled(CONFIG_HWMON)
  [ drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/thermal.c ]

 - config_enabled(CONFIG_BACKLIGHT_CLASS_DEVICE)
  [ drivers/gpu/drm/gma500/opregion.c ]

I did not touch them because they should be converted to IS_BUILTIN()
in order to keep the logic, but I was not sure it was the authors'
intention.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1465215656-20569-1-git-send-email-yamada.masahiro@socionext.com
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Stas Sergeev <stsp@list.ru>
Cc: Matt Redfearn <matt.redfearn@imgtec.com>
Cc: Joshua Kinard <kumba@gentoo.org>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.com>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Markos Chandras <markos.chandras@imgtec.com>
Cc: "Dmitry V. Levin" <ldv@altlinux.org>
Cc: yu-cheng yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: Nikolay Martynov <mar.kolya@gmail.com>
Cc: Huacai Chen <chenhc@lemote.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Leonid Yegoshin <Leonid.Yegoshin@imgtec.com>
Cc: Rafal Milecki <zajec5@gmail.com>
Cc: James Cowgill <James.Cowgill@imgtec.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Alex Smith <alex.smith@imgtec.com>
Cc: Adam Buchbinder <adam.buchbinder@gmail.com>
Cc: Qais Yousef <qais.yousef@imgtec.com>
Cc: Jiang Liu <jiang.liu@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Mikko Rapeli <mikko.rapeli@iki.fi>
Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Brian Norris <computersforpeace@gmail.com>
Cc: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
Cc: "Luis R. Rodriguez" <mcgrof@do-not-panic.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com>
Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@imgtec.com>
Cc: Kalle Valo <kvalo@qca.qualcomm.com>
Cc: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
Cc: Tony Wu <tung7970@gmail.com>
Cc: Huaitong Han <huaitong.han@intel.com>
Cc: Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Jason Cooper <jason@lakedaemon.net>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Gelmini <andrea.gelmini@gelma.net>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Cc: Rabin Vincent <rabin@rab.in>
Cc: "Maciej W. Rozycki" <macro@imgtec.com>
Cc: David Daney <david.daney@cavium.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-08-04 08:50:07 -04:00
Oleg Nesterov
1333ab0315 ptrace: change __ptrace_unlink() to clear ->ptrace under ->siglock
This test-case (simplified version of generated by syzkaller)

	#include <unistd.h>
	#include <sys/ptrace.h>
	#include <sys/wait.h>

	void test(void)
	{
		for (;;) {
			if (fork()) {
				wait(NULL);
				continue;
			}

			ptrace(PTRACE_SEIZE, getppid(), 0, 0);
			ptrace(PTRACE_INTERRUPT, getppid(), 0, 0);
			_exit(0);
		}
	}

	int main(void)
	{
		int np;

		for (np = 0; np < 8; ++np)
			if (!fork())
				test();

		while (wait(NULL) > 0)
			;
		return 0;
	}

triggers the 2nd WARN_ON_ONCE(!signr) warning in do_jobctl_trap().  The
problem is that __ptrace_unlink() clears task->jobctl under siglock but
task->ptrace is cleared without this lock held; this fools the "else"
branch which assumes that !PT_SEIZED means PT_PTRACED.

Note also that most of other PTRACE_SEIZE checks can race with detach
from the exiting tracer too.  Say, the callers of ptrace_trap_notify()
assume that SEIZED can't go away after it was checked.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-22 15:36:02 -07:00
Andy Lutomirski
5c465217a9 ptrace: in PEEK_SIGINFO, check syscall bitness, not task bitness
Users of the 32-bit ptrace() ABI expect the full 32-bit ABI.  siginfo
translation should check ptrace() ABI, not caller task ABI.

This is an ABI change on SPARC.  Let's hope that no one relied on the
old buggy ABI.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-22 15:36:02 -07:00
Jann Horn
caaee6234d ptrace: use fsuid, fsgid, effective creds for fs access checks
By checking the effective credentials instead of the real UID / permitted
capabilities, ensure that the calling process actually intended to use its
credentials.

To ensure that all ptrace checks use the correct caller credentials (e.g.
in case out-of-tree code or newly added code omits the PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS
flag), use two new flags and require one of them to be set.

The problem was that when a privileged task had temporarily dropped its
privileges, e.g.  by calling setreuid(0, user_uid), with the intent to
perform following syscalls with the credentials of a user, it still passed
ptrace access checks that the user would not be able to pass.

While an attacker should not be able to convince the privileged task to
perform a ptrace() syscall, this is a problem because the ptrace access
check is reused for things in procfs.

In particular, the following somewhat interesting procfs entries only rely
on ptrace access checks:

 /proc/$pid/stat - uses the check for determining whether pointers
     should be visible, useful for bypassing ASLR
 /proc/$pid/maps - also useful for bypassing ASLR
 /proc/$pid/cwd - useful for gaining access to restricted
     directories that contain files with lax permissions, e.g. in
     this scenario:
     lrwxrwxrwx root root /proc/13020/cwd -> /root/foobar
     drwx------ root root /root
     drwxr-xr-x root root /root/foobar
     -rw-r--r-- root root /root/foobar/secret

Therefore, on a system where a root-owned mode 6755 binary changes its
effective credentials as described and then dumps a user-specified file,
this could be used by an attacker to reveal the memory layout of root's
processes or reveal the contents of files he is not allowed to access
(through /proc/$pid/cwd).

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warning]
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-01-20 17:09:18 -08:00
Oleg Nesterov
7c3b00e06d ptrace: make wait_on_bit(JOBCTL_TRAPPING_BIT) in ptrace_attach() killable
ptrace_attach() can hang waiting for STOPPED -> TRACED transition if the
tracee gets frozen in between, change wait_on_bit() to use TASK_KILLABLE.

This doesn't really solve the problem(s) and we probably need to fix the
freezer.  In particular, note that this means that pm freezer will fail if
it races attach-to-stopped-task.

And otoh perhaps we can just remove JOBCTL_TRAPPING_BIT altogether, it is
not clear if we really need to hide this transition from debugger, WNOHANG
after PTRACE_ATTACH can fail anyway if it races with SIGCONT.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan Kratochvil <jan.kratochvil@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-01-20 17:09:18 -08:00
Tycho Andersen
f8e529ed94 seccomp, ptrace: add support for dumping seccomp filters
This patch adds support for dumping a process' (classic BPF) seccomp
filters via ptrace.

PTRACE_SECCOMP_GET_FILTER allows the tracer to dump the user's classic BPF
seccomp filters. addr should be an integer which represents the ith seccomp
filter (0 is the most recently installed filter). data should be a struct
sock_filter * with enough room for the ith filter, or NULL, in which case
the filter is not saved. The return value for this command is the number of
BPF instructions the program represents, or negative in the case of errors.
Command specific errors are ENOENT: which indicates that there is no ith
filter in this seccomp tree, and EMEDIUMTYPE, which indicates that the ith
filter was not installed as a classic BPF filter.

A caveat with this approach is that there is no way to get explicitly at
the heirarchy of seccomp filters, and users need to memcmp() filters to
decide which are inherited. This means that a task which installs two of
the same filter can potentially confuse users of this interface.

v2: * make save_orig const
    * check that the orig_prog exists (not necessary right now, but when
       grows eBPF support it will be)
    * s/n/filter_off and make it an unsigned long to match ptrace
    * count "down" the tree instead of "up" when passing a filter offset

v3: * don't take the current task's lock for inspecting its seccomp mode
    * use a 0x42** constant for the ptrace command value

v4: * don't copy to userspace while holding spinlocks

v5: * add another condition to WARN_ON

v6: * rebase on net-next

Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho.andersen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
CC: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
CC: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
CC: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
CC: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
CC: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
CC: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-27 19:55:13 -07:00
Tycho Andersen
13c4a90119 seccomp: add ptrace options for suspend/resume
This patch is the first step in enabling checkpoint/restore of processes
with seccomp enabled.

One of the things CRIU does while dumping tasks is inject code into them
via ptrace to collect information that is only available to the process
itself. However, if we are in a seccomp mode where these processes are
prohibited from making these syscalls, then what CRIU does kills the task.

This patch adds a new ptrace option, PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP, that enables
a task from the init user namespace which has CAP_SYS_ADMIN and no seccomp
filters to disable (and re-enable) seccomp filters for another task so that
they can be successfully dumped (and restored). We restrict the set of
processes that can disable seccomp through ptrace because although today
ptrace can be used to bypass seccomp, there is some discussion of closing
this loophole in the future and we would like this patch to not depend on
that behavior and be future proofed for when it is removed.

Note that seccomp can be suspended before any filters are actually
installed; this behavior is useful on criu restore, so that we can suspend
seccomp, restore the filters, unmap our restore code from the restored
process' address space, and then resume the task by detaching and have the
filters resumed as well.

v2 changes:

* require that the tracer have no seccomp filters installed
* drop TIF_NOTSC manipulation from the patch
* change from ptrace command to a ptrace option and use this ptrace option
  as the flag to check. This means that as soon as the tracer
  detaches/dies, seccomp is re-enabled and as a corrollary that one can not
  disable seccomp across PTRACE_ATTACHs.

v3 changes:

* get rid of various #ifdefs everywhere
* report more sensible errors when PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP is incorrectly
  used

v4 changes:

* get rid of may_suspend_seccomp() in favor of a capable() check in ptrace
  directly

v5 changes:

* check that seccomp is not enabled (or suspended) on the tracer

Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho.andersen@canonical.com>
CC: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
CC: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com>
CC: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
CC: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
[kees: access seccomp.mode through seccomp_mode() instead]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2015-07-15 11:52:52 -07:00
Oleg Nesterov
64a4096c5c ptrace: ptrace_detach() can no longer race with SIGKILL
ptrace_detach() re-checks ->ptrace under tasklist lock and calls
release_task() if __ptrace_detach() returns true.  This was needed because
the __TASK_TRACED tracee could be killed/untraced, and it could even pass
exit_notify() before we take tasklist_lock.

But this is no longer possible after 9899d11f65 "ptrace: ensure
arch_ptrace/ptrace_request can never race with SIGKILL".  We can turn
these checks into WARN_ON() and remove release_task().

While at it, document the setting of child->exit_code.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Pavel Labath <labath@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-17 09:04:06 -04:00
Oleg Nesterov
b72c186999 ptrace: fix race between ptrace_resume() and wait_task_stopped()
ptrace_resume() is called when the tracee is still __TASK_TRACED.  We set
tracee->exit_code and then wake_up_state() changes tracee->state.  If the
tracer's sub-thread does wait() in between, task_stopped_code(ptrace => T)
wrongly looks like another report from tracee.

This confuses debugger, and since wait_task_stopped() clears ->exit_code
the tracee can miss a signal.

Test-case:

	#include <stdio.h>
	#include <unistd.h>
	#include <sys/wait.h>
	#include <sys/ptrace.h>
	#include <pthread.h>
	#include <assert.h>

	int pid;

	void *waiter(void *arg)
	{
		int stat;

		for (;;) {
			assert(pid == wait(&stat));
			assert(WIFSTOPPED(stat));
			if (WSTOPSIG(stat) == SIGHUP)
				continue;

			assert(WSTOPSIG(stat) == SIGCONT);
			printf("ERR! extra/wrong report:%x\n", stat);
		}
	}

	int main(void)
	{
		pthread_t thread;

		pid = fork();
		if (!pid) {
			assert(ptrace(PTRACE_TRACEME, 0,0,0) == 0);
			for (;;)
				kill(getpid(), SIGHUP);
		}

		assert(pthread_create(&thread, NULL, waiter, NULL) == 0);

		for (;;)
			ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, pid, 0, SIGCONT);

		return 0;
	}

Note for stable: the bug is very old, but without 9899d11f65 "ptrace:
ensure arch_ptrace/ptrace_request can never race with SIGKILL" the fix
should use lock_task_sighand(child).

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Pavel Labath <labath@google.com>
Tested-by: Pavel Labath <labath@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-17 09:04:06 -04:00
Fabian Frederick
1cca3385e6 ptrace: remove linux/compat.h inclusion under CONFIG_COMPAT
Commit 84c751bd4a ("ptrace: add ability to retrieve signals without
removing from a queue (v4)") includes <linux/compat.h> globally in
ptrace.c

This patch removes inclusion under if defined CONFIG_COMPAT.

Signed-off-by: Fabian Frederick <fabf@skynet.be>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-17 14:34:51 -08:00
Oleg Nesterov
7c8bd2322c exit: ptrace: shift "reap dead" code from exit_ptrace() to forget_original_parent()
Now that forget_original_parent() uses ->ptrace_entry for EXIT_DEAD tasks,
we can simply pass "dead_children" list to exit_ptrace() and remove
another release_task() loop.  Plus this way we do not need to drop and
reacquire tasklist_lock.

Also shift the list_empty(ptraced) check, if we want this optimization it
makes sense to eliminate the function call altogether.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Cc: Sterling Alexander <stalexan@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-12-10 17:41:10 -08:00
NeilBrown
743162013d sched: Remove proliferation of wait_on_bit() action functions
The current "wait_on_bit" interface requires an 'action'
function to be provided which does the actual waiting.
There are over 20 such functions, many of them identical.
Most cases can be satisfied by one of just two functions, one
which uses io_schedule() and one which just uses schedule().

So:
 Rename wait_on_bit and        wait_on_bit_lock to
        wait_on_bit_action and wait_on_bit_lock_action
 to make it explicit that they need an action function.

 Introduce new wait_on_bit{,_lock} and wait_on_bit{,_lock}_io
 which are *not* given an action function but implicitly use
 a standard one.
 The decision to error-out if a signal is pending is now made
 based on the 'mode' argument rather than being encoded in the action
 function.

 All instances of the old wait_on_bit and wait_on_bit_lock which
 can use the new version have been changed accordingly and their
 action functions have been discarded.
 wait_on_bit{_lock} does not return any specific error code in the
 event of a signal so the caller must check for non-zero and
 interpolate their own error code as appropriate.

The wait_on_bit() call in __fscache_wait_on_invalidate() was
ambiguous as it specified TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE but used
fscache_wait_bit_interruptible as an action function.
David Howells confirms this should be uniformly
"uninterruptible"

The main remaining user of wait_on_bit{,_lock}_action is NFS
which needs to use a freezer-aware schedule() call.

A comment in fs/gfs2/glock.c notes that having multiple 'action'
functions is useful as they display differently in the 'wchan'
field of 'ps'. (and /proc/$PID/wchan).
As the new bit_wait{,_io} functions are tagged "__sched", they
will not show up at all, but something higher in the stack.  So
the distinction will still be visible, only with different
function names (gds2_glock_wait versus gfs2_glock_dq_wait in the
gfs2/glock.c case).

Since first version of this patch (against 3.15) two new action
functions appeared, on in NFS and one in CIFS.  CIFS also now
uses an action function that makes the same freezer aware
schedule call as NFS.

Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> (fscache, keys)
Acked-by: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com> (gfs2)
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Steve French <sfrench@samba.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140707051603.28027.72349.stgit@notabene.brown
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2014-07-16 15:10:39 +02:00
Heiko Carstens
62a6fa9768 kernel/compat: convert to COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE
Convert all compat system call functions where all parameter types
have a size of four or less than four bytes, or are pointer types
to COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE.
The implicit casts within COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE will perform proper
zero and sign extension to 64 bit of all parameters if needed.

Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
2014-03-06 15:35:10 +01:00
Kees Cook
d049f74f2d exec/ptrace: fix get_dumpable() incorrect tests
The get_dumpable() return value is not boolean.  Most users of the
function actually want to be testing for non-SUID_DUMP_USER(1) rather than
SUID_DUMP_DISABLE(0).  The SUID_DUMP_ROOT(2) is also considered a
protected state.  Almost all places did this correctly, excepting the two
places fixed in this patch.

Wrong logic:
    if (dumpable == SUID_DUMP_DISABLE) { /* be protective */ }
        or
    if (dumpable == 0) { /* be protective */ }
        or
    if (!dumpable) { /* be protective */ }

Correct logic:
    if (dumpable != SUID_DUMP_USER) { /* be protective */ }
        or
    if (dumpable != 1) { /* be protective */ }

Without this patch, if the system had set the sysctl fs/suid_dumpable=2, a
user was able to ptrace attach to processes that had dropped privileges to
that user.  (This may have been partially mitigated if Yama was enabled.)

The macros have been moved into the file that declares get/set_dumpable(),
which means things like the ia64 code can see them too.

CVE-2013-2929

Reported-by: Vasily Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-11-13 12:09:33 +09:00
Mark Grondona
73af963f9f __ptrace_may_access() should not deny sub-threads
__ptrace_may_access() checks get_dumpable/ptrace_has_cap/etc if task !=
current, this can can lead to surprising results.

For example, a sub-thread can't readlink("/proc/self/exe") if the
executable is not readable.  setup_new_exec()->would_dump() notices that
inode_permission(MAY_READ) fails and then it does
set_dumpable(suid_dumpable).  After that get_dumpable() fails.

(It is not clear why proc_pid_readlink() checks get_dumpable(), perhaps we
could add PTRACE_MODE_NODUMPABLE)

Change __ptrace_may_access() to use same_thread_group() instead of "task
== current".  Any security check is pointless when the tasks share the
same ->mm.

Signed-off-by: Mark Grondona <mgrondona@llnl.gov>
Signed-off-by: Ben Woodard <woodard@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-09-11 15:59:01 -07:00
Oleg Nesterov
35114fcbe0 Revert "ptrace: PTRACE_DETACH should do flush_ptrace_hw_breakpoint(child)"
This reverts commit fab840fc2d.

This commit even has the test-case to prove that the tracee
can be killed by SIGTRAP if the debugger does not remove the
breakpoints before PTRACE_DETACH.

However, this is exactly what wineserver deliberately does,
set_thread_context() calls PTRACE_ATTACH + PTRACE_DETACH just
for PTRACE_POKEUSER(DR*) in between.

So we should revert this fix and document that PTRACE_DETACH
should keep the breakpoints.

Reported-by: Felipe Contreras <felipe.contreras@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-08-06 13:16:32 -07:00
Oleg Nesterov
fab840fc2d ptrace: PTRACE_DETACH should do flush_ptrace_hw_breakpoint(child)
Change ptrace_detach() to call flush_ptrace_hw_breakpoint(child).  This
frees the slots for non-ptrace PERF_TYPE_BREAKPOINT users, and this
ensures that the tracee won't be killed by SIGTRAP triggered by the
active breakpoints.

Test-case:

	unsigned long encode_dr7(int drnum, int enable, unsigned int type, unsigned int len)
	{
		unsigned long dr7;

		dr7 = ((len | type) & 0xf)
			<< (DR_CONTROL_SHIFT + drnum * DR_CONTROL_SIZE);
		if (enable)
			dr7 |= (DR_GLOBAL_ENABLE << (drnum * DR_ENABLE_SIZE));

		return dr7;
	}

	int write_dr(int pid, int dr, unsigned long val)
	{
		return ptrace(PTRACE_POKEUSER, pid,
				offsetof (struct user, u_debugreg[dr]),
				val);
	}

	void func(void)
	{
	}

	int main(void)
	{
		int pid, stat;
		unsigned long dr7;

		pid = fork();
		if (!pid) {
			assert(ptrace(PTRACE_TRACEME, 0,0,0) == 0);
			kill(getpid(), SIGHUP);

			func();
			return 0x13;
		}

		assert(pid == waitpid(-1, &stat, 0));
		assert(WSTOPSIG(stat) == SIGHUP);

		assert(write_dr(pid, 0, (long)func) == 0);
		dr7 = encode_dr7(0, 1, DR_RW_EXECUTE, DR_LEN_1);
		assert(write_dr(pid, 7, dr7) == 0);

		assert(ptrace(PTRACE_DETACH, pid, 0,0) == 0);
		assert(pid == waitpid(-1, &stat, 0));
		assert(stat == 0x1300);

		return 0;
	}

Before this patch the child is killed after PTRACE_DETACH.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Jan Kratochvil <jan.kratochvil@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Prasad <prasad@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-07-09 10:33:26 -07:00
Oleg Nesterov
7c8df28633 ptrace: revert "Prepare to fix racy accesses on task breakpoints"
This reverts commit bf26c01849 ("Prepare to fix racy accesses on task
breakpoints").

The patch was fine but we can no longer race with SIGKILL after commit
9899d11f65 ("ptrace: ensure arch_ptrace/ptrace_request can never race
with SIGKILL"), the __TASK_TRACED tracee can't be woken up and
->ptrace_bps[] can't go away.

Now that ptrace_get_breakpoints/ptrace_put_breakpoints have no callers,
we can kill them and remove task->ptrace_bp_refcnt.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Jan Kratochvil <jan.kratochvil@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Prasad <prasad@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-07-09 10:33:26 -07:00
Andrey Vagin
29000caecb ptrace: add ability to get/set signal-blocked mask
crtools uses a parasite code for dumping processes.  The parasite code is
injected into a process with help PTRACE_SEIZE.

Currently crtools blocks signals from a parasite code.  If a process has
pending signals, crtools wait while a process handles these signals.

This method is not suitable for stopped tasks.  A stopped task can have a
few pending signals, when we will try to execute a parasite code, we will
need to drop SIGSTOP, but all other signals must remain pending, because a
state of processes must not be changed during checkpointing.

This patch adds two ptrace commands to set/get signal-blocked mask.

I think gdb can use this commands too.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: be consistent with brace layout]
Signed-off-by: Andrey Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-07-03 16:08:01 -07:00
Mathieu Desnoyers
706b23bde2 Fix: kernel/ptrace.c: ptrace_peek_siginfo() missing __put_user() validation
This __put_user() could be used by unprivileged processes to write into
kernel memory.  The issue here is that even if copy_siginfo_to_user()
fails, the error code is not checked before __put_user() is executed.

Luckily, ptrace_peek_siginfo() has been added within the 3.10-rc cycle,
so it has not hit a stable release yet.

Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrey Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-06-29 11:29:08 -07:00
Kent Overstreet
a27bb332c0 aio: don't include aio.h in sched.h
Faster kernel compiles by way of fewer unnecessary includes.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fallout]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build]
Signed-off-by: Kent Overstreet <koverstreet@google.com>
Cc: Zach Brown <zab@redhat.com>
Cc: Felipe Balbi <balbi@ti.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Asai Thambi S P <asamymuthupa@micron.com>
Cc: Selvan Mani <smani@micron.com>
Cc: Sam Bradshaw <sbradshaw@micron.com>
Cc: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Benjamin LaHaise <bcrl@kvack.org>
Reviewed-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-05-07 20:16:25 -07:00
Andrey Vagin
84c751bd4a ptrace: add ability to retrieve signals without removing from a queue (v4)
This patch adds a new ptrace request PTRACE_PEEKSIGINFO.

This request is used to retrieve information about pending signals
starting with the specified sequence number.  Siginfo_t structures are
copied from the child into the buffer starting at "data".

The argument "addr" is a pointer to struct ptrace_peeksiginfo_args.
struct ptrace_peeksiginfo_args {
	u64 off;	/* from which siginfo to start */
	u32 flags;
	s32 nr;		/* how may siginfos to take */
};

"nr" has type "s32", because ptrace() returns "long", which has 32 bits on
i386 and a negative values is used for errors.

Currently here is only one flag PTRACE_PEEKSIGINFO_SHARED for dumping
signals from process-wide queue.  If this flag is not set, signals are
read from a per-thread queue.

The request PTRACE_PEEKSIGINFO returns a number of dumped signals.  If a
signal with the specified sequence number doesn't exist, ptrace returns
zero.  The request returns an error, if no signal has been dumped.

Errors:
EINVAL - one or more specified flags are not supported or nr is negative
EFAULT - buf or addr is outside your accessible address space.

A result siginfo contains a kernel part of si_code which usually striped,
but it's required for queuing the same siginfo back during restore of
pending signals.

This functionality is required for checkpointing pending signals.  Pedro
Alves suggested using it in "gdb" to peek at pending signals.  gdb already
uses PTRACE_GETSIGINFO to get the siginfo for the signal which was already
dequeued.  This functionality allows gdb to look at the pending signals
which were not reported yet.

The prototype of this code was developed by Oleg Nesterov.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Cc: "Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-04-30 17:04:05 -07:00
Josh Stone
e8440c1458 uprobes: Add exports for module use
The original pull message for uprobes (commit 654443e2) noted:

  This tree includes uprobes support in 'perf probe' - but SystemTap
  (and other tools) can take advantage of user probe points as well.

In order to actually be usable in module-based tools like SystemTap, the
interface needs to be exported.  This patch first adds the obvious
exports for uprobe_register and uprobe_unregister.  Then it also adds
one for task_user_regset_view, which is necessary to get the correct
state of userspace registers.

Signed-off-by: Josh Stone <jistone@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
2013-02-08 17:47:13 +01:00
Oleg Nesterov
9899d11f65 ptrace: ensure arch_ptrace/ptrace_request can never race with SIGKILL
putreg() assumes that the tracee is not running and pt_regs_access() can
safely play with its stack.  However a killed tracee can return from
ptrace_stop() to the low-level asm code and do RESTORE_REST, this means
that debugger can actually read/modify the kernel stack until the tracee
does SAVE_REST again.

set_task_blockstep() can race with SIGKILL too and in some sense this
race is even worse, the very fact the tracee can be woken up breaks the
logic.

As Linus suggested we can clear TASK_WAKEKILL around the arch_ptrace()
call, this ensures that nobody can ever wakeup the tracee while the
debugger looks at it.  Not only this fixes the mentioned problems, we
can do some cleanups/simplifications in arch_ptrace() paths.

Probably ptrace_unfreeze_traced() needs more callers, for example it
makes sense to make the tracee killable for oom-killer before
access_process_vm().

While at it, add the comment into may_ptrace_stop() to explain why
ptrace_stop() still can't rely on SIGKILL and signal_pending_state().

Reported-by: Salman Qazi <sqazi@google.com>
Reported-by: Suleiman Souhlal <suleiman@google.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-01-22 10:08:00 -08:00
Oleg Nesterov
910ffdb18a ptrace: introduce signal_wake_up_state() and ptrace_signal_wake_up()
Cleanup and preparation for the next change.

signal_wake_up(resume => true) is overused. None of ptrace/jctl callers
actually want to wakeup a TASK_WAKEKILL task, but they can't specify the
necessary mask.

Turn signal_wake_up() into signal_wake_up_state(state), reintroduce
signal_wake_up() as a trivial helper, and add ptrace_signal_wake_up()
which adds __TASK_TRACED.

This way ptrace_signal_wake_up() can work "inside" ptrace_request()
even if the tracee doesn't have the TASK_WAKEKILL bit set.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-01-22 08:50:08 -08:00
Oleg Nesterov
edea0d03ee ia64: kill thread_matches(), unexport ptrace_check_attach()
The ia64 function "thread_matches()" has no users since commit
e868a55c2a ("[IA64] remove find_thread_for_addr()").  Remove it.

This allows us to make ptrace_check_attach() static to kernel/ptrace.c,
which is good since we'll need to change the semantics of it and fix up
all the callers.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-01-20 12:26:05 -08:00
Linus Torvalds
848b81415c Merge branch 'akpm' (Andrew's patch-bomb)
Merge misc patches from Andrew Morton:
 "Incoming:

   - lots of misc stuff

   - backlight tree updates

   - lib/ updates

   - Oleg's percpu-rwsem changes

   - checkpatch

   - rtc

   - aoe

   - more checkpoint/restart support

  I still have a pile of MM stuff pending - Pekka should be merging
  later today after which that is good to go.  A number of other things
  are twiddling thumbs awaiting maintainer merges."

* emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (180 commits)
  scatterlist: don't BUG when we can trivially return a proper error.
  docs: update documentation about /proc/<pid>/fdinfo/<fd> fanotify output
  fs, fanotify: add @mflags field to fanotify output
  docs: add documentation about /proc/<pid>/fdinfo/<fd> output
  fs, notify: add procfs fdinfo helper
  fs, exportfs: add exportfs_encode_inode_fh() helper
  fs, exportfs: escape nil dereference if no s_export_op present
  fs, epoll: add procfs fdinfo helper
  fs, eventfd: add procfs fdinfo helper
  procfs: add ability to plug in auxiliary fdinfo providers
  tools/testing/selftests/kcmp/kcmp_test.c: print reason for failure in kcmp_test
  breakpoint selftests: print failure status instead of cause make error
  kcmp selftests: print fail status instead of cause make error
  kcmp selftests: make run_tests fix
  mem-hotplug selftests: print failure status instead of cause make error
  cpu-hotplug selftests: print failure status instead of cause make error
  mqueue selftests: print failure status instead of cause make error
  vm selftests: print failure status instead of cause make error
  ubifs: use prandom_bytes
  mtd: nandsim: use prandom_bytes
  ...
2012-12-17 20:58:12 -08:00