1093 lines
32 KiB
C
1093 lines
32 KiB
C
/*
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* Public Key abstraction layer: wrapper functions
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*
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* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
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* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
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*/
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#include "common.h"
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C)
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#include "mbedtls/pk_internal.h"
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#include "mbedtls/error.h"
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/* Even if RSA not activated, for the sake of RSA-alt */
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#include "mbedtls/rsa.h"
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#include <string.h>
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
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#include "mbedtls/ecp.h"
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#endif
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
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#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h"
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#endif
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
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#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h"
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#endif
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT)
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#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
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#endif
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
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#include "psa/crypto.h"
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#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h"
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#include "mbedtls/asn1.h"
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#endif
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#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
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#include <limits.h>
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#include <stdint.h>
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
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static int rsa_can_do(mbedtls_pk_type_t type)
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{
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return type == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ||
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type == MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS;
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}
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static size_t rsa_get_bitlen(const void *ctx)
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{
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const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (const mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx;
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/* Unfortunately, the rsa.h interface does not have a direct way
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* to access the bit-length that works with MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT.
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* So we have to do a little work here.
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*/
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mbedtls_mpi N;
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mbedtls_mpi_init(&N);
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int ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, &N, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
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/* If the export fails for some reason (e.g. the RSA_ALT implementation
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* does not support export, or there is not enough memory),
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* we have no way of returning an error from this function.
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* As a fallback, return the byte-length converted in bits, which is
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* the correct value if the modulus size is a multiple of 8 bits, which
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* is very often the case in practice. */
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size_t bitlen = (ret == 0 ? mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&N) :
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8 * mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa));
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mbedtls_mpi_free(&N);
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return bitlen;
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}
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static int rsa_verify_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
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const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
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const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len)
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{
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int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
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mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx;
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size_t rsa_len = mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa);
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#if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX
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if (md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && UINT_MAX < hash_len) {
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return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
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}
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#endif /* SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX */
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if (sig_len < rsa_len) {
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return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED;
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}
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if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify(rsa, NULL, NULL,
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MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, md_alg,
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(unsigned int) hash_len, hash, sig)) != 0) {
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return ret;
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}
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/* The buffer contains a valid signature followed by extra data.
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* We have a special error code for that so that so that callers can
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* use mbedtls_pk_verify() to check "Does the buffer start with a
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* valid signature?" and not just "Does the buffer contain a valid
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* signature?". */
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if (sig_len > rsa_len) {
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return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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static int rsa_sign_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
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const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
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unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len,
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int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng)
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{
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mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx;
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#if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX
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if (md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && UINT_MAX < hash_len) {
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return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
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}
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#endif /* SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX */
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*sig_len = mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa);
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return mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign(rsa, f_rng, p_rng, MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE,
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md_alg, (unsigned int) hash_len, hash, sig);
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}
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static int rsa_decrypt_wrap(void *ctx,
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const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen,
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unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize,
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int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng)
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{
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mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx;
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if (ilen != mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa)) {
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return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
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}
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return mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt(rsa, f_rng, p_rng,
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MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, olen, input, output, osize);
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}
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static int rsa_encrypt_wrap(void *ctx,
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const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen,
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unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize,
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int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng)
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{
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mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx;
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*olen = mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa);
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if (*olen > osize) {
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return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE;
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}
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return mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt(rsa, f_rng, p_rng, MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC,
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ilen, input, output);
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}
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static int rsa_check_pair_wrap(const void *pub, const void *prv)
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{
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return mbedtls_rsa_check_pub_priv((const mbedtls_rsa_context *) pub,
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(const mbedtls_rsa_context *) prv);
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}
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static void *rsa_alloc_wrap(void)
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{
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void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_rsa_context));
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if (ctx != NULL) {
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mbedtls_rsa_init((mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx, 0, 0);
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}
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return ctx;
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}
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static void rsa_free_wrap(void *ctx)
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{
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mbedtls_rsa_free((mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx);
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mbedtls_free(ctx);
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}
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static void rsa_debug(const void *ctx, mbedtls_pk_debug_item *items)
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{
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items->type = MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_MPI;
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items->name = "rsa.N";
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items->value = &(((mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx)->N);
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items++;
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items->type = MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_MPI;
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items->name = "rsa.E";
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items->value = &(((mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx)->E);
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}
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const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_rsa_info = {
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MBEDTLS_PK_RSA,
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"RSA",
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rsa_get_bitlen,
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rsa_can_do,
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rsa_verify_wrap,
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rsa_sign_wrap,
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
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NULL,
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NULL,
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#endif
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rsa_decrypt_wrap,
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rsa_encrypt_wrap,
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rsa_check_pair_wrap,
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rsa_alloc_wrap,
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rsa_free_wrap,
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
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NULL,
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NULL,
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#endif
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rsa_debug,
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};
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#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
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/*
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* Generic EC key
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*/
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static int eckey_can_do(mbedtls_pk_type_t type)
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{
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return type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ||
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type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH ||
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type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA;
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}
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static size_t eckey_get_bitlen(const void *ctx)
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{
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return ((mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) ctx)->grp.pbits;
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}
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
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/* Forward declarations */
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static int ecdsa_verify_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
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const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
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const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len);
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static int ecdsa_sign_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
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const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
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unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len,
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int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng);
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static int eckey_verify_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
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const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
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const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len)
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{
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int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
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mbedtls_ecdsa_context ecdsa;
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mbedtls_ecdsa_init(&ecdsa);
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if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair(&ecdsa, ctx)) == 0) {
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ret = ecdsa_verify_wrap(&ecdsa, md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len);
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}
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mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ecdsa);
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return ret;
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}
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static int eckey_sign_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
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const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
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unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len,
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int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng)
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{
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int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
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mbedtls_ecdsa_context ecdsa;
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mbedtls_ecdsa_init(&ecdsa);
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if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair(&ecdsa, ctx)) == 0) {
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ret = ecdsa_sign_wrap(&ecdsa, md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len,
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f_rng, p_rng);
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}
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mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ecdsa);
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return ret;
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}
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
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/* Forward declarations */
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static int ecdsa_verify_rs_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
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const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
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const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len,
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void *rs_ctx);
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static int ecdsa_sign_rs_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
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const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
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unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len,
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int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng,
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void *rs_ctx);
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/*
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* Restart context for ECDSA operations with ECKEY context
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*
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* We need to store an actual ECDSA context, as we need to pass the same to
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* the underlying ecdsa function, so we can't create it on the fly every time.
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*/
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typedef struct {
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mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx ecdsa_rs;
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mbedtls_ecdsa_context ecdsa_ctx;
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} eckey_restart_ctx;
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static void *eckey_rs_alloc(void)
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{
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eckey_restart_ctx *rs_ctx;
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void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(eckey_restart_ctx));
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if (ctx != NULL) {
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rs_ctx = ctx;
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mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_init(&rs_ctx->ecdsa_rs);
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mbedtls_ecdsa_init(&rs_ctx->ecdsa_ctx);
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}
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return ctx;
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}
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static void eckey_rs_free(void *ctx)
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{
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eckey_restart_ctx *rs_ctx;
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if (ctx == NULL) {
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return;
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}
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rs_ctx = ctx;
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mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_free(&rs_ctx->ecdsa_rs);
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mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&rs_ctx->ecdsa_ctx);
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mbedtls_free(ctx);
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}
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static int eckey_verify_rs_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
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const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
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const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len,
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void *rs_ctx)
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{
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int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
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eckey_restart_ctx *rs = rs_ctx;
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/* Should never happen */
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if (rs == NULL) {
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return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
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}
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/* set up our own sub-context if needed (that is, on first run) */
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if (rs->ecdsa_ctx.grp.pbits == 0) {
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair(&rs->ecdsa_ctx, ctx));
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}
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecdsa_verify_rs_wrap(&rs->ecdsa_ctx,
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md_alg, hash, hash_len,
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sig, sig_len, &rs->ecdsa_rs));
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cleanup:
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return ret;
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}
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static int eckey_sign_rs_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
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const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
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unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len,
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int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng,
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void *rs_ctx)
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{
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int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
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eckey_restart_ctx *rs = rs_ctx;
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/* Should never happen */
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if (rs == NULL) {
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return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
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}
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/* set up our own sub-context if needed (that is, on first run) */
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if (rs->ecdsa_ctx.grp.pbits == 0) {
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair(&rs->ecdsa_ctx, ctx));
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}
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecdsa_sign_rs_wrap(&rs->ecdsa_ctx, md_alg,
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hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len,
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f_rng, p_rng, &rs->ecdsa_rs));
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cleanup:
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return ret;
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}
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#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
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#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */
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static int eckey_check_pair(const void *pub, const void *prv)
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{
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return mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv((const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) pub,
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(const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) prv);
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}
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static void *eckey_alloc_wrap(void)
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{
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void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_ecp_keypair));
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if (ctx != NULL) {
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mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(ctx);
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}
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return ctx;
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}
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static void eckey_free_wrap(void *ctx)
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{
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mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free((mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) ctx);
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mbedtls_free(ctx);
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}
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static void eckey_debug(const void *ctx, mbedtls_pk_debug_item *items)
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{
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items->type = MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_ECP;
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items->name = "eckey.Q";
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items->value = &(((mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) ctx)->Q);
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}
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const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_eckey_info = {
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MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY,
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"EC",
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eckey_get_bitlen,
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eckey_can_do,
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
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eckey_verify_wrap,
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eckey_sign_wrap,
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
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eckey_verify_rs_wrap,
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eckey_sign_rs_wrap,
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#endif
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#else /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */
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NULL,
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NULL,
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#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */
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NULL,
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NULL,
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eckey_check_pair,
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eckey_alloc_wrap,
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eckey_free_wrap,
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
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eckey_rs_alloc,
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eckey_rs_free,
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#endif
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eckey_debug,
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};
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/*
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* EC key restricted to ECDH
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*/
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static int eckeydh_can_do(mbedtls_pk_type_t type)
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{
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return type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ||
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type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH;
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}
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const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_eckeydh_info = {
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MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH,
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"EC_DH",
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eckey_get_bitlen, /* Same underlying key structure */
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eckeydh_can_do,
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NULL,
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NULL,
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
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NULL,
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NULL,
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#endif
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NULL,
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NULL,
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eckey_check_pair,
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eckey_alloc_wrap, /* Same underlying key structure */
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eckey_free_wrap, /* Same underlying key structure */
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
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NULL,
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NULL,
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#endif
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eckey_debug, /* Same underlying key structure */
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};
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#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
|
|
static int ecdsa_can_do(mbedtls_pk_type_t type)
|
|
{
|
|
return type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
|
|
/*
|
|
* An ASN.1 encoded signature is a sequence of two ASN.1 integers. Parse one of
|
|
* those integers and convert it to the fixed-length encoding expected by PSA.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int extract_ecdsa_sig_int(unsigned char **from, const unsigned char *end,
|
|
unsigned char *to, size_t to_len)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
|
|
size_t unpadded_len, padding_len;
|
|
|
|
if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(from, end, &unpadded_len,
|
|
MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER)) != 0) {
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
while (unpadded_len > 0 && **from == 0x00) {
|
|
(*from)++;
|
|
unpadded_len--;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (unpadded_len > to_len || unpadded_len == 0) {
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
padding_len = to_len - unpadded_len;
|
|
memset(to, 0x00, padding_len);
|
|
memcpy(to + padding_len, *from, unpadded_len);
|
|
(*from) += unpadded_len;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Convert a signature from an ASN.1 sequence of two integers
|
|
* to a raw {r,s} buffer. Note: the provided sig buffer must be at least
|
|
* twice as big as int_size.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int extract_ecdsa_sig(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end,
|
|
unsigned char *sig, size_t int_size)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
|
|
size_t tmp_size;
|
|
|
|
if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &tmp_size,
|
|
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) {
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Extract r */
|
|
if ((ret = extract_ecdsa_sig_int(p, end, sig, int_size)) != 0) {
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Extract s */
|
|
if ((ret = extract_ecdsa_sig_int(p, end, sig + int_size, int_size)) != 0) {
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ecdsa_verify_wrap(void *ctx_arg, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
|
|
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
|
|
const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len)
|
|
{
|
|
mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx = ctx_arg;
|
|
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
|
|
psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
|
|
psa_key_id_t key_id = 0;
|
|
psa_status_t status;
|
|
mbedtls_pk_context key;
|
|
int key_len;
|
|
/* see ECP_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES in pkwrite.c */
|
|
unsigned char buf[30 + 2 * MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES];
|
|
unsigned char *p;
|
|
mbedtls_pk_info_t pk_info = mbedtls_eckey_info;
|
|
psa_algorithm_t psa_sig_md = PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY;
|
|
size_t curve_bits;
|
|
psa_ecc_family_t curve =
|
|
mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(ctx->grp.id, &curve_bits);
|
|
const size_t signature_part_size = (ctx->grp.nbits + 7) / 8;
|
|
((void) md_alg);
|
|
|
|
if (curve == 0) {
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey() expects a full PK context;
|
|
* re-construct one to make it happy */
|
|
key.pk_info = &pk_info;
|
|
key.pk_ctx = ctx;
|
|
p = buf + sizeof(buf);
|
|
key_len = mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey(&p, buf, &key);
|
|
if (key_len <= 0) {
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(curve));
|
|
psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH);
|
|
psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, psa_sig_md);
|
|
|
|
status = psa_import_key(&attributes,
|
|
buf + sizeof(buf) - key_len, key_len,
|
|
&key_id);
|
|
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
|
|
ret = mbedtls_psa_err_translate_pk(status);
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* We don't need the exported key anymore and can
|
|
* reuse its buffer for signature extraction. */
|
|
if (2 * signature_part_size > sizeof(buf)) {
|
|
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p = (unsigned char *) sig;
|
|
if ((ret = extract_ecdsa_sig(&p, sig + sig_len, buf,
|
|
signature_part_size)) != 0) {
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (psa_verify_hash(key_id, psa_sig_md,
|
|
hash, hash_len,
|
|
buf, 2 * signature_part_size)
|
|
!= PSA_SUCCESS) {
|
|
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED;
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (p != sig + sig_len) {
|
|
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH;
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
}
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
cleanup:
|
|
psa_destroy_key(key_id);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
|
|
static int ecdsa_verify_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
|
|
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
|
|
const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
|
|
((void) md_alg);
|
|
|
|
ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature((mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) ctx,
|
|
hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len);
|
|
|
|
if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH) {
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
|
|
|
|
static int ecdsa_sign_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
|
|
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
|
|
unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len,
|
|
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng)
|
|
{
|
|
return mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature((mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) ctx,
|
|
md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len, f_rng, p_rng);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
|
|
static int ecdsa_verify_rs_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
|
|
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
|
|
const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len,
|
|
void *rs_ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
|
|
((void) md_alg);
|
|
|
|
ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature_restartable(
|
|
(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) ctx,
|
|
hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len,
|
|
(mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *) rs_ctx);
|
|
|
|
if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH) {
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ecdsa_sign_rs_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
|
|
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
|
|
unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len,
|
|
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng,
|
|
void *rs_ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
return mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_restartable(
|
|
(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) ctx,
|
|
md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len, f_rng, p_rng,
|
|
(mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *) rs_ctx);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
|
|
|
|
static void *ecdsa_alloc_wrap(void)
|
|
{
|
|
void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_ecdsa_context));
|
|
|
|
if (ctx != NULL) {
|
|
mbedtls_ecdsa_init((mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ctx;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void ecdsa_free_wrap(void *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
mbedtls_ecdsa_free((mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) ctx);
|
|
mbedtls_free(ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
|
|
static void *ecdsa_rs_alloc(void)
|
|
{
|
|
void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx));
|
|
|
|
if (ctx != NULL) {
|
|
mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_init(ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ctx;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void ecdsa_rs_free(void *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_free(ctx);
|
|
mbedtls_free(ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
|
|
|
|
const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_ecdsa_info = {
|
|
MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA,
|
|
"ECDSA",
|
|
eckey_get_bitlen, /* Compatible key structures */
|
|
ecdsa_can_do,
|
|
ecdsa_verify_wrap,
|
|
ecdsa_sign_wrap,
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
|
|
ecdsa_verify_rs_wrap,
|
|
ecdsa_sign_rs_wrap,
|
|
#endif
|
|
NULL,
|
|
NULL,
|
|
eckey_check_pair, /* Compatible key structures */
|
|
ecdsa_alloc_wrap,
|
|
ecdsa_free_wrap,
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
|
|
ecdsa_rs_alloc,
|
|
ecdsa_rs_free,
|
|
#endif
|
|
eckey_debug, /* Compatible key structures */
|
|
};
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT)
|
|
/*
|
|
* Support for alternative RSA-private implementations
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int rsa_alt_can_do(mbedtls_pk_type_t type)
|
|
{
|
|
return type == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static size_t rsa_alt_get_bitlen(const void *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
const mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *rsa_alt = (const mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *) ctx;
|
|
|
|
return 8 * rsa_alt->key_len_func(rsa_alt->key);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int rsa_alt_sign_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
|
|
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
|
|
unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len,
|
|
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng)
|
|
{
|
|
mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *rsa_alt = (mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *) ctx;
|
|
|
|
#if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX
|
|
if (UINT_MAX < hash_len) {
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX */
|
|
|
|
*sig_len = rsa_alt->key_len_func(rsa_alt->key);
|
|
if (*sig_len > MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE) {
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return rsa_alt->sign_func(rsa_alt->key, f_rng, p_rng, MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE,
|
|
md_alg, (unsigned int) hash_len, hash, sig);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int rsa_alt_decrypt_wrap(void *ctx,
|
|
const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen,
|
|
unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize,
|
|
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng)
|
|
{
|
|
mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *rsa_alt = (mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *) ctx;
|
|
|
|
((void) f_rng);
|
|
((void) p_rng);
|
|
|
|
if (ilen != rsa_alt->key_len_func(rsa_alt->key)) {
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return rsa_alt->decrypt_func(rsa_alt->key,
|
|
MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, olen, input, output, osize);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
|
|
static int rsa_alt_check_pair(const void *pub, const void *prv)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char sig[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE];
|
|
unsigned char hash[32];
|
|
size_t sig_len = 0;
|
|
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
|
|
|
|
if (rsa_alt_get_bitlen(prv) != rsa_get_bitlen(pub)) {
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memset(hash, 0x2a, sizeof(hash));
|
|
|
|
if ((ret = rsa_alt_sign_wrap((void *) prv, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE,
|
|
hash, sizeof(hash),
|
|
sig, &sig_len, NULL, NULL)) != 0) {
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (rsa_verify_wrap((void *) pub, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE,
|
|
hash, sizeof(hash), sig, sig_len) != 0) {
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
|
|
|
|
static void *rsa_alt_alloc_wrap(void)
|
|
{
|
|
void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_rsa_alt_context));
|
|
|
|
if (ctx != NULL) {
|
|
memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_rsa_alt_context));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ctx;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void rsa_alt_free_wrap(void *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_rsa_alt_context));
|
|
mbedtls_free(ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_rsa_alt_info = {
|
|
MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT,
|
|
"RSA-alt",
|
|
rsa_alt_get_bitlen,
|
|
rsa_alt_can_do,
|
|
NULL,
|
|
rsa_alt_sign_wrap,
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
|
|
NULL,
|
|
NULL,
|
|
#endif
|
|
rsa_alt_decrypt_wrap,
|
|
NULL,
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
|
|
rsa_alt_check_pair,
|
|
#else
|
|
NULL,
|
|
#endif
|
|
rsa_alt_alloc_wrap,
|
|
rsa_alt_free_wrap,
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
|
|
NULL,
|
|
NULL,
|
|
#endif
|
|
NULL,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
|
|
|
|
static void *pk_opaque_alloc_wrap(void)
|
|
{
|
|
void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(psa_key_id_t));
|
|
|
|
/* no _init() function to call, as calloc() already zeroized */
|
|
|
|
return ctx;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void pk_opaque_free_wrap(void *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(psa_key_id_t));
|
|
mbedtls_free(ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static size_t pk_opaque_get_bitlen(const void *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
const psa_key_id_t *key = (const psa_key_id_t *) ctx;
|
|
size_t bits;
|
|
psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
|
|
|
|
if (PSA_SUCCESS != psa_get_key_attributes(*key, &attributes)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bits = psa_get_key_bits(&attributes);
|
|
psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes);
|
|
return bits;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int pk_opaque_can_do(mbedtls_pk_type_t type)
|
|
{
|
|
/* For now opaque PSA keys can only wrap ECC keypairs,
|
|
* as checked by setup_psa().
|
|
* Also, ECKEY_DH does not really make sense with the current API. */
|
|
return type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ||
|
|
type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Simultaneously convert and move raw MPI from the beginning of a buffer
|
|
* to an ASN.1 MPI at the end of the buffer.
|
|
* See also mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi().
|
|
*
|
|
* p: pointer to the end of the output buffer
|
|
* start: start of the output buffer, and also of the mpi to write at the end
|
|
* n_len: length of the mpi to read from start
|
|
*/
|
|
static int asn1_write_mpibuf(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
|
|
size_t n_len)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
|
|
size_t len = 0;
|
|
|
|
if ((size_t) (*p - start) < n_len) {
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
len = n_len;
|
|
*p -= len;
|
|
memmove(*p, start, len);
|
|
|
|
/* ASN.1 DER encoding requires minimal length, so skip leading 0s.
|
|
* Neither r nor s should be 0, but as a failsafe measure, still detect
|
|
* that rather than overflowing the buffer in case of a PSA error. */
|
|
while (len > 0 && **p == 0x00) {
|
|
++(*p);
|
|
--len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* this is only reached if the signature was invalid */
|
|
if (len == 0) {
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_HW_ACCEL_FAILED;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* if the msb is 1, ASN.1 requires that we prepend a 0.
|
|
* Neither r nor s can be 0, so we can assume len > 0 at all times. */
|
|
if (**p & 0x80) {
|
|
if (*p - start < 1) {
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*--(*p) = 0x00;
|
|
len += 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, start, len));
|
|
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, start,
|
|
MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER));
|
|
|
|
return (int) len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Transcode signature from PSA format to ASN.1 sequence.
|
|
* See ecdsa_signature_to_asn1 in ecdsa.c, but with byte buffers instead of
|
|
* MPIs, and in-place.
|
|
*
|
|
* [in/out] sig: the signature pre- and post-transcoding
|
|
* [in/out] sig_len: signature length pre- and post-transcoding
|
|
* [int] buf_len: the available size the in/out buffer
|
|
*/
|
|
static int pk_ecdsa_sig_asn1_from_psa(unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len,
|
|
size_t buf_len)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
|
|
size_t len = 0;
|
|
const size_t rs_len = *sig_len / 2;
|
|
unsigned char *p = sig + buf_len;
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, asn1_write_mpibuf(&p, sig + rs_len, rs_len));
|
|
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, asn1_write_mpibuf(&p, sig, rs_len));
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&p, sig, len));
|
|
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&p, sig,
|
|
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
|
|
MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE));
|
|
|
|
memmove(sig, p, len);
|
|
*sig_len = len;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */
|
|
|
|
static int pk_opaque_sign_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
|
|
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
|
|
unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len,
|
|
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng)
|
|
{
|
|
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
|
|
((void) ctx);
|
|
((void) md_alg);
|
|
((void) hash);
|
|
((void) hash_len);
|
|
((void) sig);
|
|
((void) sig_len);
|
|
((void) f_rng);
|
|
((void) p_rng);
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
|
|
#else /* !MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */
|
|
const psa_key_id_t *key = (const psa_key_id_t *) ctx;
|
|
psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
|
|
psa_algorithm_t alg = PSA_ALG_ECDSA(mbedtls_psa_translate_md(md_alg));
|
|
size_t buf_len;
|
|
psa_status_t status;
|
|
|
|
/* PSA has its own RNG */
|
|
(void) f_rng;
|
|
(void) p_rng;
|
|
|
|
/* PSA needs an output buffer of known size, but our API doesn't provide
|
|
* that information. Assume that the buffer is large enough for a
|
|
* maximal-length signature with that key (otherwise the application is
|
|
* buggy anyway). */
|
|
status = psa_get_key_attributes(*key, &attributes);
|
|
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
|
|
return mbedtls_psa_err_translate_pk(status);
|
|
}
|
|
buf_len = MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_SIG_LEN(psa_get_key_bits(&attributes));
|
|
psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes);
|
|
if (buf_len > MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE) {
|
|
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* make the signature */
|
|
status = psa_sign_hash(*key, alg, hash, hash_len,
|
|
sig, buf_len, sig_len);
|
|
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
|
|
return mbedtls_psa_err_translate_pk(status);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* transcode it to ASN.1 sequence */
|
|
return pk_ecdsa_sig_asn1_from_psa(sig, sig_len, buf_len);
|
|
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_pk_opaque_info = {
|
|
MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE,
|
|
"Opaque",
|
|
pk_opaque_get_bitlen,
|
|
pk_opaque_can_do,
|
|
NULL, /* verify - will be done later */
|
|
pk_opaque_sign_wrap,
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
|
|
NULL, /* restartable verify - not relevant */
|
|
NULL, /* restartable sign - not relevant */
|
|
#endif
|
|
NULL, /* decrypt - will be done later */
|
|
NULL, /* encrypt - will be done later */
|
|
NULL, /* check_pair - could be done later or left NULL */
|
|
pk_opaque_alloc_wrap,
|
|
pk_opaque_free_wrap,
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
|
|
NULL, /* restart alloc - not relevant */
|
|
NULL, /* restart free - not relevant */
|
|
#endif
|
|
NULL, /* debug - could be done later, or even left NULL */
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
|
|
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C */
|