Commit graph

374 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Eric W. Biederman
ca24a23ebc audit: Simplify and correct audit_log_capset
- Always report the current process as capset now always only works on
  the current process.  This prevents reporting 0 or a random pid in
  a random pid namespace.

- Don't bother to pass the pid as is available.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
(cherry picked from commit bcc85f0af31af123e32858069eb2ad8f39f90e67)
(cherry picked from commit f911cac4556a7a23e0b3ea850233d13b32328692)

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
[eparis: fix build error when audit disabled]
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2014-01-13 22:26:48 -05:00
Eric Paris
9175c9d2ae audit: fix type of sessionid in audit_set_loginuid()
sfr pointed out that with CONFIG_UIDGID_STRICT_TYPE_CHECKS set the audit
tree would not build.  This is because the oldsessionid in
audit_set_loginuid() was accidentally being declared as a kuid_t.  This
patch fixes that declaration mistake.

Example of problem:
kernel/auditsc.c: In function 'audit_set_loginuid':
kernel/auditsc.c:2003:15: error: incompatible types when assigning to
type 'kuid_t' from type 'int'
  oldsessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);

Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2013-11-06 11:47:24 -05:00
Richard Guy Briggs
9410d228a4 audit: call audit_bprm() only once to add AUDIT_EXECVE information
Move the audit_bprm() call from search_binary_handler() to exec_binprm().  This
allows us to get rid of the mm member of struct audit_aux_data_execve since
bprm->mm will equal current->mm.

This also mitigates the issue that ->argc could be modified by the
load_binary() call in search_binary_handler().

audit_bprm() was being called to add an AUDIT_EXECVE record to the audit
context every time search_binary_handler() was recursively called.  Only one
reference is necessary.

Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov <onestero@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
---
This patch is against 3.11, but was developed on Oleg's post-3.11 patches that
introduce exec_binprm().
2013-11-05 11:15:03 -05:00
Richard Guy Briggs
d9cfea91e9 audit: move audit_aux_data_execve contents into audit_context union
audit_bprm() was being called to add an AUDIT_EXECVE record to the audit
context every time search_binary_handler() was recursively called.  Only one
reference is necessary, so just update it.  Move the the contents of
audit_aux_data_execve into the union in audit_context, removing dependence on a
kmalloc along the way.

Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov <onestero@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2013-11-05 11:09:36 -05:00
Richard Guy Briggs
9462dc5981 audit: remove unused envc member of audit_aux_data_execve
Get rid of write-only audit_aux_data_exeve structure member envc.

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2013-11-05 11:09:31 -05:00
Eric W. Biederman
bd131fb1aa audit: Kill the unused struct audit_aux_data_capset
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
(cherry picked from ebiederman commit 6904431d6b41190e42d6b94430b67cb4e7e6a4b7)
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2013-11-05 11:09:20 -05:00
Richard Guy Briggs
db510fc5cd audit: update AUDIT_INODE filter rule to comparator function
It appears this one comparison function got missed in f368c07d (and 9c937dcc).

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2013-11-05 11:08:24 -05:00
Eric Paris
21b85c31d2 audit: audit feature to set loginuid immutable
This adds a new 'audit_feature' bit which allows userspace to set it
such that the loginuid is absolutely immutable, even if you have
CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2013-11-05 11:08:17 -05:00
Eric Paris
d040e5af38 audit: audit feature to only allow unsetting the loginuid
This is a new audit feature which only grants processes with
CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL the ability to unset their loginuid.  They cannot
directly set it from a valid uid to another valid uid.  The ability to
unset the loginuid is nice because a priviledged task, like that of
container creation, can unset the loginuid and then priv is not needed
inside the container when a login daemon needs to set the loginuid.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2013-11-05 11:08:13 -05:00
Eric Paris
81407c84ac audit: allow unsetting the loginuid (with priv)
If a task has CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL allow that task to unset their loginuid.
This would allow a child of that task to set their loginuid without
CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL.  Thus when launching a new login daemon, a
priviledged helper would be able to unset the loginuid and then the
daemon, which may be malicious user facing, do not need priv to function
correctly.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2013-11-05 11:08:09 -05:00
Eric Paris
83fa6bbe4c audit: remove CONFIG_AUDIT_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE
After trying to use this feature in Fedora we found the hard coding
policy like this into the kernel was a bad idea.  Surprise surprise.
We ran into these problems because it was impossible to launch a
container as a logged in user and run a login daemon inside that container.
This reverts back to the old behavior before this option was added.  The
option will be re-added in a userspace selectable manor such that
userspace can choose when it is and when it is not appropriate.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2013-11-05 11:08:01 -05:00
Eric Paris
da0a610497 audit: loginuid functions coding style
This is just a code rework.  It makes things more readable.  It does not
make any functional changes.

It does change the log messages to include both the old session id as
well the new and it includes a new res field, which means we get
messages even when the user did not have permission to change the
loginuid.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2013-11-05 11:07:56 -05:00
Oleg Nesterov
d48d805122 audit_alloc: clear TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT if !audit_context
If audit_filter_task() nacks the new thread it makes sense
to clear TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT which can be copied from parent
by dup_task_struct().

A wrong TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT is not really bad but it triggers
the "slow" audit paths in entry.S to ensure the task can not
miss audit_syscall_*() calls, this is pointless if the task
has no ->audit_context.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2013-11-05 11:07:18 -05:00
Jeff Layton
79f6530cb5 audit: fix mq_open and mq_unlink to add the MQ root as a hidden parent audit_names record
The old audit PATH records for mq_open looked like this:

  type=PATH msg=audit(1366282323.982:869): item=1 name=(null) inode=6777
  dev=00:0c mode=041777 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00
  obj=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s15:c0.c1023
  type=PATH msg=audit(1366282323.982:869): item=0 name="test_mq" inode=26732
  dev=00:0c mode=0100700 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00
  obj=staff_u:object_r:user_tmpfs_t:s15:c0.c1023

...with the audit related changes that went into 3.7, they now look like this:

  type=PATH msg=audit(1366282236.776:3606): item=2 name=(null) inode=66655
  dev=00:0c mode=0100700 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00
  obj=staff_u:object_r:user_tmpfs_t:s15:c0.c1023
  type=PATH msg=audit(1366282236.776:3606): item=1 name=(null) inode=6926
  dev=00:0c mode=041777 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00
  obj=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s15:c0.c1023
  type=PATH msg=audit(1366282236.776:3606): item=0 name="test_mq"

Both of these look wrong to me.  As Steve Grubb pointed out:

 "What we need is 1 PATH record that identifies the MQ.  The other PATH
  records probably should not be there."

Fix it to record the mq root as a parent, and flag it such that it
should be hidden from view when the names are logged, since the root of
the mq filesystem isn't terribly interesting.  With this change, we get
a single PATH record that looks more like this:

  type=PATH msg=audit(1368021604.836:484): item=0 name="test_mq" inode=16914
  dev=00:0c mode=0100644 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00
  obj=unconfined_u:object_r:user_tmpfs_t:s0

In order to do this, a new audit_inode_parent_hidden() function is
added.  If we do it this way, then we avoid having the existing callers
of audit_inode needing to do any sort of flag conversion if auditing is
inactive.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jiri Jaburek <jjaburek@redhat.com>
Cc: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-07-09 10:33:19 -07:00
Eric W. Biederman
780a7654ce audit: Make testing for a valid loginuid explicit.
audit rule additions containing "-F auid!=4294967295" were failing
with EINVAL because of a regression caused by e1760bd.

Apparently some userland audit rule sets want to know if loginuid uid
has been set and are using a test for auid != 4294967295 to determine
that.

In practice that is a horrible way to ask if a value has been set,
because it relies on subtle implementation details and will break
every time the uid implementation in the kernel changes.

So add a clean way to test if the audit loginuid has been set, and
silently convert the old idiom to the cleaner and more comprehensible
new idiom.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.7
Reported-By: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Tested-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2013-05-07 22:27:15 -04:00
Eric Paris
b24a30a730 audit: fix event coverage of AUDIT_ANOM_LINK
The userspace audit tools didn't like the existing formatting of the
AUDIT_ANOM_LINK event. It needed to be expanded to emit an AUDIT_PATH
event as well, so this implements the change. The bulk of the patch is
moving code out of auditsc.c into audit.c and audit.h for general use.
It expands audit_log_name to include an optional "struct path" argument
for the simple case of just needing to report a pathname. This also
makes
audit_log_task_info available when syscall auditing is not enabled,
since
it is needed in either case for process details.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
2013-04-30 15:31:28 -04:00
Eric Paris
b122c3767c audit: use a consistent audit helper to log lsm information
We have a number of places we were reimplementing the same code to write
out lsm labels.  Just do it one darn place.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2013-04-30 15:31:28 -04:00
Eric Paris
34c474de7b audit: fix build break when AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
Looks like this one has been around since 5195d8e21:

	kernel/auditsc.c: In function ‘audit_free_names’:
	kernel/auditsc.c:998: error: ‘i’ undeclared (first use in this function)

...and this warning:

	kernel/auditsc.c: In function ‘audit_putname’:
	kernel/auditsc.c:2045: warning: ‘i’ may be used uninitialized in this function

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2013-04-16 10:17:02 -04:00
Eric Paris
ad395abece Audit: do not print error when LSMs disabled
RHBZ: 785936

If the audit system collects a record about one process sending a signal
to another process it includes in that collection the 'secid' or 'an int
used to represet an LSM label.'  If there is no LSM enabled it will
collect a 0.  The problem is that when we attempt to print that record
we ask the LSM to convert the secid back to a string.  Since there is no
LSM it returns EOPNOTSUPP.

Most code in the audit system checks if the secid is 0 and does not
print LSM info in that case.  The signal information code however forgot
that check.  Thus users will see a message in syslog indicating that
converting the sid to string failed.  Add the right check.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2013-04-11 15:39:10 -04:00
Andrew Morton
e2c5adc88a auditsc: remove audit_set_context() altogether - fold it into its caller
>   In function audit_alloc_context(), use kzalloc, instead of kmalloc+memset. Patch also renames audit_zero_context() to
> audit_set_context(), to represent it's inner workings properly.

Fair enough.  I'd go futher...

Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Rakib Mullick <rakib.mullick@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2013-04-10 15:18:50 -04:00
Rakib Mullick
17c6ee707a auditsc: Use kzalloc instead of kmalloc+memset.
In function audit_alloc_context(), use kzalloc, instead of kmalloc+memset. Patch also renames audit_zero_context() to
audit_set_context(), to represent it's inner workings properly.

Signed-off-by: Rakib Mullick <rakib.mullick@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2013-04-10 15:18:24 -04:00
Chen Gang
2950fa9d32 kernel: audit: beautify code, for extern function, better to check its parameters by itself
__audit_socketcall is an extern function.
  better to check its parameters by itself.

    also can return error code, when fail (find invalid parameters).
    also use macro instead of real hard code number
    also give related comments for it.

Signed-off-by: Chen Gang <gang.chen@asianux.com>
[eparis: fix the return value when !CONFIG_AUDIT]
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2013-04-10 13:31:12 -04:00
Dmitry Monakhov
65ada7bc02 audit: destroy long filenames correctly
filename should be destroyed via final_putname() instead of __putname()
Otherwise this result in following BUGON() in case of long names:
  kernel BUG at mm/slab.c:3006!
  Call Trace:
  kmem_cache_free+0x1c1/0x850
  audit_putname+0x88/0x90
  putname+0x73/0x80
  sys_symlinkat+0x120/0x150
  sys_symlink+0x16/0x20
  system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b

Introduced-in: 7950e3852

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Monakhov <dmonakhov@openvz.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2013-04-10 13:21:52 -04:00
Matvejchikov Ilya
37eebe39c9 audit: improve GID/EGID comparation logic
It is useful to extend GID/EGID comparation logic to be able to
match not only the exact EID/EGID values but the group/egroup also.

Signed-off-by: Matvejchikov Ilya <matvejchikov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2013-04-08 16:19:15 -04:00
Kees Cook
0644ec0cc8 audit: catch possible NULL audit buffers
It's possible for audit_log_start() to return NULL.  Handle it in the
various callers.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@google.com>
Cc: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-01-11 14:54:55 -08:00
Kees Cook
7b9205bd77 audit: create explicit AUDIT_SECCOMP event type
The seccomp path was using AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND from when seccomp mode 1
could only kill a process.  While we still want to make sure an audit
record is forced on a kill, this should use a separate record type since
seccomp mode 2 introduces other behaviors.

In the case of "handled" behaviors (process wasn't killed), only emit a
record if the process is under inspection.  This change also fixes
userspace examination of seccomp audit events, since it was considered
malformed due to missing fields of the AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND event type.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com>
Acked-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-01-11 14:54:55 -08:00
Linus Torvalds
9977d9b379 Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/signal
Pull big execve/kernel_thread/fork unification series from Al Viro:
 "All architectures are converted to new model.  Quite a bit of that
  stuff is actually shared with architecture trees; in such cases it's
  literally shared branch pulled by both, not a cherry-pick.

  A lot of ugliness and black magic is gone (-3KLoC total in this one):

   - kernel_thread()/kernel_execve()/sys_execve() redesign.

     We don't do syscalls from kernel anymore for either kernel_thread()
     or kernel_execve():

     kernel_thread() is essentially clone(2) with callback run before we
     return to userland, the callbacks either never return or do
     successful do_execve() before returning.

     kernel_execve() is a wrapper for do_execve() - it doesn't need to
     do transition to user mode anymore.

     As a result kernel_thread() and kernel_execve() are
     arch-independent now - they live in kernel/fork.c and fs/exec.c
     resp.  sys_execve() is also in fs/exec.c and it's completely
     architecture-independent.

   - daemonize() is gone, along with its parts in fs/*.c

   - struct pt_regs * is no longer passed to do_fork/copy_process/
     copy_thread/do_execve/search_binary_handler/->load_binary/do_coredump.

   - sys_fork()/sys_vfork()/sys_clone() unified; some architectures
     still need wrappers (ones with callee-saved registers not saved in
     pt_regs on syscall entry), but the main part of those suckers is in
     kernel/fork.c now."

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/signal: (113 commits)
  do_coredump(): get rid of pt_regs argument
  print_fatal_signal(): get rid of pt_regs argument
  ptrace_signal(): get rid of unused arguments
  get rid of ptrace_signal_deliver() arguments
  new helper: signal_pt_regs()
  unify default ptrace_signal_deliver
  flagday: kill pt_regs argument of do_fork()
  death to idle_regs()
  don't pass regs to copy_process()
  flagday: don't pass regs to copy_thread()
  bfin: switch to generic vfork, get rid of pointless wrappers
  xtensa: switch to generic clone()
  openrisc: switch to use of generic fork and clone
  unicore32: switch to generic clone(2)
  score: switch to generic fork/vfork/clone
  c6x: sanitize copy_thread(), get rid of clone(2) wrapper, switch to generic clone()
  take sys_fork/sys_vfork/sys_clone prototypes to linux/syscalls.h
  mn10300: switch to generic fork/vfork/clone
  h8300: switch to generic fork/vfork/clone
  tile: switch to generic clone()
  ...

Conflicts:
	arch/microblaze/include/asm/Kbuild
2012-12-12 12:22:13 -08:00
Al Viro
c62d773a37 audit: no nested contexts anymore...
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-11-28 21:53:36 -05:00
Alan Cox
8ae763cd7e audit: remove bogus tty name check
tty name is an array not a pointer

Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2012-10-24 11:34:51 -07:00
Jeff Layton
adb5c2473d audit: make audit_inode take struct filename
Keep a pointer to the audit_names "slot" in struct filename.

Have all of the audit_inode callers pass a struct filename ponter to
audit_inode instead of a string pointer. If the aname field is already
populated, then we can skip walking the list altogether and just use it
directly.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-10-12 20:15:09 -04:00
Jeff Layton
7ac86265dc audit: allow audit code to satisfy getname requests from its names_list
Currently, if we call getname() on a userland string more than once,
we'll get multiple copies of the string and multiple audit_names
records.

Add a function that will allow the audit_names code to satisfy getname
requests using info from the audit_names list, avoiding a new allocation
and audit_names records.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-10-12 20:15:08 -04:00
Jeff Layton
91a27b2a75 vfs: define struct filename and have getname() return it
getname() is intended to copy pathname strings from userspace into a
kernel buffer. The result is just a string in kernel space. It would
however be quite helpful to be able to attach some ancillary info to
the string.

For instance, we could attach some audit-related info to reduce the
amount of audit-related processing needed. When auditing is enabled,
we could also call getname() on the string more than once and not
need to recopy it from userspace.

This patchset converts the getname()/putname() interfaces to return
a struct instead of a string. For now, the struct just tracks the
string in kernel space and the original userland pointer for it.

Later, we'll add other information to the struct as it becomes
convenient.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-10-12 20:14:55 -04:00
Jeff Layton
4fa6b5ecbf audit: overhaul __audit_inode_child to accomodate retrying
In order to accomodate retrying path-based syscalls, we need to add a
new "type" argument to audit_inode_child. This will tell us whether
we're looking for a child entry that represents a create or a delete.

If we find a parent, don't automatically assume that we need to create a
new entry. Instead, use the information we have to try to find an
existing entry first. Update it if one is found and create a new one if
not.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-10-12 00:32:03 -04:00
Jeff Layton
e3d6b07b8b audit: optimize audit_compare_dname_path
In the cases where we already know the length of the parent, pass it as
a parm so we don't need to recompute it. In the cases where we don't
know the length, pass in AUDIT_NAME_FULL (-1) to indicate that it should
be determined.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-10-12 00:32:02 -04:00
Jeff Layton
563a0d1236 audit: remove dirlen argument to audit_compare_dname_path
All the callers set this to NULL now.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-10-12 00:32:01 -04:00
Jeff Layton
bfcec70874 audit: set the name_len in audit_inode for parent lookups
Currently, this gets set mostly by happenstance when we call into
audit_inode_child. While that might be a little more efficient, it seems
wrong. If the syscall ends up failing before audit_inode_child ever gets
called, then you'll have an audit_names record that shows the full path
but has the parent inode info attached.

Fix this by passing in a parent flag when we call audit_inode that gets
set to the value of LOOKUP_PARENT. We can then fix up the pathname for
the audit entry correctly from the get-go.

While we're at it, clean up the no-op macro for audit_inode in the
!CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL case.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-10-12 00:32:01 -04:00
Jeff Layton
78e2e802a8 audit: add a new "type" field to audit_names struct
For now, we just have two possibilities:

UNKNOWN: for a new audit_names record that we don't know anything about yet
NORMAL: for everything else

In later patches, we'll add other types so we can distinguish and update
records created under different circumstances.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-10-12 00:32:00 -04:00
Jeff Layton
c43a25abba audit: reverse arguments to audit_inode_child
Most of the callers get called with an inode and dentry in the reverse
order. The compiler then has to reshuffle the arg registers and/or
stack in order to pass them on to audit_inode_child.

Reverse those arguments for a micro-optimization.

Reported-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-10-12 00:32:00 -04:00
Jeff Layton
9cec9d68ae audit: no need to walk list in audit_inode if name is NULL
If name is NULL then the condition in the loop will never be true. Also,
with this change, we can eliminate the check for n->name == NULL since
the equivalence check will never be true if it is.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-10-12 00:31:59 -04:00
Jeff Layton
1c2e51e8c1 audit: pass in dentry to audit_copy_inode wherever possible
In some cases, we were passing in NULL even when we have a dentry.

Reported-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-10-12 00:31:59 -04:00
Konstantin Khlebnikov
2dd8ad81e3 mm: use mm->exe_file instead of first VM_EXECUTABLE vma->vm_file
Some security modules and oprofile still uses VM_EXECUTABLE for retrieving
a task's executable file.  After this patch they will use mm->exe_file
directly.  mm->exe_file is protected with mm->mmap_sem, so locking stays
the same.

Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@tilera.com>			[arch/tile]
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>	[tomoyo]
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Carsten Otte <cotte@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com>
Cc: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
Cc: Matt Helsley <matthltc@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Robert Richter <robert.richter@amd.com>
Cc: Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com>
Cc: Venkatesh Pallipadi <venki@google.com>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-10-09 16:22:18 +09:00
Linus Torvalds
88265322c1 Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
 "Highlights:

   - Integrity: add local fs integrity verification to detect offline
     attacks
   - Integrity: add digital signature verification
   - Simple stacking of Yama with other LSMs (per LSS discussions)
   - IBM vTPM support on ppc64
   - Add new driver for Infineon I2C TIS TPM
   - Smack: add rule revocation for subject labels"

Fixed conflicts with the user namespace support in kernel/auditsc.c and
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c.

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (39 commits)
  Documentation: Update git repository URL for Smack userland tools
  ima: change flags container data type
  Smack: setprocattr memory leak fix
  Smack: implement revoking all rules for a subject label
  Smack: remove task_wait() hook.
  ima: audit log hashes
  ima: generic IMA action flag handling
  ima: rename ima_must_appraise_or_measure
  audit: export audit_log_task_info
  tpm: fix tpm_acpi sparse warning on different address spaces
  samples/seccomp: fix 31 bit build on s390
  ima: digital signature verification support
  ima: add support for different security.ima data types
  ima: add ima_inode_setxattr/removexattr function and calls
  ima: add inode_post_setattr call
  ima: replace iint spinblock with rwlock/read_lock
  ima: allocating iint improvements
  ima: add appraise action keywords and default rules
  ima: integrity appraisal extension
  vfs: move ima_file_free before releasing the file
  ...
2012-10-02 21:38:48 -07:00
Eric W. Biederman
cca080d9b6 userns: Convert audit to work with user namespaces enabled
- Explicitly format uids gids in audit messges in the initial user
  namespace. This is safe because auditd is restrected to be in
  the initial user namespace.

- Convert audit_sig_uid into a kuid_t.

- Enable building the audit code and user namespaces at the same time.

The net result is that the audit subsystem now uses kuid_t and kgid_t whenever
possible making it almost impossible to confuse a raw uid_t with a kuid_t
preventing bugs.

Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-09-18 01:00:26 -07:00
Eric W. Biederman
e1760bd5ff userns: Convert the audit loginuid to be a kuid
Always store audit loginuids in type kuid_t.

Print loginuids by converting them into uids in the appropriate user
namespace, and then printing the resulting uid.

Modify audit_get_loginuid to return a kuid_t.

Modify audit_set_loginuid to take a kuid_t.

Modify /proc/<pid>/loginuid on read to convert the loginuid into the
user namespace of the opener of the file.

Modify /proc/<pid>/loginud on write to convert the loginuid
rom the user namespace of the opener of the file.

Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> ?
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-09-17 18:08:54 -07:00
Eric W. Biederman
ca57ec0f00 audit: Add typespecific uid and gid comparators
The audit filter code guarantees that uid are always compared with
uids and gids are always compared with gids, as the comparason
operations are type specific.  Take advantage of this proper to define
audit_uid_comparator and audit_gid_comparator which use the type safe
comparasons from uidgid.h.

Build on audit_uid_comparator and audit_gid_comparator and replace
audit_compare_id with audit_compare_uid and audit_compare_gid.  This
is one of those odd cases where being type safe and duplicating code
leads to simpler shorter and more concise code.

Don't allow bitmask operations in uid and gid comparisons in
audit_data_to_entry.  Bitmask operations are already denined in
audit_rule_to_entry.

Convert constants in audit_rule_to_entry and audit_data_to_entry into
kuids and kgids when appropriate.

Convert the uid and gid field in struct audit_names to be of type
kuid_t and kgid_t respectively, so that the new uid and gid comparators
can be applied in a type safe manner.

Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-09-17 18:08:09 -07:00
Peter Moody
e23eb920b0 audit: export audit_log_task_info
At the suggestion of eparis@redhat.com, move this chunk of task
logging from audit_log_exit to audit_log_task_info and export this
function so it's usuable elsewhere in the kernel.

This patch is against
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity#next-ima-appraisal

Changelog v2:
 - add empty audit_log_task_info if CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL isn't set.

Changelog v1:
 - Initial post.

Signed-off-by: Peter Moody <pmoody@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2012-09-12 07:28:05 -04:00
Kees Cook
3dc1c1b2d2 seccomp: remove duplicated failure logging
This consolidates the seccomp filter error logging path and adds more
details to the audit log.

Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>

v18: make compat= permanent in the record
v15: added a return code to the audit_seccomp path by wad@chromium.org
     (suggested by eparis@redhat.com)
v*: original by keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2012-04-14 11:13:20 +10:00
Randy Dunlap
42ae610c1a kernel-doc: fix new warnings in auditsc.c
Fix new kernel-doc warnings in auditsc.c:

Warning(kernel/auditsc.c:1875): No description found for parameter 'success'
Warning(kernel/auditsc.c:1875): No description found for parameter 'return_code'
Warning(kernel/auditsc.c:1875): Excess function parameter 'pt_regs' description in '__audit_syscall_exit'

Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-01-23 08:44:53 -08:00
Kees Cook
c158a35c8a audit: no leading space in audit_log_d_path prefix
audit_log_d_path() injects an additional space before the prefix,
which serves no purpose and doesn't mix well with other audit_log*()
functions that do not sneak extra characters into the log.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-01-17 16:17:04 -05:00
Xi Wang
5afb8a3f96 audit: fix signedness bug in audit_log_execve_info()
In the loop, a size_t "len" is used to hold the return value of
audit_log_single_execve_arg(), which returns -1 on error.  In that
case the error handling (len <= 0) will be bypassed since "len" is
unsigned, and the loop continues with (p += len) being wrapped.
Change the type of "len" to signed int to fix the error handling.

	size_t len;
	...
	for (...) {
		len = audit_log_single_execve_arg(...);
		if (len <= 0)
			break;
		p += len;
	}

Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-01-17 16:17:03 -05:00
Peter Moody
10d6836087 audit: comparison on interprocess fields
This allows audit to specify rules in which we compare two fields of a
process.  Such as is the running process uid != to the running process
euid?

Signed-off-by: Peter Moody <pmoody@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-01-17 16:17:03 -05:00
Peter Moody
4a6633ed08 audit: implement all object interfield comparisons
This completes the matrix of interfield comparisons between uid/gid
information for the current task and the uid/gid information for inodes.
aka I can audit based on differences between the euid of the process and
the uid of fs objects.

Signed-off-by: Peter Moody <pmoody@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-01-17 16:17:02 -05:00
Eric Paris
c9fe685f7a audit: allow interfield comparison between gid and ogid
Allow audit rules to compare the gid of the running task to the gid of the
inode in question.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-01-17 16:17:02 -05:00
Eric Paris
b34b039324 audit: complex interfield comparison helper
Rather than code the same loop over and over implement a helper function which
uses some pointer magic to make it generic enough to be used numerous places
as we implement more audit interfield comparisons

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-01-17 16:17:02 -05:00
Eric Paris
02d86a568c audit: allow interfield comparison in audit rules
We wish to be able to audit when a uid=500 task accesses a file which is
uid=0.  Or vice versa.  This patch introduces a new audit filter type
AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE which takes as an 'enum' which indicates which fields
should be compared.  At this point we only define the task->uid vs
inode->uid, but other comparisons can be added.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-01-17 16:17:01 -05:00
Eric Paris
4043cde8ec audit: do not call audit_getname on error
Just a code cleanup really.  We don't need to make a function call just for
it to return on error.  This also makes the VFS function even easier to follow
and removes a conditional on a hot path.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-01-17 16:17:01 -05:00
Eric Paris
633b454545 audit: only allow tasks to set their loginuid if it is -1
At the moment we allow tasks to set their loginuid if they have
CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL.  In reality we want tasks to set the loginuid when they
log in and it be impossible to ever reset.  We had to make it mutable even
after it was once set (with the CAP) because on update and admin might have
to restart sshd.  Now sshd would get his loginuid and the next user which
logged in using ssh would not be able to set his loginuid.

Systemd has changed how userspace works and allowed us to make the kernel
work the way it should.  With systemd users (even admins) are not supposed
to restart services directly.  The system will restart the service for
them.  Thus since systemd is going to loginuid==-1, sshd would get -1, and
sshd would be allowed to set a new loginuid without special permissions.

If an admin in this system were to manually start an sshd he is inserting
himself into the system chain of trust and thus, logically, it's his
loginuid that should be used!  Since we have old systems I make this a
Kconfig option.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-01-17 16:17:00 -05:00
Eric Paris
0a300be6d5 audit: remove task argument to audit_set_loginuid
The function always deals with current.  Don't expose an option
pretending one can use it for something.  You can't.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-01-17 16:17:00 -05:00
Eric Paris
54d3218b31 audit: allow audit matching on inode gid
Much like the ability to filter audit on the uid of an inode collected, we
should be able to filter on the gid of the inode.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-01-17 16:16:59 -05:00
Eric Paris
efaffd6e44 audit: allow matching on obj_uid
Allow syscall exit filter matching based on the uid of the owner of an
inode used in a syscall.  aka:

auditctl -a always,exit -S open -F obj_uid=0 -F perm=wa

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-01-17 16:16:59 -05:00
Eric Paris
6422e78de6 audit: remove audit_finish_fork as it can't be called
Audit entry,always rules are not allowed and are automatically changed in
exit,always rules in userspace.  The kernel refuses to load such rules.

Thus a task in the middle of a syscall (and thus in audit_finish_fork())
can only be in one of two states: AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT or AUDIT_DISABLED.
Since the current task cannot be in AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT we aren't every
going to actually use the code in audit_finish_fork() since it will
return without doing anything.  Thus drop the code.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-01-17 16:16:59 -05:00
Eric Paris
a4ff8dba7d audit: inline audit_free to simplify the look of generic code
make the conditional a static inline instead of doing it in generic code.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-01-17 16:16:58 -05:00
Eric Paris
07c4941787 audit: inline checks for not needing to collect aux records
A number of audit hooks make function calls before they determine that
auxilary records do not need to be collected.  Do those checks as static
inlines since the most common case is going to be that records are not
needed and we can skip the function call overhead.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-01-17 16:16:57 -05:00
Eric Paris
56179a6ec6 audit: drop some potentially inadvisable likely notations
The audit code makes heavy use of likely() and unlikely() macros, but they
don't always make sense.  Drop any that seem questionable and let the
computer do it's thing.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-01-17 16:16:57 -05:00
Eric Paris
b05d8447e7 audit: inline audit_syscall_entry to reduce burden on archs
Every arch calls:

if (unlikely(current->audit_context))
	audit_syscall_entry()

which requires knowledge about audit (the existance of audit_context) in
the arch code.  Just do it all in static inline in audit.h so that arch's
can remain blissfully ignorant.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-01-17 16:16:56 -05:00
Eric Paris
d7e7528bcd Audit: push audit success and retcode into arch ptrace.h
The audit system previously expected arches calling to audit_syscall_exit to
supply as arguments if the syscall was a success and what the return code was.
Audit also provides a helper AUDITSC_RESULT which was supposed to simplify things
by converting from negative retcodes to an audit internal magic value stating
success or failure.  This helper was wrong and could indicate that a valid
pointer returned to userspace was a failed syscall.  The fix is to fix the
layering foolishness.  We now pass audit_syscall_exit a struct pt_reg and it
in turns calls back into arch code to collect the return value and to
determine if the syscall was a success or failure.  We also define a generic
is_syscall_success() macro which determines success/failure based on if the
value is < -MAX_ERRNO.  This works for arches like x86 which do not use a
separate mechanism to indicate syscall failure.

We make both the is_syscall_success() and regs_return_value() static inlines
instead of macros.  The reason is because the audit function must take a void*
for the regs.  (uml calls theirs struct uml_pt_regs instead of just struct
pt_regs so audit_syscall_exit can't take a struct pt_regs).  Since the audit
function takes a void* we need to use static inlines to cast it back to the
arch correct structure to dereference it.

The other major change is that on some arches, like ia64, MIPS and ppc, we
change regs_return_value() to give us the negative value on syscall failure.
THE only other user of this macro, kretprobe_example.c, won't notice and it
makes the value signed consistently for the audit functions across all archs.

In arch/sh/kernel/ptrace_64.c I see that we were using regs[9] in the old
audit code as the return value.  But the ptrace_64.h code defined the macro
regs_return_value() as regs[3].  I have no idea which one is correct, but this
patch now uses the regs_return_value() function, so it now uses regs[3].

For powerpc we previously used regs->result but now use the
regs_return_value() function which uses regs->gprs[3].  regs->gprs[3] is
always positive so the regs_return_value(), much like ia64 makes it negative
before calling the audit code when appropriate.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> [for x86 portion]
Acked-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> [for ia64]
Acked-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> [for uml]
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [for sparc]
Acked-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> [for mips]
Acked-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> [for ppc]
2012-01-17 16:16:56 -05:00
Eric Paris
85e7bac33b seccomp: audit abnormal end to a process due to seccomp
The audit system likes to collect information about processes that end
abnormally (SIGSEGV) as this may me useful intrusion detection information.
This patch adds audit support to collect information when seccomp forces a
task to exit because of misbehavior in a similar way.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-01-17 16:16:55 -05:00
Eric Paris
16c174bd95 audit: check current inode and containing object when filtering on major and minor
The audit system has the ability to filter on the major and minor number of
the device containing the inode being operated upon.  Lets say that
/dev/sda1 has major,minor 8,1 and that we mount /dev/sda1 on /boot.  Now lets
say we add a watch with a filter on 8,1.  If we proceed to open an inode
inside /boot, such as /vboot/vmlinuz, we will match the major,minor filter.

Lets instead assume that one were to use a tool like debugfs and were to
open /dev/sda1 directly and to modify it's contents.  We might hope that
this would also be logged, but it isn't.  The rules will check the
major,minor of the device containing /dev/sda1.  In other words the rule
would match on the major/minor of the tmpfs mounted at /dev.

I believe these rules should trigger on either device.  The man page is
devoid of useful information about the intended semantics.  It only seems
logical that if you want to know everything that happened on a major,minor
that would include things that happened to the device itself...

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-01-17 16:16:55 -05:00
Eric Paris
5195d8e217 audit: dynamically allocate audit_names when not enough space is in the names array
This patch does 2 things.  First it reduces the number of audit_names
allocated in every audit context from 20 to 5.  5 should be enough for all
'normal' syscalls (rename being the worst).  Some syscalls can still touch
more the 5 inodes such as mount.  When rpc filesystem is mounted it will
create inodes and those can exceed 5.  To handle that problem this patch will
dynamically allocate audit_names if it needs more than 5.  This should
decrease the typicall memory usage while still supporting all the possible
kernel operations.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-01-17 16:16:54 -05:00
Eric Paris
5ef30ee53b audit: make filetype matching consistent with other filters
Every other filter that matches part of the inodes list collected by audit
will match against any of the inodes on that list.  The filetype matching
however had a strange way of doing things.  It allowed userspace to
indicated if it should match on the first of the second name collected by
the kernel.  Name collection ordering seems like a kernel internal and
making userspace rules get that right just seems like a bad idea.  As it
turns out the userspace audit writers had no idea it was doing this and
thus never overloaded the value field.  The kernel always checked the first
name collected which for the tested rules was always correct.

This patch just makes the filetype matching like the major, minor, inode,
and LSM rules in that it will match against any of the names collected.  It
also changes the rule validation to reject the old unused rule types.

Noone knew it was there.  Noone used it.  Why keep around the extra code?

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-01-17 16:16:54 -05:00
Al Viro
93d3a10ef4 auditsc: propage umode_t
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-01-03 22:55:17 -05:00
Al Viro
2570ebbd1f switch kern_ipc_perm to umode_t
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-01-03 22:55:17 -05:00
Al Viro
df0a42837b switch mq_open() to umode_t 2012-01-03 22:55:16 -05:00
Paul Gortmaker
9984de1a5a kernel: Map most files to use export.h instead of module.h
The changed files were only including linux/module.h for the
EXPORT_SYMBOL infrastructure, and nothing else.  Revector them
onto the isolated export header for faster compile times.

Nothing to see here but a whole lot of instances of:

  -#include <linux/module.h>
  +#include <linux/export.h>

This commit is only changing the kernel dir; next targets
will probably be mm, fs, the arch dirs, etc.

Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2011-10-31 09:20:12 -04:00
Arun Sharma
60063497a9 atomic: use <linux/atomic.h>
This allows us to move duplicated code in <asm/atomic.h>
(atomic_inc_not_zero() for now) to <linux/atomic.h>

Signed-off-by: Arun Sharma <asharma@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-07-26 16:49:47 -07:00
Tony Jones
f562988350 audit: acquire creds selectively to reduce atomic op overhead
Commit c69e8d9c01 ("CRED: Use RCU to access another task's creds and to
release a task's own creds") added calls to get_task_cred and put_cred in
audit_filter_rules.  Profiling with a large number of audit rules active
on the exit chain shows that we are spending upto 48% in this routine for
syscall intensive tests, most of which is in the atomic ops.

1. The code should be accessing tsk->cred rather than tsk->real_cred.
2. Since tsk is current (or tsk is being created by copy_process) access to
tsk->cred without rcu read lock is possible.  At the request of the audit
maintainer, a new flag has been added to audit_filter_rules in order to make
this explicit and guide future code.

Signed-off-by: Tony Jones <tonyj@suse.de>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
2011-04-27 15:11:03 +02:00
Lucas De Marchi
25985edced Fix common misspellings
Fixes generated by 'codespell' and manually reviewed.

Signed-off-by: Lucas De Marchi <lucas.demarchi@profusion.mobi>
2011-03-31 11:26:23 -03:00
Al Viro
120a795da0 audit mmap
Normal syscall audit doesn't catch 5th argument of syscall.  It also
doesn't catch the contents of userland structures pointed to be
syscall argument, so for both old and new mmap(2) ABI it doesn't
record the descriptor we are mapping.  For old one it also misses
flags.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2010-10-30 08:45:43 -04:00
Miklos Szeredi
f7ad3c6be9 vfs: add helpers to get root and pwd
Add three helpers that retrieve a refcounted copy of the root and cwd
from the supplied fs_struct.

 get_fs_root()
 get_fs_pwd()
 get_fs_root_and_pwd()

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2010-08-11 00:28:20 -04:00
Eric Paris
e61ce86737 fsnotify: rename fsnotify_mark_entry to just fsnotify_mark
The name is long and it serves no real purpose.  So rename
fsnotify_mark_entry to just fsnotify_mark.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2010-07-28 09:58:53 -04:00
Eric Paris
2dfc1cae4c inotify: remove inotify in kernel interface
nothing uses inotify in the kernel, drop it!

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2010-07-28 09:58:31 -04:00
Eric Paris
28a3a7eb3b audit: reimplement audit_trees using fsnotify rather than inotify
Simply switch audit_trees from using inotify to using fsnotify for it's
inode pinning and disappearing act information.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2010-07-28 09:58:17 -04:00
Eric Paris
ae7b8f4108 Audit: clean up the audit_watch split
No real changes, just cleanup to the audit_watch split patch which we done
with minimal code changes for easy review.  Now fix interfaces to make
things work better.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2010-07-28 09:58:16 -04:00
Eric Paris
449cedf099 audit: preface audit printk with audit
There have been a number of reports of people seeing the message:
"name_count maxed, losing inode data: dev=00:05, inode=3185"
in dmesg.  These usually lead to people reporting problems to the filesystem
group who are in turn clueless what they mean.

Eventually someone finds me and I explain what is going on and that
these come from the audit system.  The basics of the problem is that the
audit subsystem never expects a single syscall to 'interact' (for some
wish washy meaning of interact) with more than 20 inodes.  But in fact
some operations like loading kernel modules can cause changes to lots of
inodes in debugfs.

There are a couple real fixes being bandied about including removing the
fixed compile time limit of 20 or not auditing changes in debugfs (or
both) but neither are small and obvious so I am not sending them for
immediate inclusion (I hope Al forwards a real solution next devel
window).

In the meantime this patch simply adds 'audit' to the beginning of the
crap message so if a user sees it, they come blame me first and we can
talk about what it means and make sure we understand all of the reasons
it can happen and make sure this gets solved correctly in the long run.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-04-05 13:19:45 -07:00
Tejun Heo
5a0e3ad6af include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h
percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being
included when building most .c files.  percpu.h includes slab.h which
in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files
universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies.

percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed.  Prepare for
this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those
headers directly instead of assuming availability.  As this conversion
needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is
used as the basis of conversion.

  http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py

The script does the followings.

* Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that
  only the necessary includes are there.  ie. if only gfp is used,
  gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h.

* When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include
  blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms
  to its surrounding.  It's put in the include block which contains
  core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered -
  alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there
  doesn't seem to be any matching order.

* If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly
  because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out
  an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the
  file.

The conversion was done in the following steps.

1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly
   over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h
   and ~3000 slab.h inclusions.  The script emitted errors for ~400
   files.

2. Each error was manually checked.  Some didn't need the inclusion,
   some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or
   embedding .c file was more appropriate for others.  This step added
   inclusions to around 150 files.

3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits
   from #2 to make sure no file was left behind.

4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed.
   e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab
   APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually.

5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically
   editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h
   files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell.  Most gfp.h
   inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually
   wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros.  Each
   slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as
   necessary.

6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h.

7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures
   were fixed.  CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my
   distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few
   more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things
   build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq).

   * x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config.
   * powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig
   * sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig
   * ia64 SMP allmodconfig
   * s390 SMP allmodconfig
   * alpha SMP allmodconfig
   * um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig

8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as
   a separate patch and serve as bisection point.

Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step
6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch.
If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch
headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of
the specific arch.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
2010-03-30 22:02:32 +09:00
Al Viro
cccc6bba3f Lose the first argument of audit_inode_child()
it's always equal to ->d_name.name of the second argument

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2010-02-08 14:38:36 -05:00
Al Viro
5300990c03 Sanitize f_flags helpers
* pull ACC_MODE to fs.h; we have several copies all over the place
* nightmarish expression calculating f_mode by f_flags deserves a helper
too (OPEN_FMODE(flags))

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-12-22 12:27:34 -05:00
Eric Paris
44e51a1b78 Audit: rearrange audit_context to save 16 bytes per struct
pahole pointed out that on x86_64 struct audit_context can be rearrainged
to save 16 bytes per struct.  Since we have an audit_context per task this
can acually be a pretty significant gain.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-09-24 03:50:26 -04:00
Al Viro
916d75761c Fix rule eviction order for AUDIT_DIR
If syscall removes the root of subtree being watched, we
definitely do not want the rules refering that subtree
to be destroyed without the syscall in question having
a chance to match them.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-06-24 00:02:38 -04:00
Eric Paris
9d96098510 Audit: clean up all op= output to include string quoting
A number of places in the audit system we send an op= followed by a string
that includes spaces.  Somehow this works but it's just wrong.  This patch
moves all of those that I could find to be quoted.

Example:

Change From: type=CONFIG_CHANGE msg=audit(1244666690.117:31): auid=0 ses=1
subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:auditctl_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=remove rule
key="number2" list=4 res=0

Change To: type=CONFIG_CHANGE msg=audit(1244666690.117:31): auid=0 ses=1
subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:auditctl_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op="remove rule"
key="number2" list=4 res=0

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2009-06-24 00:00:52 -04:00
Eric Paris
cfcad62c74 audit: seperate audit inode watches into a subfile
In preparation for converting audit to use fsnotify instead of inotify we
seperate the inode watching code into it's own file.  This is similar to
how the audit tree watching code is already seperated into audit_tree.c

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2009-06-23 23:50:59 -04:00
Eric Paris
b87ce6e418 Audit: better estimation of execve record length
The audit execve record splitting code estimates the length of the message
generated.  But it forgot to include the "" that wrap each string in its
estimation.  This means that execve messages with lots of tiny (1-2 byte)
arguments could still cause records greater than 8k to be emitted.  Simply
fix the estimate.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2009-06-23 23:50:34 -04:00
Eric Paris
def5754341 Audit: remove spaces from audit_log_d_path
audit_log_d_path had spaces in the strings which would be emitted on the
error paths.  This patch simply replaces those spaces with an _ or removes
the needless spaces entirely.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-04-05 13:49:04 -04:00
Eric Paris
679173b724 audit: audit_set_auditable defined but not used
after 0590b9335a audit_set_auditable() is now only
used by the audit tree code.  If CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE is unset it will be defined
but unused.  This patch simply moves the function inside a CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
block.

cc1: warnings being treated as errors
/home/acme_unencrypted/git/linux-2.6-tip/kernel/auditsc.c:745: error: ‘audit_set_auditable’ defined but not used
make[2]: *** [kernel/auditsc.o] Error 1
make[1]: *** [kernel] Error 2
make[1]: *** Waiting for unfinished jobs....

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-04-05 13:48:52 -04:00
Paul Moore
6d208da89a audit: Fix possible return value truncation in audit_get_context()
The audit subsystem treats syscall return codes as type long, unfortunately
the audit_get_context() function mistakenly converts the return code to an
int type in the parameters which could cause problems on systems where the
sizeof(int) != sizeof(long).

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-04-05 13:46:19 -04:00
Randy Dunlap
6b96255998 auditsc: fix kernel-doc notation
Fix auditsc kernel-doc notation:

Warning(linux-2.6.28-git7//kernel/auditsc.c:2156): No description found for parameter 'attr'
Warning(linux-2.6.28-git7//kernel/auditsc.c:2156): Excess function parameter 'u_attr' description in '__audit_mq_open'
Warning(linux-2.6.28-git7//kernel/auditsc.c:2204): No description found for parameter 'notification'
Warning(linux-2.6.28-git7//kernel/auditsc.c:2204): Excess function parameter 'u_notification' description in '__audit_mq_notify'

Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
cc:	Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
cc:	Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-04-05 13:39:19 -04:00
Jiri Pirko
ca96a895a6 audit: EXECVE record - removed bogus newline
(updated)
Added hunk that changes the comment, the rest is the same.

EXECVE records contain a newline after every argument. auditd converts
"\n" to " " so you cannot see newlines even in raw logs, but they're
there nevertheless. If you're not using auditd, you need to work round
them. These '\n' chars are can be easily replaced by spaces when
creating record in kernel. Note there is no need for trailing '\n' in
an audit record.

record before this patch:
"type=EXECVE msg=audit(1231421801.566:31): argc=4 a0=\"./test\"\na1=\"a\"\na2=\"b\"\na3=\"c\"\n"

record after this patch:
"type=EXECVE msg=audit(1231421801.566:31): argc=4 a0=\"./test\" a1=\"a\" a2=\"b\" a3=\"c\""

Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jpirko@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-04-05 13:38:59 -04:00
Al Viro
5ad4e53bd5 Get rid of indirect include of fs_struct.h
Don't pull it in sched.h; very few files actually need it and those
can include directly.  sched.h itself only needs forward declaration
of struct fs_struct;

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-03-31 23:00:27 -04:00
Al Viro
e048e02c89 make sure that filterkey of task,always rules is reported
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-01-04 15:14:42 -05:00
Al Viro
0590b9335a fixing audit rule ordering mess, part 1
Problem: ordering between the rules on exit chain is currently lost;
all watch and inode rules are listed after everything else _and_
exit,never on one kind doesn't stop exit,always on another from
being matched.

Solution: assign priorities to rules, keep track of the current
highest-priority matching rule and its result (always/never).

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-01-04 15:14:41 -05:00
Al Viro
57f71a0af4 sanitize audit_log_capset()
* no allocations
* return void
* don't duplicate checked for dummy context

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-01-04 15:14:41 -05:00
Al Viro
157cf649a7 sanitize audit_fd_pair()
* no allocations
* return void

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-01-04 15:14:41 -05:00
Al Viro
564f6993ff sanitize audit_mq_open()
* don't bother with allocations
* don't do double copy_from_user()
* don't duplicate parts of check for audit_dummy_context()

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-01-04 15:14:41 -05:00
Al Viro
c32c8af43b sanitize AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV
* logging the original value of *msg_prio in mq_timedreceive(2)
  is insane - the argument is write-only (i.e. syscall always
  ignores the original value and only overwrites it).
* merge __audit_mq_timed{send,receive}
* don't do copy_from_user() twice
* don't mess with allocations in auditsc part
* ... and don't bother checking !audit_enabled and !context in there -
  we'd already checked for audit_dummy_context().

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-01-04 15:14:40 -05:00
Al Viro
20114f71b2 sanitize audit_mq_notify()
* don't copy_from_user() twice
* don't bother with allocations
* don't duplicate parts of audit_dummy_context()
* make it return void

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-01-04 15:14:40 -05:00
Al Viro
7392906ea9 sanitize audit_mq_getsetattr()
* get rid of allocations
* make it return void
* don't duplicate parts of audit_dummy_context()

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-01-04 15:14:40 -05:00
Al Viro
e816f370cb sanitize audit_ipc_set_perm()
* get rid of allocations
* make it return void
* simplify callers

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-01-04 15:14:40 -05:00
Al Viro
a33e675100 sanitize audit_ipc_obj()
* get rid of allocations
* make it return void
* simplify callers

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-01-04 15:14:39 -05:00
Al Viro
f3298dc4f2 sanitize audit_socketcall
* don't bother with allocations
* now that it can't fail, make it return void

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-01-04 15:14:39 -05:00
Al Viro
4f6b434fee don't reallocate buffer in every audit_sockaddr()
No need to do that more than once per process lifetime; allocating/freeing
on each sendto/accept/etc. is bloody pointless.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-01-04 15:14:39 -05:00
James Morris
cbacc2c7f0 Merge branch 'next' into for-linus 2008-12-25 11:40:09 +11:00
Al Viro
48887e63d6 [PATCH] fix broken timestamps in AVC generated by kernel threads
Timestamp in audit_context is valid only if ->in_syscall is set.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-12-09 02:27:41 -05:00
Randy Dunlap
7f0ed77d24 [patch 1/1] audit: remove excess kernel-doc
Delete excess kernel-doc notation in kernel/auditsc.c:

Warning(linux-2.6.27-git10//kernel/auditsc.c:1481): Excess function parameter or struct member 'tsk' description in 'audit_syscall_entry'
Warning(linux-2.6.27-git10//kernel/auditsc.c:1564): Excess function parameter or struct member 'tsk' description in 'audit_syscall_exit'

Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-12-09 02:27:40 -05:00
Al Viro
a64e64944f [PATCH] return records for fork() both to child and parent
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-12-09 02:27:38 -05:00
David Howells
d84f4f992c CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management.  This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.

A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().

With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:

	struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
	int ret = blah(new);
	if (ret < 0) {
		abort_creds(new);
		return ret;
	}
	return commit_creds(new);

There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.

To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const.  The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers.  Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:

  (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.

  (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.

The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).

This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.

This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:

 (1) execve().

     This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
     security code rather than altering the current creds directly.

 (2) Temporary credential overrides.

     do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
     temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
     preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
     on the thread being dumped.

     This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
     credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
     the task's objective credentials.

 (3) LSM interface.

     A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:

     (*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
     (*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()

     	 Removed in favour of security_capset().

     (*) security_capset(), ->capset()

     	 New.  This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
     	 creds and the proposed capability sets.  It should fill in the new
     	 creds or return an error.  All pointers, barring the pointer to the
     	 new creds, are now const.

     (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()

     	 Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
     	 killed if it's an error.

     (*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()

     	 Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().

     (*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()

     	 New.  Free security data attached to cred->security.

     (*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()

     	 New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.

     (*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()

     	 New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
     	 security by commit_creds().

     (*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()

     	 Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().

     (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()

     	 Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid().  This is used by
     	 cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
     	 setuid() changes.  Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
     	 than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().

     (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()

     	 Removed.  Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
     	 directly to init's credentials.

	 NOTE!  This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
	 longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.

     (*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
     (*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()

     	 Changed.  These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
     	 refer to the security context.

 (4) sys_capset().

     This has been simplified and uses less locking.  The LSM functions it
     calls have been merged.

 (5) reparent_to_kthreadd().

     This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
     commit_thread() to point that way.

 (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()

     __sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
     beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
     user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
     successful.

     switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
     folded into that.  commit_creds() should take care of protecting
     __sigqueue_alloc().

 (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.

     The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
     abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
     it.

     security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section.  This
     guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.

     The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().

     Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
     commit_creds().

     The get functions all simply access the data directly.

 (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().

     security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
     want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
     rather than through an argument.

     Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
     if it doesn't end up using it.

 (9) Keyrings.

     A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:

     (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
     	 all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
     	 They may want separating out again later.

     (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
     	 rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.

     (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
     	 thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
     	 keyring.

     (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
     	 the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.

     (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
     	 credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
     	 process or session keyrings (they're shared).

(10) Usermode helper.

     The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
     subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer.  This set
     of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
     after it has been cloned.

     call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
     call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used.  A
     special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
     specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.

     call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
     supplied keyring as the new session keyring.

(11) SELinux.

     SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
     interface changes mentioned above:

     (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
     	 current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
     	 that covers getting the ptracer's SID.  Whilst this lock ensures that
     	 the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
     	 until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
     	 lock.

(12) is_single_threaded().

     This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
     a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
     wants to use it too.

     The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
     with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough.  We really want
     to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).

(13) nfsd.

     The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
     credentials it is going to use.  It really needs to pass the credentials
     down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
     in this series have been applied.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 10:39:23 +11:00
David Howells
c69e8d9c01 CRED: Use RCU to access another task's creds and to release a task's own creds
Use RCU to access another task's creds and to release a task's own creds.
This means that it will be possible for the credentials of a task to be
replaced without another task (a) requiring a full lock to read them, and (b)
seeing deallocated memory.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 10:39:19 +11:00
David Howells
b6dff3ec5e CRED: Separate task security context from task_struct
Separate the task security context from task_struct.  At this point, the
security data is temporarily embedded in the task_struct with two pointers
pointing to it.

Note that the Alpha arch is altered as it refers to (E)UID and (E)GID in
entry.S via asm-offsets.

With comment fixes Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne <marc.c.dionne@gmail.com>

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 10:39:16 +11:00
David Howells
76aac0e9a1 CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the core kernel
Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
Cc: containers@lists.linux-foundation.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 10:39:12 +11:00
Eric Paris
e68b75a027 When the capset syscall is used it is not possible for audit to record the
actual capbilities being added/removed.  This patch adds a new record type
which emits the target pid and the eff, inh, and perm cap sets.

example output if you audit capset syscalls would be:

type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1225743140.465:76): arch=c000003e syscall=126 success=yes exit=0 a0=17f2014 a1=17f201c a2=80000000 a3=7fff2ab7f060 items=0 ppid=2160 pid=2223 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts0 ses=1 comm="setcap" exe="/usr/sbin/setcap" subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
type=UNKNOWN[1322] msg=audit(1225743140.465:76): pid=0 cap_pi=ffffffffffffffff cap_pp=ffffffffffffffff cap_pe=ffffffffffffffff

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-11 21:48:22 +11:00
Eric Paris
3fc689e96c Any time fcaps or a setuid app under SECURE_NOROOT is used to result in a
non-zero pE we will crate a new audit record which contains the entire set
of known information about the executable in question, fP, fI, fE, fversion
and includes the process's pE, pI, pP.  Before and after the bprm capability
are applied.  This record type will only be emitted from execve syscalls.

an example of making ping use fcaps instead of setuid:

setcap "cat_net_raw+pe" /bin/ping

type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1225742021.015:236): arch=c000003e syscall=59 success=yes exit=0 a0=1457f30 a1=14606b0 a2=1463940 a3=321b770a70 items=2 ppid=2929 pid=2963 auid=0 uid=500 gid=500 euid=500 suid=500 fsuid=500 egid=500 sgid=500 fsgid=500 tty=pts0 ses=3 comm="ping" exe="/bin/ping" subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
type=UNKNOWN[1321] msg=audit(1225742021.015:236): fver=2 fp=0000000000002000 fi=0000000000000000 fe=1 old_pp=0000000000000000 old_pi=0000000000000000 old_pe=0000000000000000 new_pp=0000000000002000 new_pi=0000000000000000 new_pe=0000000000002000
type=EXECVE msg=audit(1225742021.015:236): argc=2 a0="ping" a1="127.0.0.1"
type=CWD msg=audit(1225742021.015:236):  cwd="/home/test"
type=PATH msg=audit(1225742021.015:236): item=0 name="/bin/ping" inode=49256 dev=fd:00 mode=0100755 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:ping_exec_t:s0 cap_fp=0000000000002000 cap_fe=1 cap_fver=2
type=PATH msg=audit(1225742021.015:236): item=1 name=(null) inode=507915 dev=fd:00 mode=0100755 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:ld_so_t:s0

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-11 21:48:18 +11:00
Eric Paris
851f7ff56d This patch will print cap_permitted and cap_inheritable data in the PATH
records of any file that has file capabilities set.  Files which do not
have fcaps set will not have different PATH records.

An example audit record if you run:
setcap "cap_net_admin+pie" /bin/bash
/bin/bash

type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1225741937.363:230): arch=c000003e syscall=59 success=yes exit=0 a0=2119230 a1=210da30 a2=20ee290 a3=8 items=2 ppid=2149 pid=2923 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts0 ses=3 comm="ping" exe="/bin/ping" subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
type=EXECVE msg=audit(1225741937.363:230): argc=2 a0="ping" a1="www.google.com"
type=CWD msg=audit(1225741937.363:230):  cwd="/root"
type=PATH msg=audit(1225741937.363:230): item=0 name="/bin/ping" inode=49256 dev=fd:00 mode=0104755 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:ping_exec_t:s0 cap_fp=0000000000002000 cap_fi=0000000000002000 cap_fe=1 cap_fver=2
type=PATH msg=audit(1225741937.363:230): item=1 name=(null) inode=507915 dev=fd:00 mode=0100755 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:ld_so_t:s0

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-11 21:48:14 +11:00
Alan Cox
dbda4c0b97 tty: Fix abusers of current->sighand->tty
Various people outside the tty layer still stick their noses in behind the
scenes. We need to make sure they also obey the locking and referencing rules.

Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-10-13 09:51:42 -07:00
Cordelia
c4bacefb7a [PATCH] audit: Moved variable declaration to beginning of function
got rid of compilation warning:
ISO C90 forbids mixed declarations and code

Signed-off-by: Cordelia Sam <cordesam@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-09-01 23:06:45 -04:00
zhangxiliang
1a61c88def Re: [PATCH] Fix the kernel panic of audit_filter_task when key field is set
Sorry, I miss a blank between if and "(".
And I add "unlikely" to check "ctx" in audit_match_perm() and audit_match_filetype().
This is a new patch for it.

Signed-off-by: Zhang Xiliang <zhangxiliang@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-08-04 06:13:50 -04:00
zhangxiliang
980dfb0db3 [PATCH] Fix the kernel panic of audit_filter_task when key field is set
When calling audit_filter_task(), it calls audit_filter_rules() with audit_context is NULL.
If the key field is set, the result in audit_filter_rules() will be set to 1 and
ctx->filterkey will be set to key.
But the ctx is NULL in this condition, so kernel will panic.

Signed-off-by: Zhang Xiliang <zhangxiliang@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-08-01 12:15:03 -04:00
Eric Paris
ee1d315663 [PATCH] Audit: Collect signal info when SIGUSR2 is sent to auditd
Makes the kernel audit subsystem collect information about the sending
process when that process sends SIGUSR2 to the userspace audit daemon.
SIGUSR2 is a new interesting signal to auditd telling auditd that it
should try to start logging to disk again and the error condition which
caused it to stop logging to disk (usually out of space) has been
rectified.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-08-01 12:05:32 -04:00
Roland McGrath
86a1c34a92 x86_64 syscall audit fast-path
This adds a fast path for 64-bit syscall entry and exit when
TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT is set, but no other kind of syscall tracing.
This path does not need to save and restore all registers as
the general case of tracing does.  Avoiding the iret return path
when syscall audit is enabled helps performance a lot.

Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
2008-07-23 17:47:32 -07:00
Al Viro
8b67dca942 [PATCH] new predicate - AUDIT_FILETYPE
Argument is S_IF... | <index>, where index is normally 0 or 1.
Triggers if chosen element of ctx->names[] is present and the
mode of object in question matches the upper bits of argument.
I.e. for things like "is the argument of that chmod a directory",
etc.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-04-28 06:28:37 -04:00
Harvey Harrison
7719e437fa [PATCH 2/2] audit: fix sparse shadowed variable warnings
Use msglen as the identifier.
kernel/audit.c:724:10: warning: symbol 'len' shadows an earlier one
kernel/audit.c:575:8: originally declared here

Don't use ino_f to check the inode field at the end of the functions.
kernel/auditfilter.c:429:22: warning: symbol 'f' shadows an earlier one
kernel/auditfilter.c:420:21: originally declared here
kernel/auditfilter.c:542:22: warning: symbol 'f' shadows an earlier one
kernel/auditfilter.c:529:21: originally declared here

i always used as a counter for a for loop and initialized to zero before
use.  Eliminate the inner i variables.
kernel/auditsc.c:1295:8: warning: symbol 'i' shadows an earlier one
kernel/auditsc.c:1152:6: originally declared here
kernel/auditsc.c:1320:7: warning: symbol 'i' shadows an earlier one
kernel/auditsc.c:1152:6: originally declared here

Signed-off-by: Harvey Harrison <harvey.harrison@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-04-28 06:28:17 -04:00
Harvey Harrison
c782f242f0 [PATCH 1/2] audit: move extern declarations to audit.h
Leave audit_sig_{uid|pid|sid} protected by #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL.

Noticed by sparse:
kernel/audit.c:73:6: warning: symbol 'audit_ever_enabled' was not declared. Should it be static?
kernel/audit.c💯8: warning: symbol 'audit_sig_uid' was not declared. Should it be static?
kernel/audit.c:101:8: warning: symbol 'audit_sig_pid' was not declared. Should it be static?
kernel/audit.c:102:6: warning: symbol 'audit_sig_sid' was not declared. Should it be static?
kernel/audit.c:117:23: warning: symbol 'audit_ih' was not declared. Should it be static?
kernel/auditfilter.c:78:18: warning: symbol 'audit_filter_list' was not declared. Should it be static?

Signed-off-by: Harvey Harrison <harvey.harrison@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-04-28 06:28:04 -04:00
Eric Paris
b556f8ad58 Audit: standardize string audit interfaces
This patch standardized the string auditing interfaces.  No userspace
changes will be visible and this is all just cleanup and consistancy
work.  We have the following string audit interfaces to use:

void audit_log_n_hex(struct audit_buffer *ab, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len);

void audit_log_n_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *buf, size_t n);
void audit_log_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *buf);

void audit_log_n_untrustedstring(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *string, size_t n);
void audit_log_untrustedstring(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *string);

This may be the first step to possibly fixing some of the issues that
people have with the string output from the kernel audit system.  But we
still don't have an agreed upon solution to that problem.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-04-28 06:19:22 -04:00
Eric Paris
436c405c7d Audit: end printk with newline
A couple of audit printk statements did not have a newline.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-04-28 04:45:07 -04:00
Ahmed S. Darwish
04305e4aff Audit: Final renamings and cleanup
Rename the se_str and se_rule audit fields elements to
lsm_str and lsm_rule to avoid confusion.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-04-19 09:59:43 +10:00
Ahmed S. Darwish
d7a96f3a1a Audit: internally use the new LSM audit hooks
Convert Audit to use the new LSM Audit hooks instead of
the exported SELinux interface.

Basically, use:
security_audit_rule_init
secuirty_audit_rule_free
security_audit_rule_known
security_audit_rule_match

instad of (respectively) :
selinux_audit_rule_init
selinux_audit_rule_free
audit_rule_has_selinux
selinux_audit_rule_match

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-04-19 09:52:37 +10:00
Ahmed S. Darwish
2a862b32f3 Audit: use new LSM hooks instead of SELinux exports
Stop using the following exported SELinux interfaces:
selinux_get_inode_sid(inode, sid)
selinux_get_ipc_sid(ipcp, sid)
selinux_get_task_sid(tsk, sid)
selinux_sid_to_string(sid, ctx, len)
kfree(ctx)

and use following generic LSM equivalents respectively:
security_inode_getsecid(inode, secid)
security_ipc_getsecid*(ipcp, secid)
security_task_getsecid(tsk, secid)
security_sid_to_secctx(sid, ctx, len)
security_release_secctx(ctx, len)

Call security_release_secctx only if security_secid_to_secctx
succeeded.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
2008-04-19 09:52:34 +10:00
Paul Moore
422b03cf75 [PATCH] Audit: Fix the format type for size_t variables
Fix the following compiler warning by using "%zu" as defined in C99.

  CC      kernel/auditsc.o
  kernel/auditsc.c: In function 'audit_log_single_execve_arg':
  kernel/auditsc.c:1074: warning: format '%ld' expects type 'long int', but
  argument 4 has type 'size_t'

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-03-01 07:16:06 -05:00
Eric Paris
b0abcfc146 Audit: use == not = in if statements
Clearly this was supposed to be an == not an = in the if statement.
This patch also causes us to stop processing execve args once we have
failed rather than continuing to loop on failure over and over and over.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-18 18:46:28 -08:00
Jan Blunck
44707fdf59 d_path: Use struct path in struct avc_audit_data
audit_log_d_path() is a d_path() wrapper that is used by the audit code.  To
use a struct path in audit_log_d_path() I need to embed it into struct
avc_audit_data.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Jan Blunck <jblunck@suse.de>
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-14 21:17:08 -08:00
Jan Blunck
6ac08c39a1 Use struct path in fs_struct
* Use struct path in fs_struct.

Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Jan Blunck <jblunck@suse.de>
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-14 21:13:33 -08:00
Eric Paris
b593d384ef [AUDIT] create context if auditing was ever enabled
Disabling audit at runtime by auditctl doesn't mean that we can
stop allocating contexts for new processes; we don't want to miss them
when that sucker is reenabled.

(based on work from Al Viro in the RHEL kernel series)

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2008-02-01 14:24:45 -05:00
Eric Paris
de6bbd1d30 [AUDIT] break large execve argument logging into smaller messages
execve arguments can be quite large.  There is no limit on the number of
arguments and a 4G limit on the size of an argument.

this patch prints those aruguments in bite sized pieces.  a userspace size
limitation of 8k was discovered so this keeps messages around 7.5k

single arguments larger than 7.5k in length are split into multiple records
and can be identified as aX[Y]=

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2008-02-01 14:23:55 -05:00
Eric Paris
6246ccab99 [AUDIT] do not panic on exclude messages in audit_log_pid_context()
If we fail to get an ab in audit_log_pid_context this may be due to an exclude
rule rather than a memory allocation failure.  If it was due to a memory
allocation failue we would have already paniced and no need to do it again.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2008-02-01 14:07:46 -05:00
Eric Paris
c0641f28dc [AUDIT] Add End of Event record
This patch adds an end of event record type. It will be sent by the kernel as
the last record when a multi-record event is triggered. This will aid realtime
analysis programs since they will now reliably know they have the last record
to complete an event. The audit daemon filters this and will not write it to
disk.

Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb redhat com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2008-02-01 14:07:19 -05:00
Eric Paris
4746ec5b01 [AUDIT] add session id to audit messages
In order to correlate audit records to an individual login add a session
id.  This is incremented every time a user logs in and is included in
almost all messages which currently output the auid.  The field is
labeled ses=  or oses=

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2008-02-01 14:06:51 -05:00
Eric Paris
c2a7780efe [AUDIT] collect uid, loginuid, and comm in OBJ_PID records
Add uid, loginuid, and comm collection to OBJ_PID records.  This just
gives users a little more information about the task that received a
signal.  pid is rather meaningless after the fact, and even though comm
isn't great we can't collect exe reasonably on this code path for
performance reasons.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2008-02-01 14:06:23 -05:00
Eric Paris
f701b75ed5 [AUDIT] return EINTR not ERESTART*
The syscall exit code will change ERESTART* kernel internal return codes
to EINTR if it does not restart the syscall.  Since we collect the audit
info before that point we should fix those in the audit log as well.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2008-02-01 14:05:55 -05:00
Al Viro
bfef93a5d1 [PATCH] get rid of loginuid races
Keeping loginuid in audit_context is racy and results in messier
code.  Taken to task_struct, out of the way of ->audit_context
changes.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-02-01 14:05:28 -05:00
Al Viro
0c11b9428f [PATCH] switch audit_get_loginuid() to task_struct *
all callers pass something->audit_context

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-02-01 14:04:59 -05:00
Randy Dunlap
481968f44e auditsc: fix kernel-doc param warnings
Fix kernel-doc for auditsc parameter changes.

Warning(linux-2.6.23-git17//kernel/auditsc.c:1623): No description found for parameter 'dentry'
Warning(linux-2.6.23-git17//kernel/auditsc.c:1666): No description found for parameter 'dentry'

Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-22 19:40:02 -07:00
Al Viro
74c3cbe33b [PATCH] audit: watching subtrees
New kind of audit rule predicates: "object is visible in given subtree".
The part that can be sanely implemented, that is.  Limitations:
	* if you have hardlink from outside of tree, you'd better watch
it too (or just watch the object itself, obviously)
	* if you mount something under a watched tree, tell audit
that new chunk should be added to watched subtrees
	* if you umount something in a watched tree and it's still mounted
elsewhere, you will get matches on events happening there.  New command
tells audit to recalculate the trees, trimming such sources of false
positives.

Note that it's _not_ about path - if something mounted in several places
(multiple mount, bindings, different namespaces, etc.), the match does
_not_ depend on which one we are using for access.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2007-10-21 02:37:45 -04:00