asgardius/virtualx-engine
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull requests Projects Releases Packages Wiki Activity Actions
virtualx-engine/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_values.h
Lyuma 40fa684c18 mbedTLS: Update to new LTS v3.6.0 
Keep module compatibility with mbedtls 2.x (old LTS branch).

A patch has been added to allow compiling after removing all the `psa_*`
files from the library folder (will look into upstreaming it).

Note: mbedTLS 3.6 finally enabled TLSv1.3 by default, but it requires
some module changes, and to enable PSA crypto (new "standard" API
specification), so it might be best done in a separate commit/PR.
2024-04-10 21:19:22 +02:00

2783 lines
120 KiB
C++
Raw Blame History

This file contains ambiguous Unicode characters

This file contains Unicode characters that might be confused with other characters. If you think that this is intentional, you can safely ignore this warning. Use the Escape button to reveal them.

/**
* \file psa/crypto_values.h
*
* \brief PSA cryptography module: macros to build and analyze integer values.
*
* \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must
* include psa/crypto.h. Drivers must include the appropriate driver
* header file.
*
* This file contains portable definitions of macros to build and analyze
* values of integral types that encode properties of cryptographic keys,
* designations of cryptographic algorithms, and error codes returned by
* the library.
*
* Note that many of the constants defined in this file are embedded in
* the persistent key store, as part of key metadata (including usage
* policies). As a consequence, they must not be changed (unless the storage
* format version changes).
*
* This header file only defines preprocessor macros.
*/
/*
* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
*/
#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_VALUES_H
#define PSA_CRYPTO_VALUES_H
#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
/** \defgroup error Error codes
* @{
*/
/* PSA error codes */
/* Error codes are standardized across PSA domains (framework, crypto, storage,
* etc.). Do not change the values in this section or even the expansions
* of each macro: it must be possible to `#include` both this header
* and some other PSA component's headers in the same C source,
* which will lead to duplicate definitions of the `PSA_SUCCESS` and
* `PSA_ERROR_xxx` macros, which is ok if and only if the macros expand
* to the same sequence of tokens.
*
* If you must add a new
* value, check with the Arm PSA framework group to pick one that other
* domains aren't already using. */
/* Tell uncrustify not to touch the constant definitions, otherwise
* it might change the spacing to something that is not PSA-compliant
* (e.g. adding a space after casts).
*
* *INDENT-OFF*
*/
/** The action was completed successfully. */
#define PSA_SUCCESS ((psa_status_t)0)
/** An error occurred that does not correspond to any defined
* failure cause.
*
* Implementations may use this error code if none of the other standard
* error codes are applicable. */
#define PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR ((psa_status_t)-132)
/** The requested operation or a parameter is not supported
* by this implementation.
*
* Implementations should return this error code when an enumeration
* parameter such as a key type, algorithm, etc. is not recognized.
* If a combination of parameters is recognized and identified as
* not valid, return #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT instead. */
#define PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ((psa_status_t)-134)
/** The requested action is denied by a policy.
*
* Implementations should return this error code when the parameters
* are recognized as valid and supported, and a policy explicitly
* denies the requested operation.
*
* If a subset of the parameters of a function call identify a
* forbidden operation, and another subset of the parameters are
* not valid or not supported, it is unspecified whether the function
* returns #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED, #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED or
* #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT. */
#define PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED ((psa_status_t)-133)
/** An output buffer is too small.
*
* Applications can call the \c PSA_xxx_SIZE macro listed in the function
* description to determine a sufficient buffer size.
*
* Implementations should preferably return this error code only
* in cases when performing the operation with a larger output
* buffer would succeed. However implementations may return this
* error if a function has invalid or unsupported parameters in addition
* to the parameters that determine the necessary output buffer size. */
#define PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ((psa_status_t)-138)
/** Asking for an item that already exists
*
* Implementations should return this error, when attempting
* to write an item (like a key) that already exists. */
#define PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS ((psa_status_t)-139)
/** Asking for an item that doesn't exist
*
* Implementations should return this error, if a requested item (like
* a key) does not exist. */
#define PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ((psa_status_t)-140)
/** The requested action cannot be performed in the current state.
*
* Multipart operations return this error when one of the
* functions is called out of sequence. Refer to the function
* descriptions for permitted sequencing of functions.
*
* Implementations shall not return this error code to indicate
* that a key either exists or not,
* but shall instead return #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS or #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST
* as applicable.
*
* Implementations shall not return this error code to indicate that a
* key identifier is invalid, but shall return #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
* instead. */
#define PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ((psa_status_t)-137)
/** The parameters passed to the function are invalid.
*
* Implementations may return this error any time a parameter or
* combination of parameters are recognized as invalid.
*
* Implementations shall not return this error code to indicate that a
* key identifier is invalid, but shall return #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
* instead.
*/
#define PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ((psa_status_t)-135)
/** There is not enough runtime memory.
*
* If the action is carried out across multiple security realms, this
* error can refer to available memory in any of the security realms. */
#define PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ((psa_status_t)-141)
/** There is not enough persistent storage.
*
* Functions that modify the key storage return this error code if
* there is insufficient storage space on the host media. In addition,
* many functions that do not otherwise access storage may return this
* error code if the implementation requires a mandatory log entry for
* the requested action and the log storage space is full. */
#define PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE ((psa_status_t)-142)
/** There was a communication failure inside the implementation.
*
* This can indicate a communication failure between the application
* and an external cryptoprocessor or between the cryptoprocessor and
* an external volatile or persistent memory. A communication failure
* may be transient or permanent depending on the cause.
*
* \warning If a function returns this error, it is undetermined
* whether the requested action has completed or not. Implementations
* should return #PSA_SUCCESS on successful completion whenever
* possible, however functions may return #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
* if the requested action was completed successfully in an external
* cryptoprocessor but there was a breakdown of communication before
* the cryptoprocessor could report the status to the application.
*/
#define PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE ((psa_status_t)-145)
/** There was a storage failure that may have led to data loss.
*
* This error indicates that some persistent storage is corrupted.
* It should not be used for a corruption of volatile memory
* (use #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED), for a communication error
* between the cryptoprocessor and its external storage (use
* #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE), or when the storage is
* in a valid state but is full (use #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE).
*
* Note that a storage failure does not indicate that any data that was
* previously read is invalid. However this previously read data may no
* longer be readable from storage.
*
* When a storage failure occurs, it is no longer possible to ensure
* the global integrity of the keystore. Depending on the global
* integrity guarantees offered by the implementation, access to other
* data may or may not fail even if the data is still readable but
* its integrity cannot be guaranteed.
*
* Implementations should only use this error code to report a
* permanent storage corruption. However application writers should
* keep in mind that transient errors while reading the storage may be
* reported using this error code. */
#define PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE ((psa_status_t)-146)
/** A hardware failure was detected.
*
* A hardware failure may be transient or permanent depending on the
* cause. */
#define PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE ((psa_status_t)-147)
/** A tampering attempt was detected.
*
* If an application receives this error code, there is no guarantee
* that previously accessed or computed data was correct and remains
* confidential. Applications should not perform any security function
* and should enter a safe failure state.
*
* Implementations may return this error code if they detect an invalid
* state that cannot happen during normal operation and that indicates
* that the implementation's security guarantees no longer hold. Depending
* on the implementation architecture and on its security and safety goals,
* the implementation may forcibly terminate the application.
*
* This error code is intended as a last resort when a security breach
* is detected and it is unsure whether the keystore data is still
* protected. Implementations shall only return this error code
* to report an alarm from a tampering detector, to indicate that
* the confidentiality of stored data can no longer be guaranteed,
* or to indicate that the integrity of previously returned data is now
* considered compromised. Implementations shall not use this error code
* to indicate a hardware failure that merely makes it impossible to
* perform the requested operation (use #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE,
* #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE, #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE,
* #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY or other applicable error code
* instead).
*
* This error indicates an attack against the application. Implementations
* shall not return this error code as a consequence of the behavior of
* the application itself. */
#define PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED ((psa_status_t)-151)
/** There is not enough entropy to generate random data needed
* for the requested action.
*
* This error indicates a failure of a hardware random generator.
* Application writers should note that this error can be returned not
* only by functions whose purpose is to generate random data, such
* as key, IV or nonce generation, but also by functions that execute
* an algorithm with a randomized result, as well as functions that
* use randomization of intermediate computations as a countermeasure
* to certain attacks.
*
* Implementations should avoid returning this error after psa_crypto_init()
* has succeeded. Implementations should generate sufficient
* entropy during initialization and subsequently use a cryptographically
* secure pseudorandom generator (PRNG). However implementations may return
* this error at any time if a policy requires the PRNG to be reseeded
* during normal operation. */
#define PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY ((psa_status_t)-148)
/** The signature, MAC or hash is incorrect.
*
* Verification functions return this error if the verification
* calculations completed successfully, and the value to be verified
* was determined to be incorrect.
*
* If the value to verify has an invalid size, implementations may return
* either #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT or #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE. */
#define PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ((psa_status_t)-149)
/** The decrypted padding is incorrect.
*
* \warning In some protocols, when decrypting data, it is essential that
* the behavior of the application does not depend on whether the padding
* is correct, down to precise timing. Applications should prefer
* protocols that use authenticated encryption rather than plain
* encryption. If the application must perform a decryption of
* unauthenticated data, the application writer should take care not
* to reveal whether the padding is invalid.
*
* Implementations should strive to make valid and invalid padding
* as close as possible to indistinguishable to an external observer.
* In particular, the timing of a decryption operation should not
* depend on the validity of the padding. */
#define PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING ((psa_status_t)-150)
/** Return this error when there's insufficient data when attempting
* to read from a resource. */
#define PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA ((psa_status_t)-143)
/** This can be returned if a function can no longer operate correctly.
* For example, if an essential initialization operation failed or
* a mutex operation failed. */
#define PSA_ERROR_SERVICE_FAILURE ((psa_status_t)-144)
/** The key identifier is not valid. See also :ref:\`key-handles\`.
*/
#define PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE ((psa_status_t)-136)
/** Stored data has been corrupted.
*
* This error indicates that some persistent storage has suffered corruption.
* It does not indicate the following situations, which have specific error
* codes:
*
* - A corruption of volatile memory - use #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED.
* - A communication error between the cryptoprocessor and its external
* storage - use #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE.
* - When the storage is in a valid state but is full - use
* #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE.
* - When the storage fails for other reasons - use
* #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE.
* - When the stored data is not valid - use #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID.
*
* \note A storage corruption does not indicate that any data that was
* previously read is invalid. However this previously read data might no
* longer be readable from storage.
*
* When a storage failure occurs, it is no longer possible to ensure the
* global integrity of the keystore.
*/
#define PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT ((psa_status_t)-152)
/** Data read from storage is not valid for the implementation.
*
* This error indicates that some data read from storage does not have a valid
* format. It does not indicate the following situations, which have specific
* error codes:
*
* - When the storage or stored data is corrupted - use #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT
* - When the storage fails for other reasons - use #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
* - An invalid argument to the API - use #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
*
* This error is typically a result of either storage corruption on a
* cleartext storage backend, or an attempt to read data that was
* written by an incompatible version of the library.
*/
#define PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID ((psa_status_t)-153)
/** The function that returns this status is defined as interruptible and
* still has work to do, thus the user should call the function again with the
* same operation context until it either returns #PSA_SUCCESS or any other
* error. This is not an error per se, more a notification of status.
*/
#define PSA_OPERATION_INCOMPLETE ((psa_status_t)-248)
/* *INDENT-ON* */
/**@}*/
/** \defgroup crypto_types Key and algorithm types
* @{
*/
/* Note that key type values, including ECC family and DH group values, are
* embedded in the persistent key store, as part of key metadata. As a
* consequence, they must not be changed (unless the storage format version
* changes).
*/
/** An invalid key type value.
*
* Zero is not the encoding of any key type.
*/
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE ((psa_key_type_t) 0x0000)
/** Vendor-defined key type flag.
*
* Key types defined by this standard will never have the
* #PSA_KEY_TYPE_VENDOR_FLAG bit set. Vendors who define additional key types
* must use an encoding with the #PSA_KEY_TYPE_VENDOR_FLAG bit set and should
* respect the bitwise structure used by standard encodings whenever practical.
*/
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_VENDOR_FLAG ((psa_key_type_t) 0x8000)
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK ((psa_key_type_t) 0x7000)
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_RAW ((psa_key_type_t) 0x1000)
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_SYMMETRIC ((psa_key_type_t) 0x2000)
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_PUBLIC_KEY ((psa_key_type_t) 0x4000)
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_KEY_PAIR ((psa_key_type_t) 0x7000)
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_FLAG_PAIR ((psa_key_type_t) 0x3000)
/** Whether a key type is vendor-defined.
*
* See also #PSA_KEY_TYPE_VENDOR_FLAG.
*/
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_VENDOR_DEFINED(type) \
(((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_VENDOR_FLAG) != 0)
/** Whether a key type is an unstructured array of bytes.
*
* This encompasses both symmetric keys and non-key data.
*/
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_UNSTRUCTURED(type) \
(((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_RAW || \
((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_SYMMETRIC)
/** Whether a key type is asymmetric: either a key pair or a public key. */
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ASYMMETRIC(type) \
(((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK \
& ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_FLAG_PAIR) == \
PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_PUBLIC_KEY)
/** Whether a key type is the public part of a key pair. */
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY(type) \
(((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_PUBLIC_KEY)
/** Whether a key type is a key pair containing a private part and a public
* part. */
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR(type) \
(((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_KEY_PAIR)
/** The key pair type corresponding to a public key type.
*
* You may also pass a key pair type as \p type, it will be left unchanged.
*
* \param type A public key type or key pair type.
*
* \return The corresponding key pair type.
* If \p type is not a public key or a key pair,
* the return value is undefined.
*/
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_KEY_PAIR_OF_PUBLIC_KEY(type) \
((type) | PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_FLAG_PAIR)
/** The public key type corresponding to a key pair type.
*
* You may also pass a public key type as \p type, it will be left unchanged.
*
* \param type A public key type or key pair type.
*
* \return The corresponding public key type.
* If \p type is not a public key or a key pair,
* the return value is undefined.
*/
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) \
((type) & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_FLAG_PAIR)
/** Raw data.
*
* A "key" of this type cannot be used for any cryptographic operation.
* Applications may use this type to store arbitrary data in the keystore. */
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA ((psa_key_type_t) 0x1001)
/** HMAC key.
*
* The key policy determines which underlying hash algorithm the key can be
* used for.
*
* HMAC keys should generally have the same size as the underlying hash.
* This size can be calculated with #PSA_HASH_LENGTH(\c alg) where
* \c alg is the HMAC algorithm or the underlying hash algorithm. */
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC ((psa_key_type_t) 0x1100)
/** A secret for key derivation.
*
* This key type is for high-entropy secrets only. For low-entropy secrets,
* #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD should be used instead.
*
* These keys can be used as the #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET or
* #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD input of key derivation algorithms.
*
* The key policy determines which key derivation algorithm the key
* can be used for.
*/
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE ((psa_key_type_t) 0x1200)
/** A low-entropy secret for password hashing or key derivation.
*
* This key type is suitable for passwords and passphrases which are typically
* intended to be memorizable by humans, and have a low entropy relative to
* their size. It can be used for randomly generated or derived keys with
* maximum or near-maximum entropy, but #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE is more suitable
* for such keys. It is not suitable for passwords with extremely low entropy,
* such as numerical PINs.
*
* These keys can be used as the #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD input of
* key derivation algorithms. Algorithms that accept such an input were
* designed to accept low-entropy secret and are known as password hashing or
* key stretching algorithms.
*
* These keys cannot be used as the #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET input of
* key derivation algorithms, as the algorithms that take such an input expect
* it to be high-entropy.
*
* The key policy determines which key derivation algorithm the key can be
* used for, among the permissible subset defined above.
*/
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD ((psa_key_type_t) 0x1203)
/** A secret value that can be used to verify a password hash.
*
* The key policy determines which key derivation algorithm the key
* can be used for, among the same permissible subset as for
* #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD.
*/
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH ((psa_key_type_t) 0x1205)
/** A secret value that can be used in when computing a password hash.
*
* The key policy determines which key derivation algorithm the key
* can be used for, among the subset of algorithms that can use pepper.
*/
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_PEPPER ((psa_key_type_t) 0x1206)
/** Key for a cipher, AEAD or MAC algorithm based on the AES block cipher.
*
* The size of the key can be 16 bytes (AES-128), 24 bytes (AES-192) or
* 32 bytes (AES-256).
*/
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES ((psa_key_type_t) 0x2400)
/** Key for a cipher, AEAD or MAC algorithm based on the
* ARIA block cipher. */
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA ((psa_key_type_t) 0x2406)
/** Key for a cipher or MAC algorithm based on DES or 3DES (Triple-DES).
*
* The size of the key can be 64 bits (single DES), 128 bits (2-key 3DES) or
* 192 bits (3-key 3DES).
*
* Note that single DES and 2-key 3DES are weak and strongly
* deprecated and should only be used to decrypt legacy data. 3-key 3DES
* is weak and deprecated and should only be used in legacy protocols.
*/
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES ((psa_key_type_t) 0x2301)
/** Key for a cipher, AEAD or MAC algorithm based on the
* Camellia block cipher. */
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA ((psa_key_type_t) 0x2403)
/** Key for the ChaCha20 stream cipher or the Chacha20-Poly1305 AEAD algorithm.
*
* ChaCha20 and the ChaCha20_Poly1305 construction are defined in RFC 7539.
*
* \note For ChaCha20 and ChaCha20_Poly1305, Mbed TLS only supports
* 12-byte nonces.
*
* \note For ChaCha20, the initial counter value is 0. To encrypt or decrypt
* with the initial counter value 1, you can process and discard a
* 64-byte block before the real data.
*/
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 ((psa_key_type_t) 0x2004)
/** RSA public key.
*
* The size of an RSA key is the bit size of the modulus.
*/
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY ((psa_key_type_t) 0x4001)
/** RSA key pair (private and public key).
*
* The size of an RSA key is the bit size of the modulus.
*/
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR ((psa_key_type_t) 0x7001)
/** Whether a key type is an RSA key (pair or public-only). */
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(type) \
(PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY)
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE ((psa_key_type_t) 0x4100)
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASE ((psa_key_type_t) 0x7100)
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_CURVE_MASK ((psa_key_type_t) 0x00ff)
/** Elliptic curve key pair.
*
* The size of an elliptic curve key is the bit size associated with the curve,
* i.e. the bit size of *q* for a curve over a field *F<sub>q</sub>*.
* See the documentation of `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx` curve families for details.
*
* \param curve A value of type ::psa_ecc_family_t that
* identifies the ECC curve to be used.
*/
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(curve) \
(PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASE | (curve))
/** Elliptic curve public key.
*
* The size of an elliptic curve public key is the same as the corresponding
* private key (see #PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR and the documentation of
* `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx` curve families).
*
* \param curve A value of type ::psa_ecc_family_t that
* identifies the ECC curve to be used.
*/
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(curve) \
(PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE | (curve))
/** Whether a key type is an elliptic curve key (pair or public-only). */
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(type) \
((PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) & \
~PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_CURVE_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE)
/** Whether a key type is an elliptic curve key pair. */
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(type) \
(((type) & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_CURVE_MASK) == \
PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASE)
/** Whether a key type is an elliptic curve public key. */
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(type) \
(((type) & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_CURVE_MASK) == \
PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE)
/** Extract the curve from an elliptic curve key type. */
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(type) \
((psa_ecc_family_t) (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(type) ? \
((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_CURVE_MASK) : \
0))
/** Check if the curve of given family is Weierstrass elliptic curve. */
#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_IS_WEIERSTRASS(family) ((family & 0xc0) == 0)
/** SEC Koblitz curves over prime fields.
*
* This family comprises the following curves:
* secp192k1, secp224k1, secp256k1.
* They are defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_,
* _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_.
* https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf
*
* \note For secp224k1, the bit-size is 225 (size of a private value).
*
* \note Mbed TLS only supports secp192k1 and secp256k1.
*/
#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x17)
/** SEC random curves over prime fields.
*
* This family comprises the following curves:
* secp192r1, secp224r1, secp256r1, secp384r1, secp521r1.
* They are defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_,
* _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_.
* https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf
*/
#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x12)
/* SECP160R2 (SEC2 v1, obsolete, not supported in Mbed TLS) */
#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x1b)
/** SEC Koblitz curves over binary fields.
*
* This family comprises the following curves:
* sect163k1, sect233k1, sect239k1, sect283k1, sect409k1, sect571k1.
* They are defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_,
* _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_.
* https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf
*
* \note Mbed TLS does not support any curve in this family.
*/
#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x27)
/** SEC random curves over binary fields.
*
* This family comprises the following curves:
* sect163r1, sect233r1, sect283r1, sect409r1, sect571r1.
* They are defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_,
* _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_.
* https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf
*
* \note Mbed TLS does not support any curve in this family.
*/
#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x22)
/** SEC additional random curves over binary fields.
*
* This family comprises the following curve:
* sect163r2.
* It is defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_,
* _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_.
* https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf
*
* \note Mbed TLS does not support any curve in this family.
*/
#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x2b)
/** Brainpool P random curves.
*
* This family comprises the following curves:
* brainpoolP160r1, brainpoolP192r1, brainpoolP224r1, brainpoolP256r1,
* brainpoolP320r1, brainpoolP384r1, brainpoolP512r1.
* It is defined in RFC 5639.
*
* \note Mbed TLS only supports the 256-bit, 384-bit and 512-bit curves
* in this family.
*/
#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x30)
/** Curve25519 and Curve448.
*
* This family comprises the following Montgomery curves:
* - 255-bit: Bernstein et al.,
* _Curve25519: new Diffie-Hellman speed records_, LNCS 3958, 2006.
* The algorithm #PSA_ALG_ECDH performs X25519 when used with this curve.
* - 448-bit: Hamburg,
* _Ed448-Goldilocks, a new elliptic curve_, NIST ECC Workshop, 2015.
* The algorithm #PSA_ALG_ECDH performs X448 when used with this curve.
*/
#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x41)
/** The twisted Edwards curves Ed25519 and Ed448.
*
* These curves are suitable for EdDSA (#PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA for both curves,
* #PSA_ALG_ED25519PH for the 255-bit curve,
* #PSA_ALG_ED448PH for the 448-bit curve).
*
* This family comprises the following twisted Edwards curves:
* - 255-bit: Edwards25519, the twisted Edwards curve birationally equivalent
* to Curve25519.
* Bernstein et al., _Twisted Edwards curves_, Africacrypt 2008.
* - 448-bit: Edwards448, the twisted Edwards curve birationally equivalent
* to Curve448.
* Hamburg, _Ed448-Goldilocks, a new elliptic curve_, NIST ECC Workshop, 2015.
*
* \note Mbed TLS does not support Edwards curves yet.
*/
#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x42)
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE ((psa_key_type_t) 0x4200)
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASE ((psa_key_type_t) 0x7200)
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GROUP_MASK ((psa_key_type_t) 0x00ff)
/** Diffie-Hellman key pair.
*
* \param group A value of type ::psa_dh_family_t that identifies the
* Diffie-Hellman group to be used.
*/
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(group) \
(PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASE | (group))
/** Diffie-Hellman public key.
*
* \param group A value of type ::psa_dh_family_t that identifies the
* Diffie-Hellman group to be used.
*/
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY(group) \
(PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE | (group))
/** Whether a key type is a Diffie-Hellman key (pair or public-only). */
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH(type) \
((PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) & \
~PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GROUP_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE)
/** Whether a key type is a Diffie-Hellman key pair. */
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH_KEY_PAIR(type) \
(((type) & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GROUP_MASK) == \
PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASE)
/** Whether a key type is a Diffie-Hellman public key. */
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH_PUBLIC_KEY(type) \
(((type) & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GROUP_MASK) == \
PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE)
/** Extract the group from a Diffie-Hellman key type. */
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GET_FAMILY(type) \
((psa_dh_family_t) (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH(type) ? \
((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GROUP_MASK) : \
0))
/** Diffie-Hellman groups defined in RFC 7919 Appendix A.
*
* This family includes groups with the following key sizes (in bits):
* 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192. A given implementation may support
* all of these sizes or only a subset.
*/
#define PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919 ((psa_dh_family_t) 0x03)
#define PSA_GET_KEY_TYPE_BLOCK_SIZE_EXPONENT(type) \
(((type) >> 8) & 7)
/** The block size of a block cipher.
*
* \param type A cipher key type (value of type #psa_key_type_t).
*
* \return The block size for a block cipher, or 1 for a stream cipher.
* The return value is undefined if \p type is not a supported
* cipher key type.
*
* \note It is possible to build stream cipher algorithms on top of a block
* cipher, for example CTR mode (#PSA_ALG_CTR).
* This macro only takes the key type into account, so it cannot be
* used to determine the size of the data that #psa_cipher_update()
* might buffer for future processing in general.
*
* \note This macro returns a compile-time constant if its argument is one.
*
* \warning This macro may evaluate its argument multiple times.
*/
#define PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(type) \
(((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_SYMMETRIC ? \
1u << PSA_GET_KEY_TYPE_BLOCK_SIZE_EXPONENT(type) : \
0u)
/* Note that algorithm values are embedded in the persistent key store,
* as part of key metadata. As a consequence, they must not be changed
* (unless the storage format version changes).
*/
/** Vendor-defined algorithm flag.
*
* Algorithms defined by this standard will never have the #PSA_ALG_VENDOR_FLAG
* bit set. Vendors who define additional algorithms must use an encoding with
* the #PSA_ALG_VENDOR_FLAG bit set and should respect the bitwise structure
* used by standard encodings whenever practical.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_VENDOR_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x80000000)
#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x7f000000)
#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000000)
#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MAC ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x03000000)
#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_CIPHER ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x04000000)
#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_AEAD ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x05000000)
#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_SIGN ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06000000)
#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x07000000)
#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x08000000)
#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_AGREEMENT ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x09000000)
/** Whether an algorithm is vendor-defined.
*
* See also #PSA_ALG_VENDOR_FLAG.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_IS_VENDOR_DEFINED(alg) \
(((alg) & PSA_ALG_VENDOR_FLAG) != 0)
/** Whether the specified algorithm is a hash algorithm.
*
* \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
*
* \return 1 if \p alg is a hash algorithm, 0 otherwise.
* This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
* algorithm identifier.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(alg) \
(((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH)
/** Whether the specified algorithm is a MAC algorithm.
*
* \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
*
* \return 1 if \p alg is a MAC algorithm, 0 otherwise.
* This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
* algorithm identifier.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(alg) \
(((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MAC)
/** Whether the specified algorithm is a symmetric cipher algorithm.
*
* \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
*
* \return 1 if \p alg is a symmetric cipher algorithm, 0 otherwise.
* This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
* algorithm identifier.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg) \
(((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_CIPHER)
/** Whether the specified algorithm is an authenticated encryption
* with associated data (AEAD) algorithm.
*
* \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
*
* \return 1 if \p alg is an AEAD algorithm, 0 otherwise.
* This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
* algorithm identifier.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg) \
(((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_AEAD)
/** Whether the specified algorithm is an asymmetric signature algorithm,
* also known as public-key signature algorithm.
*
* \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
*
* \return 1 if \p alg is an asymmetric signature algorithm, 0 otherwise.
* This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
* algorithm identifier.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN(alg) \
(((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_SIGN)
/** Whether the specified algorithm is an asymmetric encryption algorithm,
* also known as public-key encryption algorithm.
*
* \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
*
* \return 1 if \p alg is an asymmetric encryption algorithm, 0 otherwise.
* This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
* algorithm identifier.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_IS_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION(alg) \
(((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION)
/** Whether the specified algorithm is a key agreement algorithm.
*
* \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
*
* \return 1 if \p alg is a key agreement algorithm, 0 otherwise.
* This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
* algorithm identifier.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg) \
(((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_AGREEMENT)
/** Whether the specified algorithm is a key derivation algorithm.
*
* \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
*
* \return 1 if \p alg is a key derivation algorithm, 0 otherwise.
* This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
* algorithm identifier.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(alg) \
(((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION)
/** Whether the specified algorithm is a key stretching / password hashing
* algorithm.
*
* A key stretching / password hashing algorithm is a key derivation algorithm
* that is suitable for use with a low-entropy secret such as a password.
* Equivalently, it's a key derivation algorithm that uses a
* #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD input step.
*
* \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
*
* \return 1 if \p alg is a key stretching / password hashing algorithm, 0
* otherwise. This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a
* supported algorithm identifier.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION_STRETCHING(alg) \
(PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(alg) && \
(alg) & PSA_ALG_KEY_DERIVATION_STRETCHING_FLAG)
/** An invalid algorithm identifier value. */
/* *INDENT-OFF* (https://github.com/ARM-software/psa-arch-tests/issues/337) */
#define PSA_ALG_NONE ((psa_algorithm_t)0)
/* *INDENT-ON* */
#define PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x000000ff)
/** MD5 */
#define PSA_ALG_MD5 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000003)
/** PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160 */
#define PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000004)
/** SHA1 */
#define PSA_ALG_SHA_1 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000005)
/** SHA2-224 */
#define PSA_ALG_SHA_224 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000008)
/** SHA2-256 */
#define PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000009)
/** SHA2-384 */
#define PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x0200000a)
/** SHA2-512 */
#define PSA_ALG_SHA_512 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x0200000b)
/** SHA2-512/224 */
#define PSA_ALG_SHA_512_224 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x0200000c)
/** SHA2-512/256 */
#define PSA_ALG_SHA_512_256 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x0200000d)
/** SHA3-224 */
#define PSA_ALG_SHA3_224 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000010)
/** SHA3-256 */
#define PSA_ALG_SHA3_256 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000011)
/** SHA3-384 */
#define PSA_ALG_SHA3_384 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000012)
/** SHA3-512 */
#define PSA_ALG_SHA3_512 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000013)
/** The first 512 bits (64 bytes) of the SHAKE256 output.
*
* This is the prehashing for Ed448ph (see #PSA_ALG_ED448PH). For other
* scenarios where a hash function based on SHA3/SHAKE is desired, SHA3-512
* has the same output size and a (theoretically) higher security strength.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_SHAKE256_512 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000015)
/** In a hash-and-sign algorithm policy, allow any hash algorithm.
*
* This value may be used to form the algorithm usage field of a policy
* for a signature algorithm that is parametrized by a hash. The key
* may then be used to perform operations using the same signature
* algorithm parametrized with any supported hash.
*
* That is, suppose that `PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE` is one of the following macros:
* - #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN, #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS, #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT,
* - #PSA_ALG_ECDSA, #PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA.
* Then you may create and use a key as follows:
* - Set the key usage field using #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH, for example:
* ```
* psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH); // or VERIFY
* psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH));
* ```
* - Import or generate key material.
* - Call psa_sign_hash() or psa_verify_hash(), passing
* an algorithm built from `PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE` and a specific hash. Each
* call to sign or verify a message may use a different hash.
* ```
* psa_sign_hash(key, PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), ...);
* psa_sign_hash(key, PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE(PSA_ALG_SHA_512), ...);
* psa_sign_hash(key, PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE(PSA_ALG_SHA3_256), ...);
* ```
*
* This value may not be used to build other algorithms that are
* parametrized over a hash. For any valid use of this macro to build
* an algorithm \c alg, #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(\c alg) is true.
*
* This value may not be used to build an algorithm specification to
* perform an operation. It is only valid to build policies.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x020000ff)
#define PSA_ALG_MAC_SUBCATEGORY_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x00c00000)
#define PSA_ALG_HMAC_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x03800000)
/** Macro to build an HMAC algorithm.
*
* For example, #PSA_ALG_HMAC(#PSA_ALG_SHA_256) is HMAC-SHA-256.
*
* \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
* #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
*
* \return The corresponding HMAC algorithm.
* \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
* hash algorithm.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_HMAC(hash_alg) \
(PSA_ALG_HMAC_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
#define PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(hmac_alg) \
(PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | ((hmac_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
/** Whether the specified algorithm is an HMAC algorithm.
*
* HMAC is a family of MAC algorithms that are based on a hash function.
*
* \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
*
* \return 1 if \p alg is an HMAC algorithm, 0 otherwise.
* This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
* algorithm identifier.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC(alg) \
(((alg) & (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK | PSA_ALG_MAC_SUBCATEGORY_MASK)) == \
PSA_ALG_HMAC_BASE)
/* In the encoding of a MAC algorithm, the bits corresponding to
* PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK encode the length to which the MAC is
* truncated. As an exception, the value 0 means the untruncated algorithm,
* whatever its length is. The length is encoded in 6 bits, so it can
* reach up to 63; the largest MAC is 64 bytes so its trivial truncation
* to full length is correctly encoded as 0 and any non-trivial truncation
* is correctly encoded as a value between 1 and 63. */
#define PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x003f0000)
#define PSA_MAC_TRUNCATION_OFFSET 16
/* In the encoding of a MAC algorithm, the bit corresponding to
* #PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG encodes the fact that the algorithm
* is a wildcard algorithm. A key with such wildcard algorithm as permitted
* algorithm policy can be used with any algorithm corresponding to the
* same base class and having a (potentially truncated) MAC length greater or
* equal than the one encoded in #PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK. */
#define PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x00008000)
/** Macro to build a truncated MAC algorithm.
*
* A truncated MAC algorithm is identical to the corresponding MAC
* algorithm except that the MAC value for the truncated algorithm
* consists of only the first \p mac_length bytes of the MAC value
* for the untruncated algorithm.
*
* \note This macro may allow constructing algorithm identifiers that
* are not valid, either because the specified length is larger
* than the untruncated MAC or because the specified length is
* smaller than permitted by the implementation.
*
* \note It is implementation-defined whether a truncated MAC that
* is truncated to the same length as the MAC of the untruncated
* algorithm is considered identical to the untruncated algorithm
* for policy comparison purposes.
*
* \param mac_alg A MAC algorithm identifier (value of type
* #psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p mac_alg)
* is true). This may be a truncated or untruncated
* MAC algorithm.
* \param mac_length Desired length of the truncated MAC in bytes.
* This must be at most the full length of the MAC
* and must be at least an implementation-specified
* minimum. The implementation-specified minimum
* shall not be zero.
*
* \return The corresponding MAC algorithm with the specified
* length.
* \return Unspecified if \p mac_alg is not a supported
* MAC algorithm or if \p mac_length is too small or
* too large for the specified MAC algorithm.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(mac_alg, mac_length) \
(((mac_alg) & ~(PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK | \
PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG)) | \
((mac_length) << PSA_MAC_TRUNCATION_OFFSET & PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK))
/** Macro to build the base MAC algorithm corresponding to a truncated
* MAC algorithm.
*
* \param mac_alg A MAC algorithm identifier (value of type
* #psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p mac_alg)
* is true). This may be a truncated or untruncated
* MAC algorithm.
*
* \return The corresponding base MAC algorithm.
* \return Unspecified if \p mac_alg is not a supported
* MAC algorithm.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC(mac_alg) \
((mac_alg) & ~(PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK | \
PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG))
/** Length to which a MAC algorithm is truncated.
*
* \param mac_alg A MAC algorithm identifier (value of type
* #psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p mac_alg)
* is true).
*
* \return Length of the truncated MAC in bytes.
* \return 0 if \p mac_alg is a non-truncated MAC algorithm.
* \return Unspecified if \p mac_alg is not a supported
* MAC algorithm.
*/
#define PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH(mac_alg) \
(((mac_alg) & PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK) >> PSA_MAC_TRUNCATION_OFFSET)
/** Macro to build a MAC minimum-MAC-length wildcard algorithm.
*
* A minimum-MAC-length MAC wildcard algorithm permits all MAC algorithms
* sharing the same base algorithm, and where the (potentially truncated) MAC
* length of the specific algorithm is equal to or larger then the wildcard
* algorithm's minimum MAC length.
*
* \note When setting the minimum required MAC length to less than the
* smallest MAC length allowed by the base algorithm, this effectively
* becomes an 'any-MAC-length-allowed' policy for that base algorithm.
*
* \param mac_alg A MAC algorithm identifier (value of type
* #psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p mac_alg)
* is true).
* \param min_mac_length Desired minimum length of the message authentication
* code in bytes. This must be at most the untruncated
* length of the MAC and must be at least 1.
*
* \return The corresponding MAC wildcard algorithm with the
* specified minimum length.
* \return Unspecified if \p mac_alg is not a supported MAC
* algorithm or if \p min_mac_length is less than 1 or
* too large for the specified MAC algorithm.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(mac_alg, min_mac_length) \
(PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(mac_alg, min_mac_length) | \
PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG)
#define PSA_ALG_CIPHER_MAC_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x03c00000)
/** The CBC-MAC construction over a block cipher
*
* \warning CBC-MAC is insecure in many cases.
* A more secure mode, such as #PSA_ALG_CMAC, is recommended.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x03c00100)
/** The CMAC construction over a block cipher */
#define PSA_ALG_CMAC ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x03c00200)
/** Whether the specified algorithm is a MAC algorithm based on a block cipher.
*
* \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
*
* \return 1 if \p alg is a MAC algorithm based on a block cipher, 0 otherwise.
* This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
* algorithm identifier.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_IS_BLOCK_CIPHER_MAC(alg) \
(((alg) & (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK | PSA_ALG_MAC_SUBCATEGORY_MASK)) == \
PSA_ALG_CIPHER_MAC_BASE)
#define PSA_ALG_CIPHER_STREAM_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x00800000)
#define PSA_ALG_CIPHER_FROM_BLOCK_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x00400000)
/** Whether the specified algorithm is a stream cipher.
*
* A stream cipher is a symmetric cipher that encrypts or decrypts messages
* by applying a bitwise-xor with a stream of bytes that is generated
* from a key.
*
* \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
*
* \return 1 if \p alg is a stream cipher algorithm, 0 otherwise.
* This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
* algorithm identifier or if it is not a symmetric cipher algorithm.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_IS_STREAM_CIPHER(alg) \
(((alg) & (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK | PSA_ALG_CIPHER_STREAM_FLAG)) == \
(PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_CIPHER | PSA_ALG_CIPHER_STREAM_FLAG))
/** The stream cipher mode of a stream cipher algorithm.
*
* The underlying stream cipher is determined by the key type.
* - To use ChaCha20, use a key type of #PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x04800100)
/** The CTR stream cipher mode.
*
* CTR is a stream cipher which is built from a block cipher.
* The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type.
* For example, to use AES-128-CTR, use this algorithm with
* a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES and a length of 128 bits (16 bytes).
*/
#define PSA_ALG_CTR ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x04c01000)
/** The CFB stream cipher mode.
*
* The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_CFB ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x04c01100)
/** The OFB stream cipher mode.
*
* The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_OFB ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x04c01200)
/** The XTS cipher mode.
*
* XTS is a cipher mode which is built from a block cipher. It requires at
* least one full block of input, but beyond this minimum the input
* does not need to be a whole number of blocks.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_XTS ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x0440ff00)
/** The Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode of a block cipher, with no padding.
*
* \warning ECB mode does not protect the confidentiality of the encrypted data
* except in extremely narrow circumstances. It is recommended that applications
* only use ECB if they need to construct an operating mode that the
* implementation does not provide. Implementations are encouraged to provide
* the modes that applications need in preference to supporting direct access
* to ECB.
*
* The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type.
*
* This symmetric cipher mode can only be used with messages whose lengths are a
* multiple of the block size of the chosen block cipher.
*
* ECB mode does not accept an initialization vector (IV). When using a
* multi-part cipher operation with this algorithm, psa_cipher_generate_iv()
* and psa_cipher_set_iv() must not be called.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x04404400)
/** The CBC block cipher chaining mode, with no padding.
*
* The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type.
*
* This symmetric cipher mode can only be used with messages whose lengths
* are whole number of blocks for the chosen block cipher.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x04404000)
/** The CBC block cipher chaining mode with PKCS#7 padding.
*
* The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type.
*
* This is the padding method defined by PKCS#7 (RFC 2315) &sect;10.3.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x04404100)
#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_FROM_BLOCK_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x00400000)
/** Whether the specified algorithm is an AEAD mode on a block cipher.
*
* \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
*
* \return 1 if \p alg is an AEAD algorithm which is an AEAD mode based on
* a block cipher, 0 otherwise.
* This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
* algorithm identifier.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER(alg) \
(((alg) & (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK | PSA_ALG_AEAD_FROM_BLOCK_FLAG)) == \
(PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_AEAD | PSA_ALG_AEAD_FROM_BLOCK_FLAG))
/** The CCM authenticated encryption algorithm.
*
* The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_CCM ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x05500100)
/** The CCM* cipher mode without authentication.
*
* This is CCM* as specified in IEEE 802.15.4 §7, with a tag length of 0.
* For CCM* with a nonzero tag length, use the AEAD algorithm #PSA_ALG_CCM.
*
* The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type.
*
* Currently only 13-byte long IV's are supported.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x04c01300)
/** The GCM authenticated encryption algorithm.
*
* The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_GCM ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x05500200)
/** The Chacha20-Poly1305 AEAD algorithm.
*
* The ChaCha20_Poly1305 construction is defined in RFC 7539.
*
* Implementations must support 12-byte nonces, may support 8-byte nonces,
* and should reject other sizes.
*
* Implementations must support 16-byte tags and should reject other sizes.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x05100500)
/* In the encoding of an AEAD algorithm, the bits corresponding to
* PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK encode the length of the AEAD tag.
* The constants for default lengths follow this encoding.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x003f0000)
#define PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_OFFSET 16
/* In the encoding of an AEAD algorithm, the bit corresponding to
* #PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG encodes the fact that the algorithm
* is a wildcard algorithm. A key with such wildcard algorithm as permitted
* algorithm policy can be used with any algorithm corresponding to the
* same base class and having a tag length greater than or equal to the one
* encoded in #PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK. */
#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x00008000)
/** Macro to build a shortened AEAD algorithm.
*
* A shortened AEAD algorithm is similar to the corresponding AEAD
* algorithm, but has an authentication tag that consists of fewer bytes.
* Depending on the algorithm, the tag length may affect the calculation
* of the ciphertext.
*
* \param aead_alg An AEAD algorithm identifier (value of type
* #psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p aead_alg)
* is true).
* \param tag_length Desired length of the authentication tag in bytes.
*
* \return The corresponding AEAD algorithm with the specified
* length.
* \return Unspecified if \p aead_alg is not a supported
* AEAD algorithm or if \p tag_length is not valid
* for the specified AEAD algorithm.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(aead_alg, tag_length) \
(((aead_alg) & ~(PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK | \
PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG)) | \
((tag_length) << PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_OFFSET & \
PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK))
/** Retrieve the tag length of a specified AEAD algorithm
*
* \param aead_alg An AEAD algorithm identifier (value of type
* #psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p aead_alg)
* is true).
*
* \return The tag length specified by the input algorithm.
* \return Unspecified if \p aead_alg is not a supported
* AEAD algorithm.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH(aead_alg) \
(((aead_alg) & PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK) >> \
PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_OFFSET)
/** Calculate the corresponding AEAD algorithm with the default tag length.
*
* \param aead_alg An AEAD algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
* #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p aead_alg) is true).
*
* \return The corresponding AEAD algorithm with the default
* tag length for that algorithm.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG(aead_alg) \
( \
PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG_CASE(aead_alg, PSA_ALG_CCM) \
PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG_CASE(aead_alg, PSA_ALG_GCM) \
PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG_CASE(aead_alg, PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) \
0)
#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG_CASE(aead_alg, ref) \
PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(aead_alg, 0) == \
PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(ref, 0) ? \
ref :
/** Macro to build an AEAD minimum-tag-length wildcard algorithm.
*
* A minimum-tag-length AEAD wildcard algorithm permits all AEAD algorithms
* sharing the same base algorithm, and where the tag length of the specific
* algorithm is equal to or larger then the minimum tag length specified by the
* wildcard algorithm.
*
* \note When setting the minimum required tag length to less than the
* smallest tag length allowed by the base algorithm, this effectively
* becomes an 'any-tag-length-allowed' policy for that base algorithm.
*
* \param aead_alg An AEAD algorithm identifier (value of type
* #psa_algorithm_t such that
* #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p aead_alg) is true).
* \param min_tag_length Desired minimum length of the authentication tag in
* bytes. This must be at least 1 and at most the largest
* allowed tag length of the algorithm.
*
* \return The corresponding AEAD wildcard algorithm with the
* specified minimum length.
* \return Unspecified if \p aead_alg is not a supported
* AEAD algorithm or if \p min_tag_length is less than 1
* or too large for the specified AEAD algorithm.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(aead_alg, min_tag_length) \
(PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(aead_alg, min_tag_length) | \
PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG)
#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06000200)
/** RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature with hashing.
*
* This is the signature scheme defined by RFC 8017
* (PKCS#1: RSA Cryptography Specifications) under the name
* RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5.
*
* \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
* #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
* This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH
* when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy.
*
* \return The corresponding RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature algorithm.
* \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
* hash algorithm.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(hash_alg) \
(PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
/** Raw PKCS#1 v1.5 signature.
*
* The input to this algorithm is the DigestInfo structure used by
* RFC 8017 (PKCS#1: RSA Cryptography Specifications), &sect;9.2
* steps 3&ndash;6.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_BASE
#define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(alg) \
(((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_BASE)
#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06000300)
#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06001300)
/** RSA PSS signature with hashing.
*
* This is the signature scheme defined by RFC 8017
* (PKCS#1: RSA Cryptography Specifications) under the name
* RSASSA-PSS, with the message generation function MGF1, and with
* a salt length equal to the length of the hash, or the largest
* possible salt length for the algorithm and key size if that is
* smaller than the hash length. The specified hash algorithm is
* used to hash the input message, to create the salted hash, and
* for the mask generation.
*
* \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
* #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
* This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH
* when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy.
*
* \return The corresponding RSA PSS signature algorithm.
* \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
* hash algorithm.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(hash_alg) \
(PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
/** RSA PSS signature with hashing with relaxed verification.
*
* This algorithm has the same behavior as #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS when signing,
* but allows an arbitrary salt length (including \c 0) when verifying a
* signature.
*
* \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
* #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
* This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH
* when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy.
*
* \return The corresponding RSA PSS signature algorithm.
* \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
* hash algorithm.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(hash_alg) \
(PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
/** Whether the specified algorithm is RSA PSS with standard salt.
*
* \param alg An algorithm value or an algorithm policy wildcard.
*
* \return 1 if \p alg is of the form
* #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(\c hash_alg),
* where \c hash_alg is a hash algorithm or
* #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH. 0 otherwise.
* This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not
* a supported algorithm identifier or policy.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_STANDARD_SALT(alg) \
(((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_BASE)
/** Whether the specified algorithm is RSA PSS with any salt.
*
* \param alg An algorithm value or an algorithm policy wildcard.
*
* \return 1 if \p alg is of the form
* #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT_BASE(\c hash_alg),
* where \c hash_alg is a hash algorithm or
* #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH. 0 otherwise.
* This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not
* a supported algorithm identifier or policy.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(alg) \
(((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT_BASE)
/** Whether the specified algorithm is RSA PSS.
*
* This includes any of the RSA PSS algorithm variants, regardless of the
* constraints on salt length.
*
* \param alg An algorithm value or an algorithm policy wildcard.
*
* \return 1 if \p alg is of the form
* #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(\c hash_alg) or
* #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT_BASE(\c hash_alg),
* where \c hash_alg is a hash algorithm or
* #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH. 0 otherwise.
* This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not
* a supported algorithm identifier or policy.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(alg) \
(PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_STANDARD_SALT(alg) || \
PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(alg))
#define PSA_ALG_ECDSA_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06000600)
/** ECDSA signature with hashing.
*
* This is the ECDSA signature scheme defined by ANSI X9.62,
* with a random per-message secret number (*k*).
*
* The representation of the signature as a byte string consists of
* the concatenation of the signature values *r* and *s*. Each of
* *r* and *s* is encoded as an *N*-octet string, where *N* is the length
* of the base point of the curve in octets. Each value is represented
* in big-endian order (most significant octet first).
*
* \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
* #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
* This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH
* when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy.
*
* \return The corresponding ECDSA signature algorithm.
* \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
* hash algorithm.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_ECDSA(hash_alg) \
(PSA_ALG_ECDSA_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
/** ECDSA signature without hashing.
*
* This is the same signature scheme as #PSA_ALG_ECDSA(), but
* without specifying a hash algorithm. This algorithm may only be
* used to sign or verify a sequence of bytes that should be an
* already-calculated hash. Note that the input is padded with
* zeros on the left or truncated on the left as required to fit
* the curve size.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY PSA_ALG_ECDSA_BASE
#define PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06000700)
/** Deterministic ECDSA signature with hashing.
*
* This is the deterministic ECDSA signature scheme defined by RFC 6979.
*
* The representation of a signature is the same as with #PSA_ALG_ECDSA().
*
* Note that when this algorithm is used for verification, signatures
* made with randomized ECDSA (#PSA_ALG_ECDSA(\p hash_alg)) with the
* same private key are accepted. In other words,
* #PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(\p hash_alg) differs from
* #PSA_ALG_ECDSA(\p hash_alg) only for signature, not for verification.
*
* \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
* #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
* This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH
* when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy.
*
* \return The corresponding deterministic ECDSA signature
* algorithm.
* \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
* hash algorithm.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(hash_alg) \
(PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
#define PSA_ALG_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x00000100)
#define PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg) \
(((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK & ~PSA_ALG_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG) == \
PSA_ALG_ECDSA_BASE)
#define PSA_ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg) \
(((alg) & PSA_ALG_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG) != 0)
#define PSA_ALG_IS_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(alg) \
(PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg) && PSA_ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg))
#define PSA_ALG_IS_RANDOMIZED_ECDSA(alg) \
(PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg) && !PSA_ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg))
/** Edwards-curve digital signature algorithm without prehashing (PureEdDSA),
* using standard parameters.
*
* Contexts are not supported in the current version of this specification
* because there is no suitable signature interface that can take the
* context as a parameter. A future version of this specification may add
* suitable functions and extend this algorithm to support contexts.
*
* PureEdDSA requires an elliptic curve key on a twisted Edwards curve.
* In this specification, the following curves are supported:
* - #PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS, 255-bit: Ed25519 as specified
* in RFC 8032.
* The curve is Edwards25519.
* The hash function used internally is SHA-512.
* - #PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS, 448-bit: Ed448 as specified
* in RFC 8032.
* The curve is Edwards448.
* The hash function used internally is the first 114 bytes of the
* SHAKE256 output.
*
* This algorithm can be used with psa_sign_message() and
* psa_verify_message(). Since there is no prehashing, it cannot be used
* with psa_sign_hash() or psa_verify_hash().
*
* The signature format is the concatenation of R and S as defined by
* RFC 8032 §5.1.6 and §5.2.6 (a 64-byte string for Ed25519, a 114-byte
* string for Ed448).
*/
#define PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06000800)
#define PSA_ALG_HASH_EDDSA_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06000900)
#define PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_EDDSA(alg) \
(((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_HASH_EDDSA_BASE)
/** Edwards-curve digital signature algorithm with prehashing (HashEdDSA),
* using SHA-512 and the Edwards25519 curve.
*
* See #PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA regarding context support and the signature format.
*
* This algorithm is Ed25519 as specified in RFC 8032.
* The curve is Edwards25519.
* The prehash is SHA-512.
* The hash function used internally is SHA-512.
*
* This is a hash-and-sign algorithm: to calculate a signature,
* you can either:
* - call psa_sign_message() on the message;
* - or calculate the SHA-512 hash of the message
* with psa_hash_compute()
* or with a multi-part hash operation started with psa_hash_setup(),
* using the hash algorithm #PSA_ALG_SHA_512,
* then sign the calculated hash with psa_sign_hash().
* Verifying a signature is similar, using psa_verify_message() or
* psa_verify_hash() instead of the signature function.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_ED25519PH \
(PSA_ALG_HASH_EDDSA_BASE | (PSA_ALG_SHA_512 & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
/** Edwards-curve digital signature algorithm with prehashing (HashEdDSA),
* using SHAKE256 and the Edwards448 curve.
*
* See #PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA regarding context support and the signature format.
*
* This algorithm is Ed448 as specified in RFC 8032.
* The curve is Edwards448.
* The prehash is the first 64 bytes of the SHAKE256 output.
* The hash function used internally is the first 114 bytes of the
* SHAKE256 output.
*
* This is a hash-and-sign algorithm: to calculate a signature,
* you can either:
* - call psa_sign_message() on the message;
* - or calculate the first 64 bytes of the SHAKE256 output of the message
* with psa_hash_compute()
* or with a multi-part hash operation started with psa_hash_setup(),
* using the hash algorithm #PSA_ALG_SHAKE256_512,
* then sign the calculated hash with psa_sign_hash().
* Verifying a signature is similar, using psa_verify_message() or
* psa_verify_hash() instead of the signature function.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_ED448PH \
(PSA_ALG_HASH_EDDSA_BASE | (PSA_ALG_SHAKE256_512 & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
/* Default definition, to be overridden if the library is extended with
* more hash-and-sign algorithms that we want to keep out of this header
* file. */
#define PSA_ALG_IS_VENDOR_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg) 0
/** Whether the specified algorithm is a signature algorithm that can be used
* with psa_sign_hash() and psa_verify_hash().
*
* This encompasses all strict hash-and-sign algorithms categorized by
* PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(), as well as algorithms that follow the
* paradigm more loosely:
* - #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW (expects its input to be an encoded hash)
* - #PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY (doesn't specify what kind of hash the input is)
*
* \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type psa_algorithm_t).
*
* \return 1 if alg is a signature algorithm that can be used to sign a
* hash. 0 if alg is a signature algorithm that can only be used
* to sign a message. 0 if alg is not a signature algorithm.
* This macro can return either 0 or 1 if alg is not a
* supported algorithm identifier.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(alg) \
(PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(alg) || PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(alg) || \
PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg) || PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_EDDSA(alg) || \
PSA_ALG_IS_VENDOR_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg))
/** Whether the specified algorithm is a signature algorithm that can be used
* with psa_sign_message() and psa_verify_message().
*
* \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
*
* \return 1 if alg is a signature algorithm that can be used to sign a
* message. 0 if \p alg is a signature algorithm that can only be used
* to sign an already-calculated hash. 0 if \p alg is not a signature
* algorithm. This macro can return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a
* supported algorithm identifier.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_MESSAGE(alg) \
(PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(alg) || (alg) == PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA)
/** Whether the specified algorithm is a hash-and-sign algorithm.
*
* Hash-and-sign algorithms are asymmetric (public-key) signature algorithms
* structured in two parts: first the calculation of a hash in a way that
* does not depend on the key, then the calculation of a signature from the
* hash value and the key. Hash-and-sign algorithms encode the hash
* used for the hashing step, and you can call #PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH
* to extract this algorithm.
*
* Thus, for a hash-and-sign algorithm,
* `psa_sign_message(key, alg, input, ...)` is equivalent to
* ```
* psa_hash_compute(PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(alg), input, ..., hash, ...);
* psa_sign_hash(key, alg, hash, ..., signature, ...);
* ```
* Most usefully, separating the hash from the signature allows the hash
* to be calculated in multiple steps with psa_hash_setup(), psa_hash_update()
* and psa_hash_finish(). Likewise psa_verify_message() is equivalent to
* calculating the hash and then calling psa_verify_hash().
*
* \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
*
* \return 1 if \p alg is a hash-and-sign algorithm, 0 otherwise.
* This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
* algorithm identifier.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg) \
(PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(alg) && \
((alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) != 0)
/** Get the hash used by a hash-and-sign signature algorithm.
*
* A hash-and-sign algorithm is a signature algorithm which is
* composed of two phases: first a hashing phase which does not use
* the key and produces a hash of the input message, then a signing
* phase which only uses the hash and the key and not the message
* itself.
*
* \param alg A signature algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
* #PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN(\p alg) is true).
*
* \return The underlying hash algorithm if \p alg is a hash-and-sign
* algorithm.
* \return 0 if \p alg is a signature algorithm that does not
* follow the hash-and-sign structure.
* \return Unspecified if \p alg is not a signature algorithm or
* if it is not supported by the implementation.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(alg) \
(PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg) ? \
((alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) | PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH : \
0)
/** RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 encryption.
*
* \warning Calling psa_asymmetric_decrypt() with this algorithm as a
* parameter is considered an inherently dangerous function
* (CWE-242). Unless it is used in a side channel free and safe
* way (eg. implementing the TLS protocol as per 7.4.7.1 of
* RFC 5246), the calling code is vulnerable.
*
*/
#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x07000200)
#define PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x07000300)
/** RSA OAEP encryption.
*
* This is the encryption scheme defined by RFC 8017
* (PKCS#1: RSA Cryptography Specifications) under the name
* RSAES-OAEP, with the message generation function MGF1.
*
* \param hash_alg The hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
* #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true) to use
* for MGF1.
*
* \return The corresponding RSA OAEP encryption algorithm.
* \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
* hash algorithm.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(hash_alg) \
(PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
#define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP(alg) \
(((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_BASE)
#define PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_GET_HASH(alg) \
(PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP(alg) ? \
((alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) | PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH : \
0)
#define PSA_ALG_HKDF_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x08000100)
/** Macro to build an HKDF algorithm.
*
* For example, `PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)` is HKDF using HMAC-SHA-256.
*
* This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs:
* - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT is the salt used in the "extract" step.
* It is optional; if omitted, the derivation uses an empty salt.
* - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the secret key used in the "extract" step.
* - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO is the info string used in the "expand" step.
* You must pass #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT before #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET.
* You may pass #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO at any time after steup and before
* starting to generate output.
*
* \warning HKDF processes the salt as follows: first hash it with hash_alg
* if the salt is longer than the block size of the hash algorithm; then
* pad with null bytes up to the block size. As a result, it is possible
* for distinct salt inputs to result in the same outputs. To ensure
* unique outputs, it is recommended to use a fixed length for salt values.
*
* \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
* #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
*
* \return The corresponding HKDF algorithm.
* \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
* hash algorithm.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_HKDF(hash_alg) \
(PSA_ALG_HKDF_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
/** Whether the specified algorithm is an HKDF algorithm.
*
* HKDF is a family of key derivation algorithms that are based on a hash
* function and the HMAC construction.
*
* \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
*
* \return 1 if \c alg is an HKDF algorithm, 0 otherwise.
* This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported
* key derivation algorithm identifier.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF(alg) \
(((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_HKDF_BASE)
#define PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH(hkdf_alg) \
(PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | ((hkdf_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
#define PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x08000400)
/** Macro to build an HKDF-Extract algorithm.
*
* For example, `PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)` is
* HKDF-Extract using HMAC-SHA-256.
*
* This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs:
* - PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT is the salt.
* - PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the input keying material used in the
* "extract" step.
* The inputs are mandatory and must be passed in the order above.
* Each input may only be passed once.
*
* \warning HKDF-Extract is not meant to be used on its own. PSA_ALG_HKDF
* should be used instead if possible. PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT is provided
* as a separate algorithm for the sake of protocols that use it as a
* building block. It may also be a slight performance optimization
* in applications that use HKDF with the same salt and key but many
* different info strings.
*
* \warning HKDF processes the salt as follows: first hash it with hash_alg
* if the salt is longer than the block size of the hash algorithm; then
* pad with null bytes up to the block size. As a result, it is possible
* for distinct salt inputs to result in the same outputs. To ensure
* unique outputs, it is recommended to use a fixed length for salt values.
*
* \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
* #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
*
* \return The corresponding HKDF-Extract algorithm.
* \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
* hash algorithm.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(hash_alg) \
(PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
/** Whether the specified algorithm is an HKDF-Extract algorithm.
*
* HKDF-Extract is a family of key derivation algorithms that are based
* on a hash function and the HMAC construction.
*
* \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
*
* \return 1 if \c alg is an HKDF-Extract algorithm, 0 otherwise.
* This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported
* key derivation algorithm identifier.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXTRACT(alg) \
(((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT_BASE)
#define PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x08000500)
/** Macro to build an HKDF-Expand algorithm.
*
* For example, `PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)` is
* HKDF-Expand using HMAC-SHA-256.
*
* This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs:
* - PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the pseudorandom key (PRK).
* - PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO is the info string.
*
* The inputs are mandatory and must be passed in the order above.
* Each input may only be passed once.
*
* \warning HKDF-Expand is not meant to be used on its own. `PSA_ALG_HKDF`
* should be used instead if possible. `PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND` is provided as
* a separate algorithm for the sake of protocols that use it as a building
* block. It may also be a slight performance optimization in applications
* that use HKDF with the same salt and key but many different info strings.
*
* \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
* #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
*
* \return The corresponding HKDF-Expand algorithm.
* \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
* hash algorithm.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(hash_alg) \
(PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
/** Whether the specified algorithm is an HKDF-Expand algorithm.
*
* HKDF-Expand is a family of key derivation algorithms that are based
* on a hash function and the HMAC construction.
*
* \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
*
* \return 1 if \c alg is an HKDF-Expand algorithm, 0 otherwise.
* This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported
* key derivation algorithm identifier.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXPAND(alg) \
(((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND_BASE)
/** Whether the specified algorithm is an HKDF or HKDF-Extract or
* HKDF-Expand algorithm.
*
*
* \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
*
* \return 1 if \c alg is any HKDF type algorithm, 0 otherwise.
* This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported
* key derivation algorithm identifier.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_IS_ANY_HKDF(alg) \
(((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_HKDF_BASE || \
((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT_BASE || \
((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND_BASE)
#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x08000200)
/** Macro to build a TLS-1.2 PRF algorithm.
*
* TLS 1.2 uses a custom pseudorandom function (PRF) for key schedule,
* specified in Section 5 of RFC 5246. It is based on HMAC and can be
* used with either SHA-256 or SHA-384.
*
* This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs, which must be
* passed in the order given here:
* - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED is the seed.
* - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the secret key.
* - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL is the label.
*
* For the application to TLS-1.2 key expansion, the seed is the
* concatenation of ServerHello.Random + ClientHello.Random,
* and the label is "key expansion".
*
* For example, `PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)` represents the
* TLS 1.2 PRF using HMAC-SHA-256.
*
* \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
* #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
*
* \return The corresponding TLS-1.2 PRF algorithm.
* \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
* hash algorithm.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(hash_alg) \
(PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
/** Whether the specified algorithm is a TLS-1.2 PRF algorithm.
*
* \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
*
* \return 1 if \c alg is a TLS-1.2 PRF algorithm, 0 otherwise.
* This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported
* key derivation algorithm identifier.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF(alg) \
(((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF_BASE)
#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF_GET_HASH(hkdf_alg) \
(PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | ((hkdf_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x08000300)
/** Macro to build a TLS-1.2 PSK-to-MasterSecret algorithm.
*
* In a pure-PSK handshake in TLS 1.2, the master secret is derived
* from the PreSharedKey (PSK) through the application of padding
* (RFC 4279, Section 2) and the TLS-1.2 PRF (RFC 5246, Section 5).
* The latter is based on HMAC and can be used with either SHA-256
* or SHA-384.
*
* This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs, which must be
* passed in the order given here:
* - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED is the seed.
* - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_OTHER_SECRET is the other secret for the
* computation of the premaster secret. This input is optional;
* if omitted, it defaults to a string of null bytes with the same length
* as the secret (PSK) input.
* - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the secret key.
* - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL is the label.
*
* For the application to TLS-1.2, the seed (which is
* forwarded to the TLS-1.2 PRF) is the concatenation of the
* ClientHello.Random + ServerHello.Random,
* the label is "master secret" or "extended master secret" and
* the other secret depends on the key exchange specified in the cipher suite:
* - for a plain PSK cipher suite (RFC 4279, Section 2), omit
* PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_OTHER_SECRET
* - for a DHE-PSK (RFC 4279, Section 3) or ECDHE-PSK cipher suite
* (RFC 5489, Section 2), the other secret should be the output of the
* PSA_ALG_FFDH or PSA_ALG_ECDH key agreement performed with the peer.
* The recommended way to pass this input is to use a key derivation
* algorithm constructed as
* PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(ka_alg, PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(hash_alg))
* and to call psa_key_derivation_key_agreement(). Alternatively,
* this input may be an output of `psa_raw_key_agreement()` passed with
* psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(), or an equivalent input passed with
* psa_key_derivation_input_bytes() or psa_key_derivation_input_key().
* - for a RSA-PSK cipher suite (RFC 4279, Section 4), the other secret
* should be the 48-byte client challenge (the PreMasterSecret of
* (RFC 5246, Section 7.4.7.1)) concatenation of the TLS version and
* a 46-byte random string chosen by the client. On the server, this is
* typically an output of psa_asymmetric_decrypt() using
* PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT, passed to the key derivation operation
* with `psa_key_derivation_input_bytes()`.
*
* For example, `PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)` represents the
* TLS-1.2 PSK to MasterSecret derivation PRF using HMAC-SHA-256.
*
* \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
* #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
*
* \return The corresponding TLS-1.2 PSK to MS algorithm.
* \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
* hash algorithm.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(hash_alg) \
(PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
/** Whether the specified algorithm is a TLS-1.2 PSK to MS algorithm.
*
* \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
*
* \return 1 if \c alg is a TLS-1.2 PSK to MS algorithm, 0 otherwise.
* This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported
* key derivation algorithm identifier.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(alg) \
(((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_BASE)
#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_GET_HASH(hkdf_alg) \
(PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | ((hkdf_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
/* The TLS 1.2 ECJPAKE-to-PMS KDF. It takes the shared secret K (an EC point
* in case of EC J-PAKE) and calculates SHA256(K.X) that the rest of TLS 1.2
* will use to derive the session secret, as defined by step 2 of
* https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-cragie-tls-ecjpake-01#section-8.7.
* Uses PSA_ALG_SHA_256.
* This function takes a single input:
* #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the shared secret K from EC J-PAKE.
* The only supported curve is secp256r1 (the 256-bit curve in
* #PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1), so the input must be exactly 65 bytes.
* The output has to be read as a single chunk of 32 bytes, defined as
* PSA_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS_DATA_SIZE.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x08000609)
/* This flag indicates whether the key derivation algorithm is suitable for
* use on low-entropy secrets such as password - these algorithms are also
* known as key stretching or password hashing schemes. These are also the
* algorithms that accepts inputs of type #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD.
*
* Those algorithms cannot be combined with a key agreement algorithm.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_KEY_DERIVATION_STRETCHING_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x00800000)
#define PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x08800100)
/** Macro to build a PBKDF2-HMAC password hashing / key stretching algorithm.
*
* PBKDF2 is defined by PKCS#5, republished as RFC 8018 (section 5.2).
* This macro specifies the PBKDF2 algorithm constructed using a PRF based on
* HMAC with the specified hash.
* For example, `PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)` specifies PBKDF2
* using the PRF HMAC-SHA-256.
*
* This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs, which must be
* provided in the following order:
* - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_COST is the iteration count.
* This input step must be used exactly once.
* - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT is the salt.
* This input step must be used one or more times; if used several times, the
* inputs will be concatenated. This can be used to build the final salt
* from multiple sources, both public and secret (also known as pepper).
* - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD is the password to be hashed.
* This input step must be used exactly once.
*
* \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
* #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
*
* \return The corresponding PBKDF2-HMAC-XXX algorithm.
* \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
* hash algorithm.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC(hash_alg) \
(PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
/** Whether the specified algorithm is a PBKDF2-HMAC algorithm.
*
* \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
*
* \return 1 if \c alg is a PBKDF2-HMAC algorithm, 0 otherwise.
* This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported
* key derivation algorithm identifier.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_IS_PBKDF2_HMAC(alg) \
(((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC_BASE)
#define PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC_GET_HASH(pbkdf2_alg) \
(PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | ((pbkdf2_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
/** The PBKDF2-AES-CMAC-PRF-128 password hashing / key stretching algorithm.
*
* PBKDF2 is defined by PKCS#5, republished as RFC 8018 (section 5.2).
* This macro specifies the PBKDF2 algorithm constructed using the
* AES-CMAC-PRF-128 PRF specified by RFC 4615.
*
* This key derivation algorithm uses the same inputs as
* #PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC() with the same constraints.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x08800200)
#define PSA_ALG_IS_PBKDF2(kdf_alg) \
(PSA_ALG_IS_PBKDF2_HMAC(kdf_alg) || \
((kdf_alg) == PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128))
#define PSA_ALG_KEY_DERIVATION_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t) 0xfe00ffff)
#define PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t) 0xffff0000)
/** Macro to build a combined algorithm that chains a key agreement with
* a key derivation.
*
* \param ka_alg A key agreement algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such
* that #PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(\p ka_alg) is true).
* \param kdf_alg A key derivation algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such
* that #PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(\p kdf_alg) is true).
*
* \return The corresponding key agreement and derivation
* algorithm.
* \return Unspecified if \p ka_alg is not a supported
* key agreement algorithm or \p kdf_alg is not a
* supported key derivation algorithm.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(ka_alg, kdf_alg) \
((ka_alg) | (kdf_alg))
#define PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF(alg) \
(((alg) & PSA_ALG_KEY_DERIVATION_MASK) | PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION)
#define PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE(alg) \
(((alg) & PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_MASK) | PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_AGREEMENT)
/** Whether the specified algorithm is a raw key agreement algorithm.
*
* A raw key agreement algorithm is one that does not specify
* a key derivation function.
* Usually, raw key agreement algorithms are constructed directly with
* a \c PSA_ALG_xxx macro while non-raw key agreement algorithms are
* constructed with #PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT().
*
* \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
*
* \return 1 if \p alg is a raw key agreement algorithm, 0 otherwise.
* This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
* algorithm identifier.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg) \
(PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg) && \
PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF(alg) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION)
#define PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION_OR_AGREEMENT(alg) \
((PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(alg) || PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg)))
/** The finite-field Diffie-Hellman (DH) key agreement algorithm.
*
* The shared secret produced by key agreement is
* `g^{ab}` in big-endian format.
* It is `ceiling(m / 8)` bytes long where `m` is the size of the prime `p`
* in bits.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_FFDH ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x09010000)
/** Whether the specified algorithm is a finite field Diffie-Hellman algorithm.
*
* This includes the raw finite field Diffie-Hellman algorithm as well as
* finite-field Diffie-Hellman followed by any supporter key derivation
* algorithm.
*
* \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
*
* \return 1 if \c alg is a finite field Diffie-Hellman algorithm, 0 otherwise.
* This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported
* key agreement algorithm identifier.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_IS_FFDH(alg) \
(PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE(alg) == PSA_ALG_FFDH)
/** The elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement algorithm.
*
* The shared secret produced by key agreement is the x-coordinate of
* the shared secret point. It is always `ceiling(m / 8)` bytes long where
* `m` is the bit size associated with the curve, i.e. the bit size of the
* order of the curve's coordinate field. When `m` is not a multiple of 8,
* the byte containing the most significant bit of the shared secret
* is padded with zero bits. The byte order is either little-endian
* or big-endian depending on the curve type.
*
* - For Montgomery curves (curve types `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_CURVEXXX`),
* the shared secret is the x-coordinate of `d_A Q_B = d_B Q_A`
* in little-endian byte order.
* The bit size is 448 for Curve448 and 255 for Curve25519.
* - For Weierstrass curves over prime fields (curve types
* `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECPXXX` and `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_PXXX`),
* the shared secret is the x-coordinate of `d_A Q_B = d_B Q_A`
* in big-endian byte order.
* The bit size is `m = ceiling(log_2(p))` for the field `F_p`.
* - For Weierstrass curves over binary fields (curve types
* `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECTXXX`),
* the shared secret is the x-coordinate of `d_A Q_B = d_B Q_A`
* in big-endian byte order.
* The bit size is `m` for the field `F_{2^m}`.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_ECDH ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x09020000)
/** Whether the specified algorithm is an elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman
* algorithm.
*
* This includes the raw elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman algorithm as well as
* elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman followed by any supporter key derivation
* algorithm.
*
* \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
*
* \return 1 if \c alg is an elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman algorithm,
* 0 otherwise.
* This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported
* key agreement algorithm identifier.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_IS_ECDH(alg) \
(PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE(alg) == PSA_ALG_ECDH)
/** Whether the specified algorithm encoding is a wildcard.
*
* Wildcard values may only be used to set the usage algorithm field in
* a policy, not to perform an operation.
*
* \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
*
* \return 1 if \c alg is a wildcard algorithm encoding.
* \return 0 if \c alg is a non-wildcard algorithm encoding (suitable for
* an operation).
* \return This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported
* algorithm identifier.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_IS_WILDCARD(alg) \
(PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg) ? \
PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH : \
PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(alg) ? \
(alg & PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG) != 0 : \
PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg) ? \
(alg & PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG) != 0 : \
(alg) == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH)
/** Get the hash used by a composite algorithm.
*
* \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
*
* \return The underlying hash algorithm if alg is a composite algorithm that
* uses a hash algorithm.
*
* \return \c 0 if alg is not a composite algorithm that uses a hash.
*/
#define PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(alg) \
(((alg) & 0x000000ff) == 0 ? ((psa_algorithm_t) 0) : 0x02000000 | ((alg) & 0x000000ff))
/**@}*/
/** \defgroup key_lifetimes Key lifetimes
* @{
*/
/* Note that location and persistence level values are embedded in the
* persistent key store, as part of key metadata. As a consequence, they
* must not be changed (unless the storage format version changes).
*/
/** The default lifetime for volatile keys.
*
* A volatile key only exists as long as the identifier to it is not destroyed.
* The key material is guaranteed to be erased on a power reset.
*
* A key with this lifetime is typically stored in the RAM area of the
* PSA Crypto subsystem. However this is an implementation choice.
* If an implementation stores data about the key in a non-volatile memory,
* it must release all the resources associated with the key and erase the
* key material if the calling application terminates.
*/
#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE ((psa_key_lifetime_t) 0x00000000)
/** The default lifetime for persistent keys.
*
* A persistent key remains in storage until it is explicitly destroyed or
* until the corresponding storage area is wiped. This specification does
* not define any mechanism to wipe a storage area, but integrations may
* provide their own mechanism (for example to perform a factory reset,
* to prepare for device refurbishment, or to uninstall an application).
*
* This lifetime value is the default storage area for the calling
* application. Integrations of Mbed TLS may support other persistent lifetimes.
* See ::psa_key_lifetime_t for more information.
*/
#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT ((psa_key_lifetime_t) 0x00000001)
/** The persistence level of volatile keys.
*
* See ::psa_key_persistence_t for more information.
*/
#define PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE ((psa_key_persistence_t) 0x00)
/** The default persistence level for persistent keys.
*
* See ::psa_key_persistence_t for more information.
*/
#define PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_DEFAULT ((psa_key_persistence_t) 0x01)
/** A persistence level indicating that a key is never destroyed.
*
* See ::psa_key_persistence_t for more information.
*/
#define PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_READ_ONLY ((psa_key_persistence_t) 0xff)
#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_PERSISTENCE(lifetime) \
((psa_key_persistence_t) ((lifetime) & 0x000000ff))
#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(lifetime) \
((psa_key_location_t) ((lifetime) >> 8))
/** Whether a key lifetime indicates that the key is volatile.
*
* A volatile key is automatically destroyed by the implementation when
* the application instance terminates. In particular, a volatile key
* is automatically destroyed on a power reset of the device.
*
* A key that is not volatile is persistent. Persistent keys are
* preserved until the application explicitly destroys them or until an
* implementation-specific device management event occurs (for example,
* a factory reset).
*
* \param lifetime The lifetime value to query (value of type
* ::psa_key_lifetime_t).
*
* \return \c 1 if the key is volatile, otherwise \c 0.
*/
#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(lifetime) \
(PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_PERSISTENCE(lifetime) == \
PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE)
/** Whether a key lifetime indicates that the key is read-only.
*
* Read-only keys cannot be created or destroyed through the PSA Crypto API.
* They must be created through platform-specific means that bypass the API.
*
* Some platforms may offer ways to destroy read-only keys. For example,
* consider a platform with multiple levels of privilege, where a
* low-privilege application can use a key but is not allowed to destroy
* it, and the platform exposes the key to the application with a read-only
* lifetime. High-privilege code can destroy the key even though the
* application sees the key as read-only.
*
* \param lifetime The lifetime value to query (value of type
* ::psa_key_lifetime_t).
*
* \return \c 1 if the key is read-only, otherwise \c 0.
*/
#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_READ_ONLY(lifetime) \
(PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_PERSISTENCE(lifetime) == \
PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_READ_ONLY)
/** Construct a lifetime from a persistence level and a location.
*
* \param persistence The persistence level
* (value of type ::psa_key_persistence_t).
* \param location The location indicator
* (value of type ::psa_key_location_t).
*
* \return The constructed lifetime value.
*/
#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION(persistence, location) \
((location) << 8 | (persistence))
/** The local storage area for persistent keys.
*
* This storage area is available on all systems that can store persistent
* keys without delegating the storage to a third-party cryptoprocessor.
*
* See ::psa_key_location_t for more information.
*/
#define PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE ((psa_key_location_t) 0x000000)
#define PSA_KEY_LOCATION_VENDOR_FLAG ((psa_key_location_t) 0x800000)
/* Note that key identifier values are embedded in the
* persistent key store, as part of key metadata. As a consequence, they
* must not be changed (unless the storage format version changes).
*/
/** The null key identifier.
*/
/* *INDENT-OFF* (https://github.com/ARM-software/psa-arch-tests/issues/337) */
#define PSA_KEY_ID_NULL ((psa_key_id_t)0)
/* *INDENT-ON* */
/** The minimum value for a key identifier chosen by the application.
*/
#define PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MIN ((psa_key_id_t) 0x00000001)
/** The maximum value for a key identifier chosen by the application.
*/
#define PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MAX ((psa_key_id_t) 0x3fffffff)
/** The minimum value for a key identifier chosen by the implementation.
*/
#define PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MIN ((psa_key_id_t) 0x40000000)
/** The maximum value for a key identifier chosen by the implementation.
*/
#define PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX ((psa_key_id_t) 0x7fffffff)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER)
#define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT ((psa_key_id_t) 0)
#define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID(id) (id)
#define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_OWNER_ID(id) (0)
/** Utility to initialize a key identifier at runtime.
*
* \param unused Unused parameter.
* \param key_id Identifier of the key.
*/
static inline mbedtls_svc_key_id_t mbedtls_svc_key_id_make(
unsigned int unused, psa_key_id_t key_id)
{
(void) unused;
return key_id;
}
/** Compare two key identifiers.
*
* \param id1 First key identifier.
* \param id2 Second key identifier.
*
* \return Non-zero if the two key identifier are equal, zero otherwise.
*/
static inline int mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id1,
mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id2)
{
return id1 == id2;
}
/** Check whether a key identifier is null.
*
* \param key Key identifier.
*
* \return Non-zero if the key identifier is null, zero otherwise.
*/
static inline int mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key)
{
return key == 0;
}
#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER */
#define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT ((mbedtls_svc_key_id_t){ 0, 0 })
#define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID(id) ((id).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_id))
#define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_OWNER_ID(id) ((id).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(owner))
/** Utility to initialize a key identifier at runtime.
*
* \param owner_id Identifier of the key owner.
* \param key_id Identifier of the key.
*/
static inline mbedtls_svc_key_id_t mbedtls_svc_key_id_make(
mbedtls_key_owner_id_t owner_id, psa_key_id_t key_id)
{
return (mbedtls_svc_key_id_t){ .MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_id) = key_id,
.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(owner) = owner_id };
}
/** Compare two key identifiers.
*
* \param id1 First key identifier.
* \param id2 Second key identifier.
*
* \return Non-zero if the two key identifier are equal, zero otherwise.
*/
static inline int mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id1,
mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id2)
{
return (id1.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_id) == id2.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_id)) &&
mbedtls_key_owner_id_equal(id1.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(owner), id2.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(owner));
}
/** Check whether a key identifier is null.
*
* \param key Key identifier.
*
* \return Non-zero if the key identifier is null, zero otherwise.
*/
static inline int mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key)
{
return key.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_id) == 0;
}
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER */
/**@}*/
/** \defgroup policy Key policies
* @{
*/
/* Note that key usage flags are embedded in the
* persistent key store, as part of key metadata. As a consequence, they
* must not be changed (unless the storage format version changes).
*/
/** Whether the key may be exported.
*
* A public key or the public part of a key pair may always be exported
* regardless of the value of this permission flag.
*
* If a key does not have export permission, implementations shall not
* allow the key to be exported in plain form from the cryptoprocessor,
* whether through psa_export_key() or through a proprietary interface.
* The key may however be exportable in a wrapped form, i.e. in a form
* where it is encrypted by another key.
*/
#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT ((psa_key_usage_t) 0x00000001)
/** Whether the key may be copied.
*
* This flag allows the use of psa_copy_key() to make a copy of the key
* with the same policy or a more restrictive policy.
*
* For lifetimes for which the key is located in a secure element which
* enforce the non-exportability of keys, copying a key outside the secure
* element also requires the usage flag #PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT.
* Copying the key inside the secure element is permitted with just
* #PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY if the secure element supports it.
* For keys with the lifetime #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE or
* #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT, the usage flag #PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY
* is sufficient to permit the copy.
*/
#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY ((psa_key_usage_t) 0x00000002)
/** Whether the key may be used to encrypt a message.
*
* This flag allows the key to be used for a symmetric encryption operation,
* for an AEAD encryption-and-authentication operation,
* or for an asymmetric encryption operation,
* if otherwise permitted by the key's type and policy.
*
* For a key pair, this concerns the public key.
*/
#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT ((psa_key_usage_t) 0x00000100)
/** Whether the key may be used to decrypt a message.
*
* This flag allows the key to be used for a symmetric decryption operation,
* for an AEAD decryption-and-verification operation,
* or for an asymmetric decryption operation,
* if otherwise permitted by the key's type and policy.
*
* For a key pair, this concerns the private key.
*/
#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT ((psa_key_usage_t) 0x00000200)
/** Whether the key may be used to sign a message.
*
* This flag allows the key to be used for a MAC calculation operation or for
* an asymmetric message signature operation, if otherwise permitted by the
* key’s type and policy.
*
* For a key pair, this concerns the private key.
*/
#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE ((psa_key_usage_t) 0x00000400)
/** Whether the key may be used to verify a message.
*
* This flag allows the key to be used for a MAC verification operation or for
* an asymmetric message signature verification operation, if otherwise
* permitted by the key’s type and policy.
*
* For a key pair, this concerns the public key.
*/
#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE ((psa_key_usage_t) 0x00000800)
/** Whether the key may be used to sign a message.
*
* This flag allows the key to be used for a MAC calculation operation
* or for an asymmetric signature operation,
* if otherwise permitted by the key's type and policy.
*
* For a key pair, this concerns the private key.
*/
#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH ((psa_key_usage_t) 0x00001000)
/** Whether the key may be used to verify a message signature.
*
* This flag allows the key to be used for a MAC verification operation
* or for an asymmetric signature verification operation,
* if otherwise permitted by the key's type and policy.
*
* For a key pair, this concerns the public key.
*/
#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH ((psa_key_usage_t) 0x00002000)
/** Whether the key may be used to derive other keys or produce a password
* hash.
*
* This flag allows the key to be used for a key derivation operation or for
* a key agreement operation, if otherwise permitted by the key's type and
* policy.
*
* If this flag is present on all keys used in calls to
* psa_key_derivation_input_key() for a key derivation operation, then it
* permits calling psa_key_derivation_output_bytes() or
* psa_key_derivation_output_key() at the end of the operation.
*/
#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE ((psa_key_usage_t) 0x00004000)
/** Whether the key may be used to verify the result of a key derivation,
* including password hashing.
*
* This flag allows the key to be used:
*
* This flag allows the key to be used in a key derivation operation, if
* otherwise permitted by the key's type and policy.
*
* If this flag is present on all keys used in calls to
* psa_key_derivation_input_key() for a key derivation operation, then it
* permits calling psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes() or
* psa_key_derivation_verify_key() at the end of the operation.
*/
#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION ((psa_key_usage_t) 0x00008000)
/**@}*/
/** \defgroup derivation Key derivation
* @{
*/
/* Key input steps are not embedded in the persistent storage, so you can
* change them if needed: it's only an ABI change. */
/** A secret input for key derivation.
*
* This should be a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE
* (passed to psa_key_derivation_input_key())
* or the shared secret resulting from a key agreement
* (obtained via psa_key_derivation_key_agreement()).
*
* The secret can also be a direct input (passed to
* key_derivation_input_bytes()). In this case, the derivation operation
* may not be used to derive keys: the operation will only allow
* psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(),
* psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes(), or
* psa_key_derivation_verify_key(), but not
* psa_key_derivation_output_key().
*/
#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET ((psa_key_derivation_step_t) 0x0101)
/** A low-entropy secret input for password hashing / key stretching.
*
* This is usually a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD (passed to
* psa_key_derivation_input_key()) or a direct input (passed to
* psa_key_derivation_input_bytes()) that is a password or passphrase. It can
* also be high-entropy secret such as a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE or
* the shared secret resulting from a key agreement.
*
* The secret can also be a direct input (passed to
* key_derivation_input_bytes()). In this case, the derivation operation
* may not be used to derive keys: the operation will only allow
* psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(),
* psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes(), or
* psa_key_derivation_verify_key(), but not
* psa_key_derivation_output_key().
*/
#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD ((psa_key_derivation_step_t) 0x0102)
/** A high-entropy additional secret input for key derivation.
*
* This is typically the shared secret resulting from a key agreement obtained
* via `psa_key_derivation_key_agreement()`. It may alternatively be a key of
* type `PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE` passed to `psa_key_derivation_input_key()`, or
* a direct input passed to `psa_key_derivation_input_bytes()`.
*/
#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_OTHER_SECRET \
((psa_key_derivation_step_t) 0x0103)
/** A label for key derivation.
*
* This should be a direct input.
* It can also be a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA.
*/
#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL ((psa_key_derivation_step_t) 0x0201)
/** A salt for key derivation.
*
* This should be a direct input.
* It can also be a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA or
* #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PEPPER.
*/
#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT ((psa_key_derivation_step_t) 0x0202)
/** An information string for key derivation.
*
* This should be a direct input.
* It can also be a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA.
*/
#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO ((psa_key_derivation_step_t) 0x0203)
/** A seed for key derivation.
*
* This should be a direct input.
* It can also be a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA.
*/
#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED ((psa_key_derivation_step_t) 0x0204)
/** A cost parameter for password hashing / key stretching.
*
* This must be a direct input, passed to psa_key_derivation_input_integer().
*/
#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_COST ((psa_key_derivation_step_t) 0x0205)
/**@}*/
/** \defgroup helper_macros Helper macros
* @{
*/
/* Helper macros */
/** Check if two AEAD algorithm identifiers refer to the same AEAD algorithm
* regardless of the tag length they encode.
*
* \param aead_alg_1 An AEAD algorithm identifier.
* \param aead_alg_2 An AEAD algorithm identifier.
*
* \return 1 if both identifiers refer to the same AEAD algorithm,
* 0 otherwise.
* Unspecified if neither \p aead_alg_1 nor \p aead_alg_2 are
* a supported AEAD algorithm.
*/
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ALG_AEAD_EQUAL(aead_alg_1, aead_alg_2) \
(!(((aead_alg_1) ^ (aead_alg_2)) & \
~(PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK | PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG)))
/**@}*/
/**@}*/
/** \defgroup interruptible Interruptible operations
* @{
*/
/** Maximum value for use with \c psa_interruptible_set_max_ops() to determine
* the maximum number of ops allowed to be executed by an interruptible
* function in a single call.
*/
#define PSA_INTERRUPTIBLE_MAX_OPS_UNLIMITED UINT32_MAX
/**@}*/
#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_VALUES_H */
Reference in a new issue View git blame Copy permalink