468 lines
15 KiB
C
468 lines
15 KiB
C
/* crypto/cms/cms_kari.c */
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/*
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* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
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* project.
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright (c) 2013 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
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* distribution.
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*
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
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* software must display the following acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
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*
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
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* licensing@OpenSSL.org.
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*
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
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*
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
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* acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
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* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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* ====================================================================
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*/
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#include "cryptlib.h"
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#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
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#include <openssl/pem.h>
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#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/cms.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#include <openssl/aes.h>
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#include "cms_lcl.h"
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#include "asn1_locl.h"
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DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo)
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DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey)
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DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_OriginatorPublicKey)
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DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_RecipientKeyIdentifier)
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/* Key Agreement Recipient Info (KARI) routines */
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int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_alg(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
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X509_ALGOR **palg,
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ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pukm)
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{
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if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) {
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CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_GET0_ALG,
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CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
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return 0;
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}
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if (palg)
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*palg = ri->d.kari->keyEncryptionAlgorithm;
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if (pukm)
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*pukm = ri->d.kari->ukm;
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return 1;
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}
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/* Retrieve recipient encrypted keys from a kari */
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STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey)
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*CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_reks(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
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{
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if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) {
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CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_GET0_REKS,
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CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
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return NULL;
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}
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return ri->d.kari->recipientEncryptedKeys;
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}
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int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_orig_id(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
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X509_ALGOR **pubalg,
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ASN1_BIT_STRING **pubkey,
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ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid,
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X509_NAME **issuer,
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ASN1_INTEGER **sno)
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{
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CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oik;
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if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) {
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CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_GET0_ORIG_ID,
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CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
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return 0;
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}
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oik = ri->d.kari->originator;
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if (issuer)
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*issuer = NULL;
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if (sno)
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*sno = NULL;
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if (keyid)
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*keyid = NULL;
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if (pubalg)
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*pubalg = NULL;
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if (pubkey)
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*pubkey = NULL;
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if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_ISSUER_SERIAL) {
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if (issuer)
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*issuer = oik->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->issuer;
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if (sno)
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*sno = oik->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->serialNumber;
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} else if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_KEYIDENTIFIER) {
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if (keyid)
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*keyid = oik->d.subjectKeyIdentifier;
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} else if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_PUBKEY) {
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if (pubalg)
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*pubalg = oik->d.originatorKey->algorithm;
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if (pubkey)
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*pubkey = oik->d.originatorKey->publicKey;
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} else
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return 0;
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return 1;
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}
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int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_orig_id_cmp(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *cert)
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{
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CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oik;
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if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) {
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CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_ORIG_ID_CMP,
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CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
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return -2;
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}
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oik = ri->d.kari->originator;
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if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_ISSUER_SERIAL)
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return cms_ias_cert_cmp(oik->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, cert);
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else if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_KEYIDENTIFIER)
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return cms_keyid_cert_cmp(oik->d.subjectKeyIdentifier, cert);
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return -1;
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}
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int CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_get0_id(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek,
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ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid,
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ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **tm,
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CMS_OtherKeyAttribute **other,
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X509_NAME **issuer, ASN1_INTEGER **sno)
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{
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CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier *rid = rek->rid;
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if (rid->type == CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL) {
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if (issuer)
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*issuer = rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->issuer;
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if (sno)
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*sno = rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->serialNumber;
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if (keyid)
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*keyid = NULL;
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if (tm)
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*tm = NULL;
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if (other)
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*other = NULL;
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} else if (rid->type == CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER) {
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if (keyid)
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*keyid = rid->d.rKeyId->subjectKeyIdentifier;
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if (tm)
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*tm = rid->d.rKeyId->date;
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if (other)
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*other = rid->d.rKeyId->other;
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if (issuer)
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*issuer = NULL;
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if (sno)
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*sno = NULL;
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} else
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return 0;
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return 1;
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}
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int CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_cert_cmp(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek,
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X509 *cert)
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{
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CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier *rid = rek->rid;
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if (rid->type == CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL)
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return cms_ias_cert_cmp(rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, cert);
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else if (rid->type == CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER)
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return cms_keyid_cert_cmp(rid->d.rKeyId->subjectKeyIdentifier, cert);
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else
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return -1;
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}
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int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_set0_pkey(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, EVP_PKEY *pk)
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{
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EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
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CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari = ri->d.kari;
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if (kari->pctx) {
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EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kari->pctx);
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kari->pctx = NULL;
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}
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if (!pk)
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return 1;
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pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
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if (!pctx || !EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx))
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goto err;
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kari->pctx = pctx;
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return 1;
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err:
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if (pctx)
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EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
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return 0;
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}
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX *CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_ctx(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
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{
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if (ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE)
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return &ri->d.kari->ctx;
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return NULL;
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}
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/*
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* Derive KEK and decrypt/encrypt with it to produce either the original CEK
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* or the encrypted CEK.
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*/
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static int cms_kek_cipher(unsigned char **pout, size_t *poutlen,
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const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen,
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CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari, int enc)
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{
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/* Key encryption key */
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unsigned char kek[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
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size_t keklen;
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int rv = 0;
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unsigned char *out = NULL;
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int outlen;
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keklen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(&kari->ctx);
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if (keklen > EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH)
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return 0;
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/* Derive KEK */
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if (EVP_PKEY_derive(kari->pctx, kek, &keklen) <= 0)
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goto err;
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/* Set KEK in context */
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if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(&kari->ctx, NULL, NULL, kek, NULL, enc))
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goto err;
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/* obtain output length of ciphered key */
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if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(&kari->ctx, NULL, &outlen, in, inlen))
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goto err;
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out = OPENSSL_malloc(outlen);
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if (!out)
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goto err;
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if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(&kari->ctx, out, &outlen, in, inlen))
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goto err;
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*pout = out;
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*poutlen = (size_t)outlen;
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rv = 1;
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err:
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OPENSSL_cleanse(kek, keklen);
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if (!rv && out)
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OPENSSL_free(out);
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&kari->ctx);
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EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kari->pctx);
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kari->pctx = NULL;
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return rv;
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}
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int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
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CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
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CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek)
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{
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int rv = 0;
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unsigned char *enckey = NULL, *cek = NULL;
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size_t enckeylen;
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size_t ceklen;
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CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
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enckeylen = rek->encryptedKey->length;
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enckey = rek->encryptedKey->data;
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/* Setup all parameters to derive KEK */
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if (!cms_env_asn1_ctrl(ri, 1))
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goto err;
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/* Attempt to decrypt CEK */
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if (!cms_kek_cipher(&cek, &ceklen, enckey, enckeylen, ri->d.kari, 0))
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goto err;
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ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo;
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if (ec->key) {
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OPENSSL_cleanse(ec->key, ec->keylen);
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OPENSSL_free(ec->key);
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}
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ec->key = cek;
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ec->keylen = ceklen;
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cek = NULL;
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rv = 1;
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err:
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if (cek)
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OPENSSL_free(cek);
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return rv;
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}
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/* Create ephemeral key and initialise context based on it */
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static int cms_kari_create_ephemeral_key(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari,
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EVP_PKEY *pk)
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{
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EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
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EVP_PKEY *ekey = NULL;
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int rv = 0;
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pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
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if (!pctx)
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goto err;
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if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(pctx) <= 0)
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goto err;
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if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(pctx, &ekey) <= 0)
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goto err;
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EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
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pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(ekey, NULL);
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if (!pctx)
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goto err;
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if (EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx) <= 0)
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goto err;
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kari->pctx = pctx;
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rv = 1;
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err:
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if (!rv && pctx)
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EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
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if (ekey)
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EVP_PKEY_free(ekey);
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return rv;
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}
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/* Initialise a ktri based on passed certificate and key */
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int cms_RecipientInfo_kari_init(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *recip,
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EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned int flags)
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{
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CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari;
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CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek = NULL;
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ri->d.kari = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo);
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if (!ri->d.kari)
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return 0;
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ri->type = CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE;
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kari = ri->d.kari;
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kari->version = 3;
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rek = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey);
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if (!sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_push(kari->recipientEncryptedKeys, rek)) {
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M_ASN1_free_of(rek, CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey);
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return 0;
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}
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if (flags & CMS_USE_KEYID) {
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rek->rid->type = CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER;
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rek->rid->d.rKeyId = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_RecipientKeyIdentifier);
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if (rek->rid->d.rKeyId == NULL)
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return 0;
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if (!cms_set1_keyid(&rek->rid->d.rKeyId->subjectKeyIdentifier, recip))
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return 0;
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} else {
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rek->rid->type = CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL;
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if (!cms_set1_ias(&rek->rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, recip))
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return 0;
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}
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/* Create ephemeral key */
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if (!cms_kari_create_ephemeral_key(kari, pk))
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return 0;
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CRYPTO_add(&pk->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
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rek->pkey = pk;
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return 1;
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}
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static int cms_wrap_init(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari,
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const EVP_CIPHER *cipher)
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{
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = &kari->ctx;
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const EVP_CIPHER *kekcipher;
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int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher);
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/* If a suitable wrap algorithm is already set nothing to do */
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kekcipher = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx);
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if (kekcipher) {
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if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx) != EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE)
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return 0;
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return 1;
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}
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/*
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* Pick a cipher based on content encryption cipher. If it is DES3 use
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* DES3 wrap otherwise use AES wrap similar to key size.
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*/
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
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if (EVP_CIPHER_type(cipher) == NID_des_ede3_cbc)
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kekcipher = EVP_des_ede3_wrap();
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else
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#endif
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if (keylen <= 16)
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kekcipher = EVP_aes_128_wrap();
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else if (keylen <= 24)
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kekcipher = EVP_aes_192_wrap();
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else
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kekcipher = EVP_aes_256_wrap();
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return EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, kekcipher, NULL, NULL, NULL);
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}
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/* Encrypt content key in key agreement recipient info */
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int cms_RecipientInfo_kari_encrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
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CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
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{
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CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari;
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CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
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CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek;
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STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey) *reks;
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int i;
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if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) {
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CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_ENCRYPT, CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
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return 0;
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}
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kari = ri->d.kari;
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reks = kari->recipientEncryptedKeys;
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ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo;
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/* Initialise wrap algorithm parameters */
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if (!cms_wrap_init(kari, ec->cipher))
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return 0;
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/*
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* If no orignator key set up initialise for ephemeral key the public key
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* ASN1 structure will set the actual public key value.
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*/
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if (kari->originator->type == -1) {
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CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oik = kari->originator;
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oik->type = CMS_OIK_PUBKEY;
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oik->d.originatorKey = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_OriginatorPublicKey);
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if (!oik->d.originatorKey)
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return 0;
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}
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/* Initialise KDF algorithm */
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if (!cms_env_asn1_ctrl(ri, 0))
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return 0;
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/* For each rek, derive KEK, encrypt CEK */
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for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_num(reks); i++) {
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unsigned char *enckey;
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size_t enckeylen;
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rek = sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_value(reks, i);
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if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(kari->pctx, rek->pkey) <= 0)
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return 0;
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if (!cms_kek_cipher(&enckey, &enckeylen, ec->key, ec->keylen,
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kari, 1))
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return 0;
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ASN1_STRING_set0(rek->encryptedKey, enckey, enckeylen);
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}
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return 1;
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}
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